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# The Modal Adverbs *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle* in the Context of Directives and Deontic Modality in Turkish<sup>1</sup> (Yönlendirme Sözeylemi ve Yükümlülük Kipliği Bağlamında *mutlaka* ve *kesinlikle* Kiplik Belirteçleri)

Associate Professor Şükriye RUHİ  
Middle East Technical University  
Faculty of Education

**Abstract:** *The study of deontic modality has largely concentrated on the semantics of linguistic forms with little systematic discussion of its connection to pragmatics. This paper aims to sketch a deictic model for describing linguistic form in deontic modality for the purpose of linking linguistic forms to pragmatic usage within a politeness-theoretic perspective. The model is based on the idea that deontic modality may distinguish between deictic centres consisting of the speaker and the 'other.' The model is illustrated in the context of two modal adverbs in Turkish directives, namely 'mutlaka' and 'kesinlikle'. This study examines the adverbs particularly in the expression of prohibition and denial of permission and claims that the differential use of the adverbs may be explained with reference to politeness strategies such that an obligation in Turkish can involve a positive politeness strategy, while a strong prohibition calls for a negative politeness strategy. As such, a positive directive in Turkish can claim common ground by relying on circumstantial support to intensify its meaning (e.g., 'Bunu mutlaka yap'), but a prohibition (e.g., 'Bunu yapma') is a stronger face-threatening act. Prohibition requires an intensification marker that reflects the attitude/judgment of the speaker or others, hence, the grammaticality of 'kesinlikle'.*

**Key words:** modal adverbs, deontic modality, directives, politeness theory

**Öz:** Yükümlülük kipliği genellikle anlambilimsel özellikleri bağlamında incelenmiş ve edimbilimsel kullanımla ilgili bağlantısı sistematik bir biçimde kurulmamıştır. Bu yazıda dilsel görünümler ile edimbilimsel kullanımı incelik kuramı çerçevesinde ilişkilendirmek amacıyla yükümlülük kipliği için bir gösterimsel model sunulmakta ve yükümlülük kipliğinin konuşucudan ve 'diğer'den (İng. other) olmak üzere iki ayrı gösterimsel merkezi olabileceği ileri sürülmektedir. Model yönlendirme sözeyleminde 'mutlaka' ile 'kesinlikle' kiplik belirteçleri incelenerek açıklanmaktadır. Çalışmada iki belirtecin kullanımı özellikle yasaklama ve izin vermeme sözeylemlerinde incelenmiş ve Türkçede yükümlülüğün ifadesinin pozitif incelik stratejileri, kesin yasaklamanın ise negatif incelik stratejileri içerebileceği öne sürülmüştür. Türkçede yükümlülüğün güçlendirilmesi (örneğin, 'Bunu mutlaka yap') ortak yargı, bilgi, vb. kaynaklara dayandırılabilirken, yasaklama (örneğin, 'Bunu yapma') daha yüz kızartıcı bir sözeylem (İng. face-threatening act) olarak görünmektedir. Bu nedenle yasaklama konuşucunun tutum ya da yargılarını ifade eden 'kesinlikle' belirteci ile güçlendirilmektedir.

**Anahtar sözcükler:** kiplik belirteçleri, yükümlülük kipliği, yönlendirme sözeylemi, incelik kuramı.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The study of deontic modality has largely concentrated on the semantics of linguistic forms with little systematic investigation of its connection to pragmatic usage. The relevance of pragmatic factors to the interpretation of linguistic form has been pointed out in some studies (see, for example, Kocaman 1988); however, the interrelation between linguistic form and pragmatic usage has largely been handled in an ad hoc manner with conflicting results obtained in cross-linguistic research on issues of appropriateness in style (see, Wierzbicka 1985 and Spencer-Oatey 2000 for similar comments). The main reason for the present state of the art in pragmatics is that linguistic analyses in pragmatics, especially those carried out with a politeness-theoretic perspective as developed by Brown and Levinson (1987) have assumed universal strategies of interpretation for linguistic forms. However, data on different languages show that there is no necessary strict correlation between linguistic form and interpretation in context (Wierzbicka, 1991). Given the present state of research, one approach to resolve this problem is to disentangle the semantics of linguistic form from issues relating to pragmatics.

This paper aims to sketch a deictic model for describing linguistic form in deontic modality for the purpose of linking linguistic forms to pragmatic usage within a politeness-theoretic perspective. The model is based on the idea that deontic modality may distinguish between deictic centres consisting of the speaker and the 'other.' The model is illustrated in the context of two modal adverbs in Turkish directives, namely *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle*. The study examines the adverbs particularly in the expression of prohibition and denial of permission and claims that the differential use of the adverbs may be explained with reference to politeness strategies such that an obligation in Turkish can involve a positive politeness strategy, while a strong prohibition calls for a negative politeness strategy. As such a positive directive in Turkish can claim common ground by relying on circumstantial support to intensify its meaning (e.g., *Bunu mutlaka yap* – lit., 'do this definitely', 'You must absolutely do this/Do do this'), but a prohibition (e.g., *Bunu yapma* – 'Don't do this') is a stronger face-threatening act. Prohibition requires an intensification marker that reflects the attitude/judgement of the speaker or others, hence, the grammaticality of *kesinlikle*.

