



THE EFFICACY OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS:

THE CASE OF UNFICYP



Doç. Dr. Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ*

Öz

Bu makalenin amacı, Kıbrıs'taki Birleşmiş Milletler Barış Gücü (UNFICYP) örneği temelinde, ülke içi çatışmalarda Birleşmiş Milletler Barış güçlerinin etkinliğini güçlü ve zayıf yönleri itibariyle değerlendirmektir. Çalışmada, ülke içi çatışmaların kontrol altına alınmaları ve çözümleri sürecinde barış güçlerinin büyük katkılarının olduğu, ancak söz konusu güçlerin personel temini, finansman güçlükleri, eğitim ve dil problemleri ile barış operasyonların başarısını sınırlayan yapısal engeller gibi ciddi sorunlarla da karşı karşıya buldukları ifade edilmektedir. Çalışma, Birleşmiş Milletler barış güçlerinin uluslararası barış ve güvenliği sağlama bağlamında daha etkin olabilmeleri için daha fazla uluslararası işbirliği gereğine dikkat çekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler Barış Gücü, Barış Operasyonları, Birleşmiş Milletler, Ülke İçi Çatışmalar, Uyuşmazlık Çözümü.

DÂHİLİ ÇATIŞMALARDA BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER BARIŞ GÜÇLERİNİN ETKİNLİĞİ: KIBRIS BARIŞ GÜCÜ ÖRNEĞİ

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to evaluate United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in situations of internal conflicts in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, based on the evaluation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP. It is addressed that in managing and resolving internal conflicts, UN peacekeeping has undeniable utilities; but on the other hand, peacekeeping forces suffer some fundamental weaknesses, including, recruitment of qualified personnel, finance, training and language problems, as well as structural constraints on peace operations. The study draws attention to the need for further international cooperation to make UN peacekeeping a more efficient tool of international peace and security.

Keywords: UN Peacekeeping, Peace Operations, United Nations, Internal Conflicts, Conflict Resolution.

* Balıkesir Üniversitesi, Bandırma İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü,
muzaffer_ercan@yahoo.com



INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Second World War, the world has witnessed a rapid decline in traditional interstate conflicts, and a comparable rise in internal ones. In fact, one of the few clear aspects of the post-Cold War world is the prevalence of strife within countries or between those just made independent. Many of the recent examples include conflicts in Kosovo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Haiti, and Sudan. This trend appears to be holding as well.

When internal conflicts occur, at first, it would be natural to assume that the parties should settle their own conflict, since this is their concern, their problem. But most of the time, because of uncontrolled escalation, as well as the psychological components of conflict (e.g., the tension of hostility, the lack of trust, the mutual suspicion, the impulse to secrecy, the biased communication, and so on), conflicting parties are the least equipped to stop fighting and design a solution by themselves. Thus, third-party intervention often becomes a necessity in the process of conflict resolution and peacemaking.

The term “third-party intervention” conveys a different range of methods, whereby a variety of external parties (e.g., regional or major powers, the United Nations (UN), and non-governmental organizations) may become involved in attempts to cope with a given conflict. This article focuses on one of the most visible forms of third-party intervention in violent internal conflicts: the UN peacekeeping. Among third-parties, the UN has a special place due to its grand mission of being the grand guardian of international peace and security. Thus, parties in conflict oftentimes expect more from the UN than any other third-party that may have an incentive to exploit their issue. But the question in this regard is: how effective is the UN in dealing with violent internal conflicts that have replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes as the principal sources of current conflicts? The purpose of this study is to find some answers to this critical question by evaluating UN peacekeeping, in terms of both its strengths and weaknesses, through examining the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP. The Cyprus conflict offers a good example, since it is the second longest-lasting conflict in the area of the Middle East after the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and UNFICYP has been on the island since March 1964.

The study will start with a brief overview of UN peacekeeping missions and their evolution over the years. Then the case of UNFICYP will be looked through in detail,



discussing its positive functions and weaknesses in managing the conflict. In this respect, several implications will also be addressed to improve the utility of UN peacekeeping so that it could become a more efficient tool of international peace and security.

AN OVERVIEW OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

The basic definition of UN peacekeeping refers to a UN-led international activity that involves the interposition of military personnel in units between conflicting groups, either to stop violence or to prevent it. The groups to be kept apart would be state agents, paramilitaries, militia, guerrilla groups, or even mobs. What they all share is a desire to use violence against the other side as a way of conducting their conflict.

