

A Proposal for the Classification of Objects

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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to make a classification of all probable objects from the standpoint of their appointment to a subject. An object of any kind is an object of my reason, my mind, my memory, my consciousness, my soul or my imagination. When a physical thing is in front of us we call that thing we obtain from it “intuition”. We call this object type of a physical thing that is provided by a single form of sensitiveness (by means of sight) an *object of intuition*. In the case of an event I do not witness personally but which is provided by means of media instruments such as newspapers or TV, it is also sensitiveness which provides me with the appearance of a physical thing on a two-dimensional surface. We call this type, provided by all visual techniques, an *object of appearance*. When neither the physical thing from which I obtain the intuition nor its appearance is in front of me and when, instead, I create them in my mind, the representation I obtain we call a *mental object*. I feel a sense of pain that I receive from any part of my body or a sensation of joy in my soul as they are, not from any perspective. We call this type of object, perceived by the consciousness and the soul, a *psychological object*. The intellect or mind acquires representations and concepts from things outside the subject; reason creates its own concepts and objects. All mathematical-logical objects-concepts, operations made by them, definitions, demonstrations and constructions are of objects of reason. Here, we shall talk about yet another kind of object that is a combination of object of reason and object of intuition. These objects, which exist in the sciences as principles, we call *objects of inference*, in the sense that they are objects which reason infers from objects of intuition or, in other words, objects created by reason through inference. We shall now speak of *objects of imagination* as a last kind in our classification. These objects are not objects of intuition or representations of something that the subject either found directly in itself (in its soul and/or body) or in something outside of itself. The object of imagination is an object that may always be visualized in all ways.

Key Words: Classification, subject, object of intuition, object of appearance, mental object, psychological object, object of reason, object of inference, object of imagination.

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The main purpose of this paper is to make a classification of all probable objects from the standpoint of their appointment to a subject. A complete classification of objects should consider the concept of object in the largest sense. For this purpose, we take “object” to include all kinds of objects; from something in our consciousness that has no correspondence outside to the object of something standing before us and independent from us, to all objects created by the mind and imagination. Only then may we claim that our classification includes all probable objects. Now, “all probable objects” is an open-ended term. Our classification will be deserving of its assertion of completeness until someone can show us an object of the sort that may not have a place in our classification.

Knowledge is to know something; to make it an object. There is a method of knowledge wherever an object is available. Consequently, our object classification will also serve as a classification of knowledge methods to form an epistemology. No complete classification is made for sciences, be it in respect to their objects, their methods, or from any standpoint whatever. However, neither is the idea of unity of sciences discarded. As every object method corresponds to a method of knowledge, our classification will also establish the desired unity on the basis of knowledge methods and serve as a classification of knowledge methods.

Only if the thing known is a three dimensional thing standing before us and independent from us do we make a distinction between the thing in itself and its object or its appearance. In this sense, we are saying that we cannot claim to know the thing itself. We understand knowing to be knowing every single part of a thing as simple elements inseparable from knowing the thing itself. In other words, we are arguing that there is a complete overlap between the thing itself and its object. Though it is possible that a knowledge gave the self of such a thing, we do not have the means to prove this is so. As the thing is given and known as it appears to us, the question “Who knows whether that thing would not be given or known in a different manner by means of other knowledge instruments?” will remain forever unanswered. This existence of a gap - which we cannot know will ever be closed - between the object and the thing itself shows that every ontological attempt asserting to give the knowledge of the self of the being can only become a theory of knowledge and that the thing meant by the term “ontic” cannot be separate from the thing meant by the term “ontological”. After all, if “ontic” means relative to the thing itself, we cannot say this as we cannot be sure whether or not we know the thing itself. Nevertheless, somebody who is not satisfied by what we have said so far should tell us for example what the more the term “This is an ontic difference” says than the term “This is an

ontological difference”. Thus, if we make a complete classification of objects here, we shall have right to say that this also replaces ontology at the same time.¹