Sections 2 and 3 in the paper discuss the semantics of negation and theoretical orientations in deontic modality, and propose a framework for studying deontic modality based on Frawley's (1992) model of deictic centres in modality. Section 4 examines the distribution of the modal adverbs and compares the various expressions of prohibition and denial of permission in terms of politeness strategies. The conclusion draws attention to the insights to be gained from studying linguistic form and politeness strategies independently to arrive at a better understanding of the two inter-related systems.

## 2. NEGATION IN DEONTIC MODALITY

In Ruhi et al (1997), the usage of the modal adverbs *mutlaka*, *kesinlikle*, *herhalde*, *galiba*, and *belki* with tense, aspect, modality markers (henceforth, TAM markers) was studied in the domain of epistemic modality. It was noted that *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle* function differentially, the former being inferential and the latter indicating confidence, hence a marker of subjectivity (1b and c below):

- 1 a Bunu yapabilirsin  
This-acc do-abil-2. p sing  
'You can do this'
- b \*Bunu mutlaka yapabilirsin  
This-acc definitely do-abil-aor-2. p sing
- c Bunu kesinlikle yapabilirsin  
This-acc definitely do-abil-aor-2. p sing  
'You certainly can do this'

In its deontic reading, (1a) is deontic possibility, namely, permission. The permission, though, is expressed through a marker of ability and willingness – which involves an assessment of the addressee's capabilities and attitude <sup>2</sup>. In other words, the utterance is formulated from the point of view of the addressee. In such cases we observe that *kesinlikle* appears as the appropriate marker to strengthen the propositional content. The adverb, then, is a marker of the speaker's subjective evaluation of the propositional content. On the other hand, *mutlaka* is appropriate for strengthening propositions deriving from forces in the sociophysical world and does not necessarily relate to what may be the speaker's evaluation of a situation. Hence, it is in conflict with subjective evaluation. Summarising Sweetser's view, Frawley (1992: 427) explains that

[w]hen a barrier and force are in the sociophysical world, we get root modality, with notions of obligatory and permitted action and ability to execute actions. But when barrier and force are in the notional/informational world, we get epistemic modality, as in the case of strong epistemic judgment, for example, which expresses an inference about the likelihood that an event will 'move' across the barrier into realisation: that is, achieve abstract factual status. Here we get cognitive force and dynamics.

Sweetser argues there is a similarity in surface forms in modality (in this case, the verbal markers) because they have the same semantic content, but apply to different domains.

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<sup>2</sup> Kerslake (1996: 91) notes that the combination of the ability marker and the aorist is ambiguous and has three modal readings: deontic, dynamic, and epistemic. Since this three-way distinction does not affect the main argument in the paper, only deontic and epistemic modality will be considered.

In this study permission is subsumed under the category of directive speech acts since the direction of fit for the act is "world-to-word" as in requests and commands (Searle, 1976: 4). However, the difference with commands and requests is that it is frequently uttered as a second turn in the adjacency pair.

Thus, Ruhi et al (1997) argued that *mutlaka* is basically deontic, with its epistemic necessity meaning emerging as a metaphorical extension of deontic necessity deriving from sociophysical circumstances.

In Turkish, *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle* emerge in different forms of sentences. While it is possible to intensify an imperative or an obligation with *mutlaka* (2a and 2b below), a negative imperative and obligation (in Palmer's (1995) terms 'necessary not') or denial of permission ('not possible') is qualified with *kesinlikle* (3c i and 3d below). There is also a difference in word order variation. The former adverb can occupy the post-predicate position, a position that allows for the presence of markers related to the interpersonal function of language (Zimmer 1986; Ruhi 1994). However, *kesinlikle* is ungrammatical in this position (3c.ii below).

- 2 a i Ben-i mutlaka ara  
I-acc definitely call-Ø  
'Do call me'
- ii Ben-i ara mutlaka / Ara ben-i mutlaka  
I-acc call definitely/ Call I-acc definitely
- b Ben-i mutlaka ara-malı-sın  
I-acc definitely call-nec-2.p sing  
'You must definitely call me'
- c \*Beni mutlaka ara-ma  
I-acc definitely call-neg-Ø
- d \*Bun-u mutlaka yap-a-ma-z-sın  
*This-acc definitely do-abil-neg-aor-2.p sing*
- 3 a i ? Ben-i kesinlikle ara  
I-acc certainly call-Ø
- b Ben-i kesinlikle ara-malı-sın  
I-acc certainly call-nec-2.p sing  
'You must definitely not call me'
- c i Ben-i kesinlikle ara-ma  
I-acc definitely call-neg-Ø  
'Do not call me on any account'
- ii \*Ben-i ara-ma kesinlikle<sup>3</sup>  
*I-acc call-neg-Ø definitely*

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<sup>3</sup> In epistemic modality, *kesinlikle* can move to the post-predicate position as in 'Eve gitmiştir kesinlikle' (He/she definitely must have gone home) to mark the strength of the speaker's assertion; however this does not seem to be possible in deontic utterances.