A broader understanding of UN peacekeeping, as it has evolved after the Cold War, on the other hand, goes far beyond just coping with physical violence. It refers to a multi-national involvement in conflict settings organized by the UN to create conditions for sustainable peace. UN peacekeepers (military officers, civilian police officers, and civilian personnel from many different countries) help to build peace and assist combatants to reach a mutually acceptable solution, or monitor the peace agreement if already signed. Such assistance manifests itself in many forms, including – but not limited to – confidence building measures, power-sharing agreements, electoral support, as well as economic and social development (Serafino, 2005; Howard, 2008).

Up to the present time, there have been 64 peacekeeping operations and 16 of them are still on duty.¹ But ironically, the term peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter. Indeed, the precise charter basis for many UN peacekeeping operations has remained ambiguous for decades. Peacekeeping evolved as a pragmatic solution in the early years of the organization when it became apparent that some of the Charter provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security could not be implemented as envisaged. In this respect, peacekeeping was often referred to as a “Chapter 6-and-a-half” activity, meaning that it fell somewhere between Chapter 6 (on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter 7 (on Action with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression).

Until the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, there were only 13 UN peacekeeping operations, most of which concerned conflicts that had arisen after European

¹ Source: <http://www.un.org.peace> (31.08.2010).



de-colonization. Many other issues, particularly East-West conflicts, on the other hand, were dealt with outside the UN due to the lack of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union (Yılmaz, 2005: 15-16).

As they evolved from the 1950s to the 1980s, the traditional tasks of UN peacekeeping operations included interposing between conflicting parties and monitoring cease-fires. These tasks were usually carried out on the ground of three key principles: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force.

The principle of non-use of force was especially central to UN peacekeeping for many years. In fact, more than half the UN peacekeeping operations before 1988 had consisted only of unarmed military observers and not counting situational exceptions, force was used only in cases of self-defense (Yılmaz, 2005: 16). But non-use of force, at times, made peacekeeping forces ineffective as well. For example, on Cyprus in 1974 and in Lebanon in 1982, the presence of UN peacekeeping could not prevent the breakdown of order and subsequent foreign interventions. Nevertheless, the achievements of UN peacekeeping forces between 1948-1988 were modestly successful, overall. They included effective freezing of many international conflicts, some reduction of competitive interventions by neighboring or major powers, and the isolation of local conflicts from the Cold-War's ideological struggle (Sitkowski, 2006).

Since mid-1988, there has been a great expansion in the number of peacekeeping forces. While from 1948 to 1978, only a total of 13 peacekeeping forces were set up, and in the following ten-year period, no new forces were established, from May 1988 to October 1993, a further twenty forces were created. As of August 31, 2010, the number of UN peacekeeping operations has reached 64, 16 of which are still operating in the field, involving 123,939 military personnel and civilian police.²

A main reason for this expansion has been the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on action in security crises after the end of the Cold War. The decreasing ideological clashes between the United States and Soviet Union manifested itself most clearly in the decline of the veto at the Security Council. More specifically, from 1945 to 1990, the permanent members of the Security Council cast the following number of vetoes: China,3; France, 18; United Kingdom, 30; US, 69; and the Soviet Union, 114. Then between June 1990



and May 1993, there was no single veto. One exception occurred in May 1993 when Russia blocked a resolution on financing the peacekeeping force on Cyprus (Yılmaz, 2005: 17). With this exception, the post-Cold War capacity of the Security Council to reach agreement has survived and constituted a key reason for the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations.

A further reason for the expansion of peacekeeping operations is also linked with the end of the Cold War in that the post-Cold War era has generally demanded an increasing need for international peacekeeping forces. For example, in the early 1990s, the collapse of two federal communist states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, produced many ethnic conflicts (i.e., in Bosnia and Georgia) that called for active UN interventions. Also, a series of peace agreements on Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and Cambodia called for impartial international forces to assist in implementing cease-fires, troop withdrawals, and elections. Since the late 1990s, local conflicts in Kosovo, Sierre Leone, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Haiti, Brundi, Sudan, and elsewhere required peacekeeping operations as well, either to stop immediate violence or to monitor and help the following peace process (Yılmaz, 2007).