Two other main benefits of making a separation between the thing itself and its object are as follows: Firstly, the possibility of obtaining different and more detailed knowledge about the same thing and of making progress in science can be explained. Secondly, and connected to the first, is that the meaning is explained of our inability to distinguish between “scientific law” or “empirical law” (law derived from experiment) and “natural law” – which in fact we cannot know belongs to nature (though it probably does) - and that we cannot know whether or not we know the latter. Our inability to know “the thing itself” shows the limit of our knowledge. It is self evident that this limit is not constant; it can expand forever with new objects that we make from the thing itself. Thus, a conclusion arising from these explanations is as follows: “The thing itself” is an acceptance.

An object of any kind is an object of my reason, my mind, my memory, my consciousness, my soul or my imagination. These abilities the subject uses during the act of knowing are adequate points of view for a complete object classification for the subject, since the subject has no other ability to know, i.e. obtain objects. (Of course we exclude here methods dependent on religious belief such as “revelation”) These points can be seen as non-physical spaces where objects are found in the subject in a mental-psychological sense; for instance, as in the case where I say “I have a table representation” and somebody asks “Where in you do you have it?” and I reply “In my memory”. Accordingly, the place of a feeling of joy that I have is my soul and the place of a pain I feel because of an injury to my arm is not that point on my arm but also my soul. The place of Pegasus, the winged horse of fiction, is my imagination. The place of a mathematical concept is my reason.

While my consciousness is in an active state engaged in activities such as seeing, hearing, thinking etc., I cannot make it an object which can follow these acts. Consciousness can realize a representation, an experience available in it, when it is folded over on itself. However, it cannot be conscious of its own act simultaneously with the action. I can only be aware that I am performing acts during the acts of my consciousness.² Although the difference between the one who is aware and the thing of which one is aware can be deduced, at the same time one cannot speak of a simultaneous subject-object difference or of a knowledge that the object as the thing one is aware of cannot stay as an active state of consciousness. Let us put it more clearly: Thinking is thinking a thing. Now, I am thinking. The

moment I am aware that I am thinking, I lose the thing that I am thinking; because awareness has replaced it. Consciousness is subject only when it is active; it is not possible to have two active consciousness in the subject at the same time. We understand awareness as if it were a shadow accompanying all the acts of our consciousness. As I have an awareness for every kind of acts of my consciousness, it stands as an indispensable condition of all kind of consciousness acts and knowledge. We may put it in a Kantian manner as follows: Awareness is the thing that accompanies all my mental activities.³ (In a state of illness, I may lack awareness. This, like the above-mentioned revelations, is not within the scope of our subject).

When a physical thing is in front of us we call that thing we obtain from it “intuition”. When the thing is removed from sight, the protection of its image in the memory is called representation. We always perceive a three-dimensional thing before us from a single standpoint; a single perspective.⁴ Even if we look at it while rotating around it continuously and rapidly, neither in perception nor in representation can we unify its two-dimensional facets; in other words, we cannot grasp its perception as its three dimensions and we cannot keep such a perception as representation in our memory because representation depends on the appearance obtained from the thing. All the representations in our mind are two-dimensional. We call this object type of a physical thing that is provided by a single form of sensitiveness (by means of sight) an *object of intuition*. We take the object of intuition that is an object of sensitiveness as a kind separate from all other objects of sensitiveness also provided by sensibility, the reason for which will become clear when the psychological object is considered below. Since there is a difference between the object of intuition and the thing by which it is provided, we may speak of a truth as to whether or not there exists compatibility between the two.