- d            Bun-u    kesinlikle yap-a-ma-z-sın  
                  This-acc definitely do-abil-neg-aor-2.p sing  
                  ‘*On no account may you do this*’

(Utterances 2b and 3b, where grammaticality differences between the two adverbs are erased will be taken up for discussion in later sections within the context of speaker/hearer orientations). If, as Sweetser argues, root modality and epistemic modality have the same semantic content one would not expect such differences to occur. But, as Palmer (1986: 96) points out, if epistemic and deontic modalities have the same semantic content and a single semantic analysis is possible, negatives would not be expected to behave differently and require suppletive forms in some languages.

Describing the modal meanings of necessity and possibility in six semantic formulas, Palmer (1995: 456-7) notes that while the negation of deontic necessity (necessary-not) in English is expressed with *must not*, the epistemic necessity meaning cannot be expressed through the negation of *must*. It requires the use of *can* to indicate strong possibility. I quote the complete semantic paradigm developed by Palmer (1995) in (4):

4	<i>Deontic</i>	<i>Epistemic</i>
<i>possible</i>	You may/can leave	He may be in school
<i>not-possible</i>	You may not/can't leave	He can't be in school
<i>possible not</i>	You needn't leave	He may not be in school
<i>necessary</i>	You must leave	He must/should be in school
<i>not-necessary</i>	You needn't leave	He may not be in school
<i>necessary-not</i>	You mustn't leave	*He mustn't be in school/He can't be in school

Palmer (1995:466-7) further draws attention to the forms of necessary-not (i.e., prohibition) in Chinese, German, and Bahasa Malaysia:

- 5    Chinese    ta míŋtjen    bu ko    Sylé  
                  he tomorrow not can/may come  
                  *He mustn't come tomorrow*
- German    Du darfst nicht herein kommen  
                  you can/may not    in.here come  
                  *You mustn't come in*  
                  (nicht müssen: 'not necessary')
- Bahasa    dia    tak boleh masuk  
                  Malaysia he/she not can come.in  
                  *He/she mustn't (can't/may not) come.in*

We may add prohibition in French, too, to this list: 'Vous ne pouvez pas parler' (lit., You cannot sleep). In all three cases noted by Palmer, we see the use of the negation of possibility markers as expressing 'necessary-not'.

Palmer (1995: 470) accounts for the irregularity of necessary-not forms as dependent on two factors:

1. they are very commonly used forms, much more common than not-necessary
2. the scope of the negation is not accurately indicated by the grammar (I don't think he'll come = I think he won't come)

But these factors do not explain why different modal markers should be used in the above languages, in the denial of permission and prohibition.

Quoting from Lyons (1977:824, 793), directives "impose upon someone the obligation to make a proposition true (or refrain from making it true) by bringing about (or refrain from bringing about) in some future world the state-of-affairs that is described by the proposition." In Searle's (1976) definition of illocutionary acts, this means that directives have a "world to words fit" relationship, which makes the propositional content non-factual.

In this sense negation in directives is not negation of the propositional content since such utterances are 'irrealis' in nature. They share with standard metalinguistic negation the expression of speaker attitude to features of the context and the proposition like in the expression 'He didn't speak, he mumbled' (Horn 1985). Frawley (1992: 432) too notes that "the negative particle in prohibition is not descriptive negation ... it does not deny the truth of propositional content." Denial of permission and prohibition are types of metalinguistic negation since they "reject aspects of context" and are, thus, non-truth-conditional. This feature puts such utterances in the contextual domain, not the propositional domain.

As mentioned above, deontic modality is non-factual. Therefore, there should not be a distinction between uttering a *necessary* and *necessary-not* directive, since both are 'irrealis' and express a desirable state in the world. In his discussion of the various forms expressing irrealis in languages, Chafe (1995) marks negation as one such form available in languages. It could be that a prohibition (*necessary-not*) is stronger on the irrealis scale than a positive directive (*necessary*), indicating a stronger subjectivity in meaning due to its encoding of speaker suppositions to a greater extent than is the case in positive directives. This may be one reason why *kesinlikle* is the appropriate modal adverb in negation of necessity or possibility in Turkish. In other words, while a positive directive appeals to the context-of-situation to justify its utterance, a negative directive cannot and requires a modal adverb that encodes subjective meaning. It is probably because of its encoding subjective meaning that *kesinlikle* occurs in the expression of negative directives.