In addition to the numerical increase in peacekeeping forces, since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have also involved a great number of activities that have been either totally new or implemented on a much larger scale than before, such as monitoring and even running local elections, protecting certain areas as “safe areas” from adversary attacks, guarding the weapons surrendered by or taken from the parties in conflict, ensuring the smooth delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and assisting in the reconstruction of state functions (Richard, 2009).

THE CASE OF UNFICYP

Before talking specifically about the case of UNFICYP, it may be useful to start with a little background information about the Cyprus conflict to make our evaluation contextually more meaningful.

The Mediterranean island of Cyprus, also known as the birthplace of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, ironically turned into a battle ground between the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups for decades. The roots of the conflict go back to 1571 when mainly Greek-speaking Cyprus was captured by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans brought in large number of

² Source: <http://www.un.org.peace/bnote010101.pdf> (31.08.2010).



settlers from across the Empire to form a Turkish element in the local population. By the end of the seventeenth century, approximately 30,000 Turks settled on Cyprus, and a sizable Turkish community was formed, eventually composing about 18 percent of the total population.

In the beginning of togetherness, there was no sign of overt troubled relations, but differences over ethnic origin, religion, language,³ and customs inevitably led to a very low level of communal interaction. Both communities preferred to live in separate quarters in towns and mixed villages, and most villages were either completely Greek or completely Turkish. Also, each community set up its own system of education conducted in its own language. Cypriot children attended these separate schools where they were socialized as members of different groups.

The political system in the Ottoman Empire also encouraged this tendency toward separation. Under the *millet* system, the Greek and Turkish communities were institutionalized as distinct *cemaats* (communities), electing their own judicial and administrative officials, such as *muhtars* (village headmen). This exclusive political socialization over a long period of time contributed to the crystallization of separate ethnic identities and aspirations (Necatigil, 1982: 1).

But such separation was mainly reinforced by the traditional tendency of both communities to identify themselves with the larger Greek and Turkish nations. This meant that the two communities' perceptions of each other, and their relations with one another, were greatly influenced by the historically adversarial relations between the Greek and Turkish nations. Although not all disputes between the motherland Greeks and Turks were replicated in inter-communal conflict on Cyprus, they, nevertheless, had the impact of perpetuating separate self-views and inhibiting any disposition to Cypriot national identity (Michael, Kappler, and Gavriel, 2009).

In 1878, Britain took administrative control of the island in return for supporting the Ottoman Empire against Russian threats to Turkey's eastern provinces. By the end of the century, some Greek Cypriot elite began to ask that the island be united with the Kingdom of Greece, which gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829. However, viewing no

³ Most Greek Cypriots are members of the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, whereas most Turkish Cypriots are adherents of Sunni Islam. The Greek Cypriots speak Greek. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, speak Turkish.



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reason to relinquish the territory and arguing that Cyprus was formally still a part of the Ottoman Empire, Britain refused the request. A reason to relinquish Cyprus arose in December 1912 and it was pursued until the island, which had been annexed upon the Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, was offered to Greece in October 1915. Yet the Greek King rejected the offer (Varnava, 2009).

After the war, with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the new Turkish Republic formally gave up its right on Cyprus in favor of Britain. Two years later, in 1925, Britain formally declared sovereignty over the island, which became a crown colony. Greek Cypriot elite increased calls for the island to be united with Greece. In 1931, there were violent riots against the British authorities, in large part driven by pro-*enosis* Greek nationalism. This led to the introduction of new laws preventing further political agitation. But this did not end hopes for union. Instead the movement went underground (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 15).

In the mid-1950s, terrorism prevailed on Cyprus as an underground guerrilla organization, with the acronym EOKA (*Ethnici Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*- National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) started its campaign of violence against the British and Turkish Cypriots. In turn, the Turkish Cypriots moved beyond their traditional desire to see continued British rule over the island and instead started to call for partition between Greece and Turkey, namely *taksim*. They argued that since Cyprus was made up of two national groups, each with its distinct language, religion, and national identification, the Turkish community was entitled to exercise the right to self-determination as much as the Greek Cypriot community. At the same time, as a reaction to the EOKA activities, they founded their counter underground organization called *Volkan*, which would later be replaced by *TMT* (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*-Turkish Resistance Organization).