In the case of an event I do not witness personally but which is provided by means of media instruments such as newspapers or TV, it is also sensitiveness which provides me with the appearance of a physical thing on a two-dimensional surface. I see not the thing itself but its appearance. We call this type, provided by all visual techniques, an *object of appearance*. The appearance stands in front of me exactly like an object of intuition. However, there is nothing itself in front of me from which I obtain its intuition. In other words, its intuition and its appearance are one and same. As the object of appearance is provided through sensitiveness – in this case by means of sight, i.e. a form of sensitiveness - it stands as a kind of sense of sight in our classification. Unlike the object of intuition, I do not perceive the object of appearance from any perspective. One may argue about whether

the appearance is compatible with the thing of which it is an appearance, but that is a technical matter. I perceive the appearance before me as my object as it is. Here, it is not possible to talk about two different things - that one is the object itself and the other its appearance - and consequently not about compatibility or truth between the two.

As the thing from which the object of intuition is obtained and the appearance are found in the same form before every single subject, there is no problem regarding the communication of the object of intuition and the appearance from one subject to another. I show them as "This" or "That" to another. The communication is carried out by assuming that the other sees what I see.

When neither the physical thing from which I obtain the intuition nor its appearance is in front of me and when, instead, I create them in my mind, the representation I obtain we call a *mental object*. The mind is a kind of sensibility because a mental object is always an imaginable thing. For the mental object there is no difference between itself and its object (as in the difference between the object of intuition and the thing that is its intuition). Consequently, one cannot speak of a compatibility or truth here. My consciousness folds on itself and sees the mental object as it is without being connected to any perspective. We call this act of folding "intellectual view". The mental object is the object of this view. When communicating a mental object to another, I say the word that shows it in the language, i.e. the name of the thing or the appearance. As language is used commonly, I assume that the other understands what I mean.

There is no difference in the giving to a subject of a physical or physiological-biological thing and a social event. We always see a social event that we are observing from a perspective, and we obtain a representation of it by keeping its appearance in our memory. This is also a mental object. With regard to our standpoint and to the principle of economy, We are not specifying a new kind of object for the social event and we understand its object as an intuition object. However, the situation is different for a historical event, which can be understood as a social event in the past. The historical event is not before us; we do not have an intuition of it. We can only obtain a representation of it through observing the documents etc. about it. We do not call this an object of intuition as we did not obtain this representation from the intuition of something; we did not create it by sensibility. We classify it within the class of imagination since we created it with our imagination. By the same token, it is my imagination which enables me to imagine an event that is happening now of which I am

not a witness but of which I am told. Such objects are classified within the class of imagination objects.

I feel a sense of pain that I receive from any part of my body or a sensation of joy in my soul as they are, not from any perspective. It is through the senses other than sight, namely hearing, touch, smell and taste that I sense the sensations I obtain either from my body or from outside without any perspective. These sensations are only given to me in different degrees of intensity depending on their distance. I sense my sensation at every level as it is. Since there is no intuition for such an object of sense, there is no representation of it either. It is perceived instantly and cannot be recalled. I can neither preserve nor recall a sound I heard a while ago. I cannot receive any sound, any touch, any smell, any taste unless I hear a sound, I touch something, I smell something or I taste something. We call this type of object, perceived by the consciousness and the soul, a *psychological object*. A psychological object is perceived by introspection. However, when it is intense enough, as in the case of a sense of pain, a sense of sound or an intense sense of joy, it is perceived directly by means of sensibility without any need for an act of introspection. Both kinds of psychological objects are instantaneous; there is no difference between the thing itself and its object. However, there is a difference between it and the thing that is its source. When we define this source as the thing itself and my sense as the object of it, whether it is in my body or outside, one can argue whether the intensity between the two are compatible with each other. Of course, it is nonsense to talk about truth simply because we are talking about two separate things and compatibility. No epistemological truth may be looked for between the intensity of a sound at its source and the intensity I hear depending on my distance from it, on my threshold of perception etc.; no question may be asked concerning which sound from which distance is true. One can only talk about the presence and absence of a psychological object, and this cannot be a matter of doubt.