An implication of such an outlook is that deontic modality may distinguish between one that emerges from the 'self' to the 'other' and one that emerges from the 'other' even

though deontic modality is considered to be essentially ‘other’ and ‘goal-oriented’ (cf. Lyons, 1977; Frawley, 1992). Hence, it is intuitively correct to assume that features of the interaction should influence the use of forms in modality. That deontic modality can distinguish between such features of the context underlies the distinction in English, for example, between subjective and objective necessity or between ‘self’ and ‘other’:

- |   |                                      |                               |
|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 6 | You may <i>have</i> to leave earlier | You <i>must</i> leave earlier |
|   | You <i>can</i> smoke                 | You <i>may</i> smoke          |

In Lyons’ (1977) words "have to and can dissociate speaker from obligation and permission." If we re-orient investigation of modality in terms of speaker-hearer relations, it might be possible to arrive at generalisations on how languages codify negation in modality and account for the above-mentioned irregularity in form and meaning. For this purpose, I now turn to related theoretical aspects of the topic.

### 3. THE SPEAKER-HEARER RELATION IN MODALITY

In a study on *néng* (Eng. can) in Mandarin, the use of which is explained as "the semanticization of *challenge*", Guo (1995: 228) draws attention to Givon’s observation on TAM systems "as discourse-pragmatic features" that "play a crucial role ... in indicating their time/truth/certainty/probability modalities vis-à-vis the speaker-hearer contract" (original emphasis). It is argued that

previous approaches [to modality] have failed to recognise the crucial interpersonal function of speaker involvement. Concern has traditionally been with the relationship between speaker and proposition, rather than with that between speaker and addressee, with the proposition serving as a means of actualising the latter relationship.

Within this perspective, the semantics of modality is better sought in the domain of intentionality and the dynamics of the interpersonal use of language.

A scheme proposed by Frawley (1992: 413), which is based on the idea that the semantics of modality can be conceptualised in terms of deixis, is insightful in describing such relationships. Frawley argues that both epistemic and deontic modality can be analysed as instances of deixis. For epistemic modality, he develops a deictic scale in two semantic categories – source of knowledge and strength of knowledge – with the self and others as centres of deixis. Below is the deictic scale developed by Frawley:

#### **Source of knowledge**

*Self*

From

To

#### **Strength of knowledge**

scaled categories of inference

necessary > possible

scaled categories of sensation

visual > auditory > other sense > feel

*Other*

From	scaled categories of external information quote > report > hearsay > other
To	scaled categories of participants other > all else

He argues that a similar type of deictic scheme is applicable to deontic modality, though admittedly, this would be different from that of epistemic modality.

Frawley (1992:421) posits that in deontic modality the reference world is the centre, and that the expressed world is always away from the reference world into some future. He observes that there is remoteness in deontic modality: "The likelihood of the emergence of the expressed world is a function of the connection of the reference world and the expressed world and the speaker's judgment thereof." Such an analysis takes knowledge as the basis for deontic modality. However, it is reasonable to argue that belief and action-theoretic notions are more fundamental in deontic modality. One would expect scales of the expression of the strength of the realisation of the expressed world to emerge as a factor of self and other (individual and all other) power relations and the actualisability of the expressed world within the context-of-situation. This perspective on deontic modality would provide a coherent framework for analysing the modality given the fact that a crucial factor in interpreting deontic utterances is not just the reference world in terms of facts (that is, the world as it is at a given time - 'realis') but speaker-hearer relations in terms of social distance and power relations along with their connection to the desires, wishes, intentions, attitudes, and judgements of the speaker and the addressee. The centres of deixis in deontic modality, then, would also include the self and other. There is remoteness regarding the reference world and the expressed world; however, these are issues independent of the interpersonal relationship and are related to assessment of the actualisation and the degree of realisability of propositions. We observe such features in pre-sequences to requests:

- Senden bir şey isteyebilir miyim?                      *Can I ask something of you?*  
- Ne istediğine bağlı    *It depends on what you want*

That role relationships are crucial in interpretation of utterances is clear from the frequently noted fact that while anyone can utter a command, giving permission is 'allowed' only if the speaker is in a position to give or deny permission (Lyons 1977). The following utterance would be interpreted as a directive to leave and not a permission to leave under appropriate social circumstances such as when uttered by an army officer to a lower rank:

- Çık-abil-ir-siniz    *You may leave*  
go out-abil-aor-2.p pl



Similarly, in English one might say ‘You may leave’ and really mean ‘Please, leave’ or ‘You must leave now.’ Another indication of the importance of the speaker-hearer relation is evident from the fact that, although deontic modality is directed to the future, it is possible for languages to encode a directive with past TAM markers. Turkish, for instance, allows the use of past markers in very polite directives and offers:

- 7 a Otur-ma-z mı -ydı-nız?  
sit-neg-aor Q-past-2.p pl  
*‘Wouldn’t you like to take a seat?’*
- b Şu-na bir bak-ma-z mı -ydı-nız?  
This-dat one look-neg-aor Q-past-2.p pl  
*‘Wouldn’t you take a look at this?’*
- c Şu-nu bir oku-sa-ydı-nız daha fazla yazar-ı suçla-ma-dan.  
This-acc one read-opt-past-2. p pl more writer-acc blame-nom-abl  
*‘You should just read this before continuing to blame the writer’*

Such use of the markers indicates that deixis in deontic modality can mark remoteness of the expressed world as well as distance in speaker-hearer relations. Spanish, too, allows for the imperfective in expressing obligation (Frawley 1992) <sup>4</sup>:

- 8 deb - ias ir  
ought Imperfect,2.p to go  
You were obliged to go, more literally, you oughted to go

Making use of Frawley’s (1992) scales of epistemic modality, I propose the following deictic centres for deontic modality (strength of necessity or possibility, and the self and other). The choice of form would depend on the type of interpersonal relationship and topic of the directive <sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Palmer’s (1986: 100) observation, then, that there are no past tenses in deontic modality may have been an early generalisation since the approach does not take into consideration the pragmatics of modality.

<sup>5</sup> The strength of the scales has not been indicated as they are beyond the scope of this study. I do not discuss degrees of the realizability of the proposition in this paper either, although they are relevant to the scales, but they can be studied through the deictic distance as indicated by tense, aspect and modality markers and lexical expressions.

***Deictic centres in deontic modality*** (adapted from Frawley 1992)

<b><i>Direction</i></b>	<b><i>Source of necessity or possibility</i></b>
<i>From Self</i>	needs, desires, intention, attitudes, judgements
<i>From Other</i>	(addressee, individual/all others, societal norms) needs, desires, intention, attitudes, judgements, abilities, obligation
<i>From Self and Other</i>	needs, desires, intention, attitudes, judgements, abilities, obligation

Unlike deixis in epistemic modality, utterances involving deontic modality are always expressed toward an addressee; therefore, the direction from the deictic centre can only be away from the centre. Following the scales above, for example, the utterance ‘Gelmeni istiyorum’ (I want you to come) would be an utterance stemming from the self’s wishes. On the other hand, child language utterances that one frequently observes in Turkish such as ‘X kızar mı?’ (Would X get angry?) would be indirect requests for permission deriving from attitude of the other. Similarly, a hint like ‘X ne der?’ (What would X say?) in adult speech incorporates other’s judgements, and would be interpretable as an indirect prohibition. That a directive speech act can incorporate intentions and attitudes deriving from the addressee as a coercive force is evident in indirect acts such as hints ‘Bunu yapmayı hep istemişsindir’ (You always wanted to do this). There would be predictable differences in the grading of the scales depending on cultural norms of interpersonal relationship roles (i.e. collectivism vs. individualism, ingroupness conceptions, intimacy degrees, and other such sociolinguistic variables). Thus, for example, the use of first person plural optative forms in directives would be formulated from the self-other perspective as markers of positive politeness in Turkish (e.g., ‘Sırayı bozmayalım beyler’).

### **3.1. Politeness Theory and Directives**

As mentioned in the introduction my reason for proposing the scales above and not directly appealing to Politeness Theory is to track the relation between face phenomena and language specific speech act realisations independently of each other. There is a need for a semantic scheme that would show the relations between the linguistic form chosen and its interaction with speaker and hearer roles in the context of situation.

With these considerations in mind, I now look into the strategies that Brown and Levinson (1987: 65-69) put forward. Brown and Levinson make a distinction between positive and negative politeness strategies in linguistic behaviour:

Positive politeness:

1. claim common ground
2. convey that S(peaker) and H(earer) are corporates

Negative politeness:

1. be conventionally indirect
  - a. don't presume/assume
  - b. don't coerce H
  - c. communicate S's want not to impose in H
  - d. redress other wants of H
2. off record

Directives are face-threatening acts in the theory since they impose restrictions on the need of the individual to act regardless of the demands of the other. In other words, directives threaten the negative face of the addressee. On the other hand, directives are threatening to the face of the speaker, too. First, the fulfilment of the expressed proposition could put the speaker in debt toward the addressee and threaten his/her negative face. Second, a possible refusal of the hearer to comply would threaten the positive face of the speaker since the utterance of a directive implies that the speaker views himself/herself and the addressee as corporates. This suggests that an investigation of the same speech act in positive-face oriented linguistic behaviour would give a different analysis. Positive face demands generating feelings of ingroupness and viewing participants as corporates in interaction. This could mean that a directive may not be regarded as negative face-threatening for the speaker or the addressee, but encode solidarity owing to underlying assumptions such as the existence of common interests and the willingness to cooperate.