The increasing violent clashes between the Cypriot communities were leading to growing tensions between Greece and Turkey, the “motherlands”. This, in turn, raised the possibility of a war in the Eastern Mediterranean between two NATO allies. In December 1958, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, hence, decided that the best course of action would be to give Cyprus independence. The Cypriot leaders were forced to accept this in early 1959, with agreements signed in Zurich and London. On August 16, 1960, the British rule over the island ended and Cyprus became an independent state (Mallinson, 2009: 21-33).



Although the birth of the Republic brought about a temporary halt in inter-communal violence for a while, quarrels over the interpretation of the constitution led to a new tension and in early 1963 and large-scale violence broke out again. Then, the Cypriot state *de facto* collapsed. In 1964, after many violent outbreaks and after the failure of the British, Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot governments to agree on how to end the inter-communal fighting, the matter went to the UN Security Council. The Security Council established UNFICYP through Resolution 186 on 4 March 1964 and has renewed the Mission's mandate for six-month terms since then.

The Evolution of UNFICYP

Attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict and reunify the island have so far been without result, although relations between north and south have improved over the years. Thus, UNFICYP has remained on the island since its first establishment.

UNFICYP evolved through three phases to become the operation as we know today. Phase I, from March 1964 to July 1974, was basically a peace monitoring or peace observing operation. According to Resolution 186, paragraph 5, the mandate of UNFICYP was defined as follows: “the function of the force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”. To implement the mandate, the following specific objectives were identified: to restore freedom of movement on all roads and for all communities within Nicosia and other cities, to progressively disarm all civilians except the regular police gendarmerie and the Cypriot army, and to control extremists on both sides. At the same time, the Council also proposed the establishment of a peacemaking mission, to be conducted under the auspices of a mediator appointed by the UN Secretary General. Within three months, the peacekeeping force became fully operational and had 6,411 personnel made up of troop contingent was allocated a patrol area. While that was generally successful, occasional outbreaks of inter-communal fighting occurred, the most serious example in 1967.⁴ Meanwhile, various efforts to reach a political settlement failed to produce any positive results.

Phase II, from July-September 1974, constituted “peacekeeping by confrontation” since the UN force physically interposed itself between two combatants, and created a buffer

⁴ For details, visit <http://www.unficyp.org> (01.11.2010).



zone that the UN pledged to defend with force if necessary. On July 20, 1974, Turkey militarily intervened northern Cyprus in response to a Greek-sponsored coup on the island five days earlier. By the time a final ceasefire was called the following month, about 36 percent of the island became Turkish-controlled area. This inevitably changed the nature of the peacekeeping. While the basic mandate remained unchanged, and the force continued to receive regular six-monthly extensions from the Security Council, UNFICYP was then tasked with four main duties: maintaining the ceasefire, maintaining the status quo, restoring law and order, and a return to regular conditions (Ker-Lindsay, 2006: 411). At the same time, the sectoral model of peacekeeping gave way to manning and dividing line.

Phase III, from September 1974 to the present, is both “classical peacekeeping” and peacemaking. In spite of reaching an agreement in 1977 to base all future talks on the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state, the two parties could make little progress towards formal reunification in the years to come. Thus, classical peacekeeping basically involved the control and supervision of the buffer zone, maintaining a buffer zone between the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces in the north and the Greek Cypriot forces in the south. The buffer zone extends over 180 kilometers across the island. In the absence of a formal ceasefire agreement, UNFICYP’s 850-plus troops and 60-plus police officers deal with hundreds of incidents each year (Ker-Lindsay, 2006: 412).

UNFICYP also adopted itself to post-Cold War developments in that the peacekeeping mission has begun to involve a great number of activities that have been implemented on a much larger scale than before. These basically included monitoring local elections, guarding the weapons taken from the parties, providing inter-communal gatherings with secure meeting places, as well as safe escorts to and from negotiations. For instance, the Ledra Palace Hotel, located in the UN zone in Nicosia, has been used for inter-communal meetings since 1974. UNFICYP also delivers humanitarian aid to Greek Cypriots and a small Maronite community living in the northern part of the island, assisting Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island as well.