The cause (source) of a psychological object may be some thing physiological that happened in my body or some particular thing coming from outside (sound, etc.). From this standpoint, there is no difference between these psychological objects in terms of type of perception as these are both objects of sense; as in, for instance, my hearing a grumble coming from my stomach and hearing a noise coming from outside. Although the object of emotion and the object of sensation are the same, from the standpoint of the manner in which the subject is making them object we consider them as two sub-categories of psychological object because they are different from the perspective of perception. The object of

sensation that is a physiological thing is always a material thing to me whether it comes to me from my body or from outside. For instance, I receive a sense of touch by means of the communication via neurofibrils to my brain of signals received by nerve endings from a pen in my hand. The same is true for the senses of hearing, smell and taste. As for the object of feeling that I feel in my soul, evidently there is no such physiological event. Here, the situation is much more complicated. Not only is the cause of the feeling a thing that cannot clearly be determined, but there is also no thing touching my body. Winning the lottery jackpot, receiving good news that I have been waiting for, or a happy moment in the past that I am remembering gives me a feeling of joy and cheerfulness. However, sometimes I may have similar feelings for reasons I do not clearly know. In my soul, my consciousness, I feel all the senses that I receive both from my body and from outside; I cannot doubt whether these sensations are present or not. The psychological object is always one and same with a thing and an object, whether it is an object of sense or of feeling. There can be no intuition for a psychological thing. Intuition is the thing seen from a perspective. The psychological object has no representation either. However, a trace of it may remain in my soul and I can recall it in a particular manner. This recalling is not in the form of representation or intuition. I cannot remember directly a psychological object that has left a trace on me (my soul), i.e. I cannot remember the trace directly. For instance, the trace of a feeling of joy that I obtained in the past is available in my memory, but I cannot remember that feeling. I can remember that I had such a feeling and the moment, but this is not the remembering of that feeling regardless of it arousing a feeling of joy in me now. This feeling of joy is a new feeling; it is not the previous feeling.

Communication of psychological objects is carried out in the following ways: Communication about an object of sense experienced by both me and another is exactly like it is for an intuition object. For instance, if a sound comes from within or outside my body in such a way that someone near can also hear it, I draw the attention of the person to it; I show it to him/her. Communication is carried out assuming that the nearby person hears what I hear. When the object is not common i.e. when it only belongs to me, then the communication of sense and feeling are of the same type. When I say a word expressing a sense or a feeling that I have, for instance when I say "I have a stomachache", the other can understand that I have such a pain in the following way: If he/she also had stomach pain before, he/she would have also said "I have a stomachache". As he knows what this utterance means he understands what I mean, although he does not remember the pain he once felt. If he has never had a stomachache but had another pain,

he would have expressed that pain. He puts the organ in which he felt the pain in the place of the “stomach” and understands what I say. In both cases, there must exist a shared use of language because the other person has to know the use of language in order to decide that the same utterance is used for both my and his sensation. As a third possibility, let us assume that he has never had a pain experience. In this case, he does not understand what I mean, but since he shares the use of the language he can use a similar utterance appropriately. This is similar to a person born blind using the word “red”, despite having no colour representation. Communication of a sense of pain as well as a feeling of joy are both connected to words; there is nothing commonly perceptible to hand. We have said that a psychological object is momentary in both types. My communicating to another the object of sense or feeling that I have had before occurs by participating in the manner of remembering the moment of feeling and also by participating in the use of language.⁵

I perceive things or events as intuition objects although I appoint them values such as “beautiful” or “good” in an aesthetical-ethical sense. The feeling of pleasure they give me is also a psychological object. In answer to the question of whether they produce a third kind as a mixture of these two types, the answer must be no. “Beautiful” or “good” are not available in a thing shown by an intuition object like the presence of a colour, a form etc. nor as the presence of pain in a pain experience (a psychological object) in those things to which I am appointing these features. This is the subject that ascribes the thing that is not available in the object and that we call “value”. For this reason, it does not stand as a different type of object from the standpoint of its appointment to the subject. Though value judgments and the things that are their subject have a great place in our life and an important role in determining our actions, the things they show do not constitute an object classification. For the same reason, religious beliefs do not have a place in our classification. As value is not a feature of the thing to which it is appointed, there is no problem of truth here in the sense of inquiring whether there is compatibility between the value and the thing.