Based on the distribution of *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle*, I propose the following strategies: An imperative or statement of obligation in Turkish involves a positive politeness strategy, while a prohibition calls for a negative politeness strategy in uttering prohibitions and denial of permission with intensification markers. A positive directive in Turkish can claim common ground by relying on circumstantial support to intensify its meaning, but a prohibition is considered a stronger face-threatening act, which requires a strategy that presents the demand in the directive from the point of view of the speaker when an intensification marker is used. The details for this and how they are related to negation of deontic necessity and possibility are worked out in the following section, but I would like to present variations of one dialogue to support the point that languages vary in their assignment of weightiness to linguistic forms that have similar propositional content. Let us suppose that daughter (D) expresses her intention to go to the disco and mother (M) responds in the ways indicated below:

D		Anne diskoya gidicem	<i>Mom, I'm gonna go to the disco</i>
M	(a)	Gitme	<i>Don't [don't go]</i>
		go-neg	
D		Ama anne	<i>But Mom</i>
M	(b)	Gidemezsin	<i>You can't go</i>
		go-neg-aor-2. p sing	

Utterance (a) is perceived as less inhibiting and imposing than (b) by native speakers of Turkish. If we compare the dialogue above with the version below, we observe that the imperative is the most neutral form of expressing a directive in Turkish, as Palmer remarks (1986: 29-30) for languages in general. The imperative would be placed in between the bald-on record refusal expressed with 'hayır' (no) (c below) and the denial of permission regarding strength of imposition:

D		Anne, diskoya gidebilir miyim?	<i>Mom, can I go to the disco?</i>
M	(c)	Hayır	<i>No</i>
D		Ama anne	<i>But Mom</i>
M		Gidemezsin dedim	<i>You can't go</i>

#### **4 mutlaka AND kesinlikle IN DIRECTIVES**

##### **4.1. Distribution**

Both *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle* indicate the strength of the speaker's assertion that the proposition regarding the expressed world be realised. I would not say that they alone indicate the speaker's commitment or involvement in the proposition, since they interact with the form of the directive in this respect. The adverbs naturally appear only where the directive structure allows for strong assertion (see 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 below). So, for example, the adverbs are infelicitous with urge or willingness forms such as 'yap-sa-n' (do-opt-2.p sing) and question form requests 'yap-ar mı-sın' (do-aor Q-2.p sing). We see that *mutlaka* is used in strengthening propositions both in obligations and imperatives, while *kesinlikle* occurs with 'necessary-not' meaning, permission (*possible*), and denial of permission (*not possible*).

<i>necessary</i>	9	yap-malı-sın do-necc-2.p sing <i>You should do (this)</i>	mutlaka/kesinlikle (henceforth, <b>m</b> and <b>k</b> ); obligation
		yap-ma-n gerek/gerek-iyor do-nom-2.p sing necessary/necessary-prog <i>It is necessary that you do (this)</i>	" "
		yap-mak zorunda-sın do-inf obligation-2.p sing <i>You are obliged to do (this)</i>	" "

In expressing obligation (grammatically marked by the necessitative marker, -mEII) the modal adverbs enable the rendering of the distinction between necessity originating from self and that from other. The necessitative in Turkish does not distinguish between objective and subjective necessity. While *mutlaka* presents the predicated act as deriving from external obligation, *kesinlikle* focuses on the speaker's attitude that the act be accomplished (cf. 6 above for the distinction in English).

Interesting cases indicating the modal differences between the adverbs besides negation occur in the following structures in imperatives (*necessary*) and permission (possible). With performative verbs, *kesinlikle* is appropriate, while *mutlaka* is ungrammatical:

<i>performative</i> ( <i>imperative</i> )	10	bunu (* <b>m/k</b> ) yap-ma-n-ı emred-iyor-um this-acc do-nom-acc order-prog-1. p sing <i>'I order you to do this'</i>
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The performative *emret-* is a speaker-oriented verb, and therefore, is in semantic clash with *mutlaka*; *kesinlikle* here indicates the strength of the commitment of the speaker to his/her proposition. On the other hand, the formulation of a directive deriving from expression of need allows for use of both adverbs (11 below). While *mutlaka* focuses on the objective need that the expressed world be realised, *kesinlikle* focuses on the speaker's desire that the act be performed. In other words, since *iste-* (want) is interpersonally (self-other) oriented, it can be qualified with *kesinlikle*. But *emret-* derives from the power that the speaker has in accordance with the rights a particular social context confers upon him/her; therefore, qualification with *mutlaka* creates a tautology:

*performative* 11 bunu (**m/k**) yap-man-ı isti-yor-um  
(*desire*) this-acc do-nom-acc want-prog-1.p sing  
'I want you definitely to do this'

In this context, a comparison with a directive that has the form of propositional content (Huls, 1987), 'bu şöyle yapılır' (Eng. This is how it's done) is revealing. The aorist and the presence of the impersonal passive morpheme carries the sense of expressing the proposition as a matter of fact, leading to the utterance's being interpreted with its epistemic meaning of judgemental confidence (Note that the impersonal passive with the necessitative marker also has a propositional content form.) Hence, it requires *kesinlikle* in the strengthening of the proposition:

12 (böyle/şöyle) yap-ıl-ır \***m/k**  
Like this do-pass-aor

The marking of strength with the simple imperative is more appropriate with *mutlaka*, which underscores the meaning of *mutlaka* as being primarily deontic in meaning:

13 yap **m/?k**  
do-Ø

In the expression of permission with the compound abilitative and the aorist, *-Ebilir*, the expression of strength of belief of the speaker can only be directed to the strength of his/her knowledge of the addressee's ability, and not to the self-other relationship – hence, the use of *kesinlikle*. The same form under the epistemic reading can be strengthened with *mutlaka*, but in this case the adverb strengthens the speaker's belief in the addressee's capacity to actualise the expressed world (16a and b below). In other words, it indicates judgemental confidence (Ruhi et al 1997). This shade of meaning is also present in (12) above:

14 a yap-abil-ir-sin \***m/k** *deontic, possible*  
do-abil-aor-2.p sing  
*You may do (this)*

b yap-abil-ir-sin **m/k** *epistemic, ability*  
*You can do this*

Regarding the expression of personal assessment with lexical expressions, *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle* exhibit different behaviour. The expression that includes the bound form –*ce*

(*bence*) (Eng. in my opinion), is grammatical with both *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle*. In contrast, *kesinlikle* is compatible with the lexical, non-bound expression *bana göre* (Eng.: lit., to my view). This corroborates Bybee et al's (1995: 240-2) findings that non-bound modal markers tend to be agent-oriented modality expressions, thus allowing for the directive to be uttered from the perspective of the addressee. (15) and (16) below exemplify the distinction:

- 15 a Bence bunu mutlaka yapmalısın      *In my opinion you must definitely do this*  
b Bence bunu kesinlikle yapmalısın
- 16 a ??Bana göre, bunu mutlaka yapmalısın  
b Bana göre, bunu kesinlikle yapmalısın

The previously mentioned difference in word order variation between *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle* suggests that the latter adverb does not incorporate speaker-hearer relational meaning (2a, ii and 3c, ii above, repeated here as 18a and b):

- 18 a Beni ara mutlaka      *Do call me/You must definitely call me*  
b \*Beni arama kesinlikle  
c ?Mutlaka beni ara  
d ??Kesinlikle beni arama

The neutral position for these adverbs is the immediately pre-verbal position. But while *mutlaka* can take the whole proposition in its scope in the post-predicate position, *kesinlikle* is restricted in its syntactic position and takes the verb as its scope. In sentence initial position, too, *mutlaka* is slightly more grammatical than *kesinlikle*. This difference indicates that although the modal adverbs appear to be semantically similar, they act on different levels of the utterance <sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> G. Aygen-Tosun (p.c.) remarks that the difference in the behaviour of the adverbs might be connected to negative polarity. While this could be the case in negation, it would not explain why deontic possibility requires propositional strengthening with *kesinlikle* as in 'Kesinlikle gidebilirsin' (You may certainly go). In terms of the 'attenuation of the factual status of the content of the proposition' (Frawley 1992: 406), a possibility is higher on the realis scale than a prohibition, which is strongly irrealis in modality. One would thus expect *mutlaka* to be grammatical in the above utterance if the difference could be accounted through negative polarity. The same argument is also valid in the case of conditional utterances and questions. Conditionals and questions decrease the factuality of utterances (Frawley 1992: 405), hence *kesinlikle* would be expected to occur in such utterances. However, we observe that while *kesinlikle* is ungrammatical in conditionals, it can occur in questions:

- Bunu kesinlikle/mutlaka yapman gerekiyor mu?      *Do you definitely have to do this?*  
Bunu kesinlikle/mutlaka yapması gerekiyor mu?      *Did s/he definitely say that?*  
Bunu kesinlikle yaptı mı?      *Did s/he definitely do that?*

(The reason why *kesinlikle* is the only available adverb in the second sentence is related to the fact that the proposition may be marked for judgemental confidence, not deontic modality.)

The essential meaning of *kesinlikle* as referring either to speaker or hearer intentions or attitudes is revealed in the dialogue below:

- 19 A Beni tehdit mi ediyorsun? *Are you threatening me?*  
 B Kesinlikle/\*Mutlaka *Absolutely/\*Certainly/\*Definitely*

Based on the discussion above, it is possible to arrive at these conclusions: *mutlaka* marks directives emerging from the self and other assessment of obligation; *kesinlikle* presents a directive as emerging from the evaluation of the speaker's assessment of a necessity or the addressee's capabilities. The table below summarises the structures where the adverbs are appropriate:

<i>Direction</i>	<i>Linguistic form</i>	
<i>From Self</i>	<i>Imperative:</i>	
	yap-	<b>m/?k</b>
<i>From Self or Other</i>	<i>Necessary:</i>	
	<i>Obligation:</i>	<b>m, k</b>
<i>From Self</i>	<i>Performative:</i>	
	emret-	<b>k</b>
	<i>Non-performative:</i>	
	iste-	<b>m/k</b>
<i>From Other</i>	<i>Propositional content:</i>	
	yap-ıl-ır	<b>k</b>
	<i>Necessary-not:</i>	
<i>From Self or Other</i>	yap-ma-malı-	<b>k</b>
<i>From Other (addressee)</i>	<i>Possible:</i>	
	yap-abilir-sin	<b>k</b>
	<i>Not-possible:</i>	
	yap-a-maz-sın	<b>k</b>

#### 4.2. Prohibition, Permission, and Denial of Permission in Turkish and Other Languages

Turkish is different from Chinese, German, and Bahasa Malaysia in that, unlike the latter group of languages for which the only available forms of prohibition are *not-possible*, Turkish can employ the negation of necessitative form or the imperative for prohibition. The only difference observed is in the use of the modal adverbs *mutlaka* and *kesinlikle*, which suggests that a prohibition and a positive imperative are speech acts of different weights.



Prohibitions to act are more face-threatening acts in that they impose a restriction on the addressee's options (cf. Rohrbaugh 1997). However, positive directives add to the addressee's obligations to act. It does not necessarily follow that they always impose a restriction on one's options in actions. This would explain why *kesinlikle*, which appears to be a speaker-oriented modal adverb is the appropriate form in Turkish, stressing as it were the speaker's commitment to a proposition.

The appearance of possibility modal markers in other languages can also be explained by the factor of not imposing the self's will on the addressee. The option, then, in these languages is to appeal to the addressee's possibility or ability to act. These formulas for *necessary-not* would be putting the force not to act in the external realm of modality, thereby focusing on circumstances external to the speaker in justifying the utterance of the directive. This would mean that *necessary-not* in the deictic scale is reversed, so to speak, in terms of the direction to act. The negation of possibility puts the source of the obligation not on the speaker, but on the hearer as forming the justification for issuing the directive.

However, whether or not this is a less coercing strategy in linguistic behaviour changes across languages. Since it appeals to the addressee's situation, it does appear to be a negative-face strategy in the standard sense. In terms of the strategies outlined by Brown and Levinson (1987), I would say that the objective presentation of the directive lessens the direct expression of the imposition created by the speaker on the addressee. However, encoding the prohibition by appealing to the addressee's abilities decreases the addressee's options to act (Rohrbaugh 1997). Hence, from the addressee's point-of-view, the negation of possibility would be interpreted as a more imposing utterance in Turkish than expressing the same directive as *necessary-not*. To exemplify this, let us compare the following utterances in Turkish and English:

(m/?k) Git	Go	(*m/k) Gitme	Don't go
(m/k) Gitmelisin	<i>You must go</i>	(*m/k) Gitmemelisin	<i>You mustn't go</i>
(*m/k) Gidebilirsin	<i>You may/can go</i>	(*m/k) Gidemezsin	<i>You can't go</i>

In Turkish, the 'not-possible' (denial of permission) forms lack the appeal to speaker-hearer cooperation in meaning. Hence, they are more threatening to the negative-face of the addressee. The positive imperative is neutral in terms of imposition and can appeal to self, other, and external circumstances to strengthen its proposition, which explains why *mutlaka* emerges as the more appropriate modal marker.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The above discussion suggests that deontic modality requires a consideration of speaker-hearer context in analysing forms in terms of weightiness of the act and ensuing politeness degrees. Though a minor aspect of the grammar of the language, the case of strengthening of a prohibition or a denial of permission with *kesinlikle* in Turkish

suggests that degrees of strength in deontic modality may be described in the semantics of the language with reference to deictic centres of expressing intentionality in the language. Regarding the adverbs, it was observed that *kesinlikle* appeals to the speaker's judgement of what is desirable and possible in the world in deontic modality, while *mutlaka* is grammatical in directives that take the self and other relationship as deictic centres for strengthening the desirability of the expressed world.

Following such an approach based on deictic centres in the semantics of modality, it is possible to develop a method to analyse degrees and kinds of politeness in the language regarding linguistic forms. The deictic scale, for example, would show the difference between 'yap-sa-n' (do-opt-2 p sing) and 'yap-iver' (do-acc-give; 'just do it, won't you') as differing in terms of the wish of the speaker, hence, self-oriented as opposed to the hearer-oriented expression of the directive with the latter formula. Discussions as to which forms are considered to be more polite or which forms would be positive or negative-face oriented would then be considered in the study of the particular language.

### Abbreviations

abil	abilitative
abl	ablative
acc	accusative
aor	aorist
k	kesinlikle
m	mutlaka
nec	necessitative
neg	negative particle
nom	nominalizer
opt	optative
p	person agreement marker
sing	singular
pl	plural
pass	passive
Q	question particle
Ill-formedness markers:	
*	unacceptable
?, ??	borderline acceptability

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