At present, the Mission’s work is based on four components that work together in close relations: the military, UN Police (UNPOL), the Civil Affairs Branch, and



Administration, which supports all activities. The Mission counts almost 1100 personnel. Since 1964, almost 180 UN personnel have lost their lives while serving in UNFICYP.⁵

The Mission is currently headed by Taye Brook Zerion of Ethiopia, who is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission. The current Force Commander is Rear Admiral Mario Sanchez Debernardi of Peru.

The Utilities of UNFICYP

The ending of the Cold War has created a new optimistic view about international relations among many whereby it has become fashionable to speak that force, in the form of military power, has run its course in international politics. By extension, many also attempted to dismiss peacekeeping as a peace strategy (for example, Fleitz, 2002). Such a view tends to see peacekeeping as an attempt to contain violence rather than ending it.

This may sound fine, but too idealistic to fit the realities of the actually turbulent world of the post Cold-War period, dominated by internal struggles. Cyprus is not an exception. UNFICYP has been a necessary element of conflict management on the island for nearly half a century. Whenever the Greek and Turkish communities engaged in mutual violence or armed clashes, especially before the Turkish military intervention of 1974, UNFICYP was there to stop them. In any case, it is beyond doubt that until violence is stopped, or at least managed, it is unlikely that any attempts to resolve competing interests, to change negative attitudes, or to alter socio-economic circumstances giving rise to conflict will be successful. By far, hundreds of civilian and military peacekeepers who have toiled over the past four decades have been successful, in general, in keeping people alive and in preventing conflict escalation on Cyprus.

Likewise, in the absence of UNFICYP, any Greek or Turkish group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative may find it easier to provoke armed clashes with the other side, since there is no impartial buffer between the sides which can act as a restraining influence. The absence of a suitable control mechanism may enable even a small group of people committed to violence to wreak enormous havoc, whereas the presence of an impartial third force can be an important factor for stability. Historically, UNFICYP has been acceptable to both Greek and Turkish communities as a third-party in a way that a purely national or even regional military presence would not be. This is mainly because of the fact that the UN, as the

⁵ http://www.unficy.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=778&tt=graphic&lang=11 (20.10.2010).



supposed guardian of international peace and security, has no particular stake in an outcome apart from a satisfactory reduction in violence. It is therefore less likely than nation-states, or even regional organizations, to exploit the conflict on Cyprus for its own ends.

Especially, the second half of the 1990s saw a marked rise in tensions in the eastern Mediterranean that reinforced the need for UNFICYP. In 1993, Greece and Cyprus concluded a joint defense pact, raising the possibility of an arms race (Demetriou, 1998). Also, in August 1996, inter-communal clashes erupted as several demonstrations turned violent. The presence of UNFICYP made it possible to alleviate tension and was helpful in preventing further sabotages as such.

In addition to dealing with physical violence, UNFICYP has been functional in peacemaking by providing international assistance. As addressed earlier, after the 1974 events, UNFICYP operations expanded to include monitoring elections, providing inter-communal gatherings with secure meeting places, assisting the smooth delivery of humanitarian assistance during conflict situations, and so on. Thus, over time, UNFICYP came to involve more and more non-military elements to ensure stability and sustainability (Ker-Lindsay, 2005). This trend gained further momentum after the establishment of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1992 whose aim was declared to support increasing demand for complex peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era.

The Challenges and Weaknesses of UNFICYP

While there cannot be any objection, in principle, to expanding tasks, UNFICYP has suffered some serious weaknesses as well, summarized as follows:

First of all, it seems that there is a growing disparity between the personnel capacity of UNFICYP and demands of peace on Cyprus. Since UNFICYP is the longest-running UN peacekeeping mission, there has been a growing sense of international frustration for its presence. Particularly, after the end of the Cold War, many countries began to openly blame Cypriot leaders, more often Rauf Denktash, former Turkish Cypriot leader, for not being constructive enough for the resolution. In 1992, Denmark withdrew its battalion, and Britain, Canada and Australia all reduced the size of their contributions, reducing the size of UNFICYP by 28 percent. In response, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar suggested restructuring to create three sections with contingents of 350 personnel, the minimum size felt required to maintain operational effectiveness.