All the objects we assembled under the titles of intuition objects, mental objects and psychological objects are classified under the general title of *objects of sensibility* as they are provided through sensibility. Among them, intuition objects, objects of appearance and psychological objects are directly objects of sensation, while mental objects are indirectly an object of sensation since they are pictures of sensation in the mind.

Now we are moving to a new kind which we call an *object of reason*. The intellect or mind acquires representations and concepts from things outside

the subject; reason creates its own concepts and objects. These are not the intuition or sensation of any thing; they are not appointed to the subject by sensibility. All mathematical-logical objects-concepts, operations made by them, definitions, demonstrations and constructions are of this kind. While the mind is connected to things when producing objects, reason is not bound to things in this act. Reason is connected only to logical principles. Objects of reason, for instance forms of geometry and the numbers of arithmetic, unlike mental or psychological objects, cannot be comprehended from any perspective; instead they are perceived as they are. They are different from the other two kinds of objects in that an object of reason is comprehensible instead of perceptible. Though a geometric form, a number can be drawn on paper and can be perceived; but that geometric form or that number is not the thing seen on paper; they are ideas of reason, ideal objects. Objects of reason do not show anything; they are pure forms with no content. Consequently, there is no object and concept (term) separation for them. Besides mathematical-logical terms, words in daily language such as "whole", or "infinite" do not show anything perceivable. They also make up a part of the class of objects of reason as they are also formal concepts. As for the communication of objects of reason - the operations carried out by them to another - this depends on the operations made with them being understood by everybody, and on their having logical principles.

Here, we shall talk about yet another kind of object that is a combination of object of reason and object of intuition. Let us start with the example. One expression of the principle of inertia - one of the main principles of physics - is as follows: *A body on which no force is being exerted remains still if standing still or remains moving if it is moving.* A body such as this exists neither in nature nor may it be obtained by experiment in laboratory conditions. Consequently, such a body has never been seen and we cannot talk about it as an object of intuition. Nor have we a picture of it, a representation of it in our mind. However, we can observe that when we reduce the forces acting on a moving body, i.e. when we reduce the friction on the body, its movement does not decrease in proportion to the reduction. In this state, it is an object of intuition, but it is by means of reason that we deduce the following from this situation: if we can reduce friction to nil, the body will move infinitely. However, we do not have the means to reduce the friction to nil. We can neither make infinite movement possible, nor can we represent such a thing in our mind. An infinite thing cannot be represented. These objects, which exist in the sciences as principles, we call *objects of inference*, in the sense that they are objects which reason infers from objects of intuition or, in other words, objects created by reason through inference.

Communication of this kind of object is carried out by reason and experiment.

At this point, one might have expected us to speak of a sub-category of objects of reference consisting of terms such as “circle square”, “equilateral circle square” for instance, terms which reason has obtained from formal objects. Such terms are obtained through combining, by means of reason (conclusion), numerous forms that are mathematical objects in themselves but which cannot unite logically. However, such word combinations, which may indeed be a source of wealth for poetry, cannot be considered as a kind of object as they are nothing more than wordplay.

We shall now speak of *objects of imagination* as a last kind in our classification. These objects are not objects of intuition or representations of something that the subject either found directly in itself (in its soul and/or body) or in something outside of itself. Instead, they are objects that it has constructed, with their help, through the power of its imagination. The imagination combines factors provided by sensibility to obtain objects whose elements are formed of intuitions and representations of things found in the outer world, but not wholly found there. Examples are Pegasus, the winged horse and the Centaur. We did not consider terms such as “circle square” to be a kind of object, and yet here in the winged horse example we find a kind of object that has never existed. Why should this be so? The answer is as follows: Firstly, a winged horse is an imaginable picture; secondly, the fact that no winged horse has ever been seen does not mean that such a thing is not possible; it is not a logical contradiction or impossibility. Indeed, developments in genetics today may even allow for the possibility of such a creature being created. The subject’s imaginings concerning an historical event or an event which is happening now but of which neither itself nor its image is available before the subject also make up a part of this kind of object. The object of imagination is an object that may always be visualized in all ways. The communicability of the object of imagination depends not only on reconciliation of use of language and a certain literature and tradition, but also on the ability of each subject to speculate about it. In the matter of the distinction between whether or not I am aware that I am dreaming, an object of hallucination is involved in the latter case. The object of hallucination is a result of insanity and does not have a place in our classification of objects of imagination.

Something which exists cannot be negated. Negation is a logical operation carried out only for formal concepts. Applying this operation to real concepts - perceptual concepts which may be connected to perception - and for instance to obtaining a so-called concept such as “something that cannot

exist” from something that exists, may lead us into dilemmas from which it may not be easy to disentangle ourselves. Another example: How to negate “tree”? If this is to be called “no tree”, this concept will cover everything that is not a tree. Consequently, “concepts” obtained in this manner do not have any part to play in any of our object classifications, as with the “circle square” example made up of two formal concepts that cannot unite logically.

We would like add a last point. Here, what we mean by object communication is not, for instance, the transmission of a feeling to another. Everybody’s feelings belong to him/her and cannot be transferred. However, I provide for another’s understanding that I have such a feeling in the ways we have specified. This understanding of communication is valid for all the objects taking place in our classification. Our point of view calls for acceptance of the idea that object belongs to subject by whatever means.

We close our study with the brief table set out below, allowing our classification system to be seen at a glance.

The act of Knowing of Subject Kind of Object

1 sensibility	objects of sensibility
1.1 sense of sight	object of intuition/ object of appearance
1.2 mind	mental object
1.31 consciousness	psychological object (object of sense)
1.32 soul	psychological object (object of sensation)
2 reason	object of reason
3 sensibility and reason	object of inference
4 imagination	object of imagination

Notes

1. The distinction that we have made here between thing and thing in itself, and the claim that thing in itself cannot be known is reminiscent of Kant. Yet Kant asserts that although the thing in the phenomenal world (in time and space) can be known, the thing that cannot be known i.e. the thing free from the condition of space-time can merely be thought of. (ex. see: *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XXVI, B 332, B 519). But we say that anything whatsoever that is bound with the condition of space-time cannot itself be known, that we can have knowledge of its appearance (object) we have of it only. Our distinction looks more like Russell’s distinction of “physical object” and “sense data”. (see: *The Problems of Philosophy*, Chapter I, Appearance and Reality.)
2. The expression “awareness” that we use here is an answer, for instance, to the question “How do we know that we see?” As a first hand source on this subject, see: Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 425b10-20.

3. We want to refer to Kant here: “The **I think** must **be able** to accompany all my representations;...” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 131-132).
4. Our opinion concerning perspectival seeing can be compared with that of Husserl on the same subject. See: Ideas § 41, 44, 97.
5. Wittgenstein’s views on the meaning of the word have been a source of inspiration for us: “The meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (*Philosophical Investigations*, Part I, 43). “For words have meaning only in the stream of life.” (*Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volume II, 687.) Some thoughts of Wittgenstein concerning the relation of sensation to the word, and its transference have also illuminated our way. For example, see: *The Brown Book* II, 25, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volume I: 1084, 1089, 1091, 1092, Volume II: 63, 162, 176, 308, 655.