After the rejection of the Annan Plan in April 2004, to reduce tension on the island, the Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a 30 percent troop reduction, from 1230 to 860 personnel. Also a new operational concept would be established, basically involving savings in personnel, logistics, and administrative tasks (Ker-Lindsay, 2006: 413). Though unhappy with the decision to reduce the size of the force, the Cypriot government accepted the suggestion, arguing that the Secretary General decided that the essential mandated mission of UNFICYP would remain unchanged. The new concept of operations came into existence in February 2005, at which point the overall strength of the mission lay at 825. To overcome the gaps that might be created by the reduction in numbers, the number of patrols rose significantly; from 50 a day in February to about 200 in the following months.

Currently, the mission counts approximately 1,100 personnel. This number is unlikely to deter any large-scale Greek or Turkish aggression, especially given the fact that UNFICYP could not prevent the Turkish military intervention in 1974 and from that time on, there have been over 30,000 Turkish troops stationed on the island.

As for the issue of personnel recruitment, the UN Charter stipulates that to assist in maintaining peace and security around the world, all member states of the UN should make available to the Security Council necessary armed forces and facilities. Since the first peacekeeping operation in 1948, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, about 130 nations have contributed military and civilian police personnel to peace operations. While detailed records of all personnel who have served in peacekeeping missions are not available, it is estimated that up to one million soldiers, police officers and civilians have served under the UN flag in the last years.⁶

Despite the large number of contributions, one of the main problems still remained unresolved is that several of the world's most capable militaries, including the United States and British military, are heavily committed in a long-term struggle of defeating terrorism, thereby focusing on certain countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and so on. Their priority is not to be the world police but defending their people and national interests against terrorist actions, in particular, and revisionist movements, in general.

Further, since Clinton administration, the United States has had a tendency to consider UN peacekeeping operations as an “extra burden”, thus becoming extremely selective in

⁶ Source: <http://www.un.org.peace> (01.11.2010).



participating in them. In fact, on May 5, 1994, the Clinton administration's long-planned Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on "multilateral peace operations" was unveiled. The directive had been foreshadowed in (former) President Clinton's speech at the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993, in which he had warned against the UN's reach exceeding its grasp and had suggested some conditions for United States participation in new peacekeeping missions. The general approach of PDD-25 was to view peacekeeping as a scarce resource. It strongly affirmed that the United States involvement in peacekeeping had to be selective. Before there could be United States support for multilateral peace operations, said the report, the following factors had to be considered: the possibilities of advancing United States interests; the existence of a clear threat to international peace and security; clear objectives; the means to accomplish the mission; consideration of the consequences of inaction; realistic criteria for ending the operation; and, the consent of the parties to the conflict, as well as a cease-fire.⁷

Obviously, these conditions are rarely met in real-world conflict settings. Besides, the interpretation of the United States has been subjective and selective in accordance with her immediate interests. Accordingly, because of both PDD-25 and the priority of struggle against terrorism, the United States has been reluctant to participate in multinational peacekeeping operation up to the present time. As a matter of fact, currently, only one percent of the troops and civilian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions come from the United States (UN Monthly Summary, 2010).

On the other hand, the contributions of other major powers, too, are rather limited. For example, the Russian participating in peacekeeping personnel today is a little more than one percent, while about ten percent come from the European Union. China's contribution is approximately six percent, and Japan does not provide any personnel at all (UN Monthly Summary, 2010). So the little and reluctant support of great powers make mostly militarily less powerful nations as main contributors of peacekeeping personnel. In fact, as of November 2010, the main troop-contributing countries of UNFICYP include Argentina, Austria, Canada, Hungary, Peru, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom.⁸

⁷ For full text of the PDD-25, see *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, (May, 1994), Washington, DC: US Department of US Publication 10161.

⁸ Source: <http://www.un.org.peace> (01.11.2010).



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In addition to the personnel issue, the budgeting of UNFICYP constitutes another problematic area. Originally, UNFICYP was supported entirely by voluntary contributions. This resulted in a serious shortfall, however. Persistent shortfalls in contributions meant that up to the end of June 1993, UNFICYP was \$200 million in deficit (Ker-Lindsay, 2006: 410). Also, the chronic nature of the conflict made most UN members rather reluctant to support UNFICYP. For example, Russia blocked a resolution on financing UNFICYP at the Security Council in May 1993.

This prompted the Security Council to recommend that the costs of UNFICYP not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the organization to be borne by member states in accordance with Article 17 of the UN Charter. This was accepted by the UN General Assembly in the fall, with the resolution 47/236.

However, since then, member states have been reluctant to pay. Currently, one-third of UNFICYP's budget is financed by the Government of Cyprus, while the Government of Greece contributes \$6.5 million annually. Specifically, the approved UNFICYP budget for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 amounts to \$54.41 million. This amount is complemented by \$18,074,373 and \$6.5 million from the governments of Cyprus and Greece, respectively.⁹ But the rest of the payment, and thus budget deficit, is continuing to be a problem.

To overcome the financial crisis that the UN has faced, many alternative financing sources have been proposed. These mainly include instituting a global tax on currency transactions, environmental taxes, and taxes on international transportation and arms trade (Yılmaz, 2009: 39). Yet major powers, in general, and the United States, in particular, are even reluctant to reform the system, fearing that they would lose political leverage.

There are other issues with respect to the financial problem. For example, the system of apportioning peacekeeping expenses among UN member states has upset various major powers. The United States has long been expected to bear over thirty percent of the costs of the UN peacekeeping operations and wants that figure reduced to twenty-five percent.¹⁰ By contrast, over 150 states are apportioned for peacekeeping at either one-tenth or one-fifth of their regular UN dues, a situation that clearly requires some modification. An additional problem is that dues for each peacekeeping operation are collected separately, so each

⁹ For further information, visit http://www.unficy.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1594&tt=graphic&lang=11 (09.11.2010).



member state receives a large number of bills in any given year, most of the time for operations in which it may feel it has little at stake. As a result, the question of apportionment and effective payment of peacekeeping dues remains a big problem. For UN operations to be effective, this problem calls for an urgent and realistic solutions

Another problematic area with respect to UNFICYP is training and language. Troops, civilian police and other personnel have been, and still are, of extraordinarily uneven quality. In spite of the UN's urgent need for such personnel, there must be higher standards that UN personnel are required to meet before they can be dispatched on a peacekeeping operation (Yılmaz, 2009: 40).

As for language, UNFICYP personnel are often crippled by two kinds of language problems. First, different contingents in the same unit may have a difficulty in communicating with one another. Second, the contingents may not be able to communicate effectively with the local population. This could be particularly crippling when there is a need for intelligence, policing, and administration (Yılmaz, 2009: 40).

A final shortcoming of UNFICYP is that this mission, like other peacekeeping operations, requires a consensus among permanent members of the Security Council. It was addressed above how peacekeeping was paralyzed by the veto power during the Cold War era. The end of the Cold War has resulted in a spirit of cooperation and excluded largely the former ideological clashes between the United States and Russia. Yet no one can guarantee that this trend will continue. The fact that the future of UN peacekeeping will depend on major-power cooperation is a frightening reality and inevitably gives rise to serious doubts with respect to the prospects of peace missions. Further, the fact that the Cyprus conflict has remained unresolved for nearly half a century may lead some members of the Security Council to withdraw their support with respect to UNFICYP. The chronic nature of the conflict has been giving rise to increasing international frustration and it is uncertain how far this will go on.

CONCLUSION

As the above discussions and evaluation of the case of UNFICYP suggest, in managing and resolving internal conflicts, UN peacekeeping has many positive functions that cannot be denied. First of all, UN peacekeeping can prevent physical violence and conflict

¹⁰ In fact, on April 6, 2005, the United States Senate voted to decrease United States' contributions to UN



escalation. Without controlling immediate violence and introducing a cooling-off period, it is not likely to initiate a peace process in any conflict. Further, peacekeeping forces can encourage negotiations between conflicting parties by providing secure meeting places, also working as mediators or intermediaries in the process. What is more, UN peacekeeping can open doors which might otherwise remain closed to efforts in peacemaking and peace building, to secure lasting peace.

But on the other hand, the problems UN peacekeeping faces today confirm that a general and uniform global system of peacekeeping is still not imminent. UN peacekeeping is patchy, *ad hoc*, and contingent upon the interests and cooperation of major states. Moreover, peacekeeping forces seriously suffer, as addressed above, personnel, finance, training, and language problems. Yet in situations of internal conflicts, intervention in the affairs of others is a critical business. It is not an arena for mere posturing or for being seen as “doing something”. It must be attempted with the best, most committed, and perseverant personnel and pursued with a relentless intensity. Hence, further international cooperation is certainly needed if UN peacekeeping is to be strengthened to be the genuine protector of international peace and security.

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