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Nesnelerin Bölümlenmesi Hakkında Bir Öneri

Ö. Naci Soykan*

Özet: Bu yazının başlıca amacı, özneye verilmiş tarzları bakımından, olası tüm nesnelerin bir sınıflamasını yapmaktır. Ne tarzda olursa olsun bir nesne, ya benim aklımın, zihnimin, belleğimin, bilincimin, ruhumun veya hayal gücümün bir nesnesidir. Fiziksel bir şey karşımızda olduğu zaman, ondan elde ettiğimiz şeye “görü” diyoruz. Bize duyarlığın yalnızca bir biçimiyle (görme ile) verilen fiziksel bir şeyin bu nesne türüne “görü nesnesi” adını veriyoruz. Bizzat tanık olmadığım, gazete, TV gibi medya araçlarıyla bana verilen, fiziksel bir şeyin, herhangi bir olayın görüntüsü, iki boyutlu bir yüzeyde bana yine duyarlıkla verilir. Ben bu tür bir şeyin kendisini değil, görüntüsünü görüyorum. Tüm görüntü teknikleriyle verilen bu türü “görüntü nesnesi” olarak adlandırıyoruz. Gerek kendisinden görüsünü edindiğim fiziksel şey, gerekse görüntü, karşımda olmadığı zaman, onları zihnimde canlandırdığımda, elde ettiğim tasarıma “zihinsel nesne” diyoruz. Bedenimin herhangi bir yerinden aldığım, örneğin bir ağır duyumunu veya ruhumdaki, örneğin bir sevinç duygusunu, hiçbir perspektif altında olmaksızın olduğu gibi duyarım. Bilincimle ve ruhumla algıladığım bu nesne türünü “psikolojik nesne” olarak adlandırıyoruz. Zihin ya da anlama yetisi, öznenin dışındaki şeylerin görülerinden tasarımlar ve kavramlar edinirken akıl, kendi kavramlarını, nesnelere yaratır. Onlar, herhangi bir şeyin görüsü, duyumu değildir; özneye duyarlıkla verilmezler. Tüm matematiksel-mantıksal nesnelere-kavramlar, bunlarla yapılan işlemler, tanımlar, ispatlar, kurgular, bu türe girer. Akıl nesnesi ile görü nesnesinin bir çeşit karışımı olan bir nesne türünden daha söz etmek istiyoruz. Bilimde ilkeler olarak bulunan bu tür nesnelere, aklın deneye, yani görü nesnesine yaptığı katkıyla elde ettiği, başka bir deyişle, duyarlığa aklın katılmasıyla, aklın görü nesnesinden çıkardığı nesne anlamında kısaca “çıkarma nesnesi” diye adlandırıyoruz. Sınıflamamızın son bir türü olarak “hayal gücü nesnesi”nden söz etmek istiyoruz. Bu nesnelere, öznenin, doğrudan doğruya, ne kendinde (ruh ve bedeninde) bulunduğu bir etkinin ne de kendi dışındaki bir şeyin görü ve tasarımının nesnesi olmayıp, onların yardımıyla hayal gücü sayesinde kurguladığı nesnelere, hayal gücü nesnesi, her tarzıyla daima göz önüne getirilebilen bir nesnedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölümlenme, özne, görü nesnesi, görüntü nesnesi, zihinsel nesne, psikolojik nesne, akıl nesnesi, çıkarma nesnesi, hayal gücü nesnesi.

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Предложение о классификации объектов

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Резюме: Главная цель этой статьи состоит в том, чтобы провести классификацию всех вероятных объектов с точки зрения их назначения к предмету. Объект любого вида является объектом моей причины, моего мнения, моей памяти, моего сознания, моей души или моего воображения. Когда перед нами физическая вещь, мы называем эту вещь основываясь на свою "интуицию". Мы называем такой тип объекта, обеспеченный единственной формой чувствительности (посредством зрения), объектом интуиции. В случае когда я, не являясь свидетелем, получаю информацию посредством СМИ, таких, как газеты или телевидение, это также появление физической вещи или события на двумерной поверхности посредством чувствительности. В данном случае я вижу не сам предмет, а его изображение. Мы называем этот тип, представленный всеми визуальными методами, «объектом изображения». Когда физическая вещь вне моей видимости или информацию о которой я получаю посредством интуиции, я создаю их в своем воображении; данное созданное представление мы называем «мысленным объектом». Ощущение своего тела, например ощущение боли в любой части моего тела или ощущение радости в моей душе, я чувствую без какой либо перспективы. Мы называем этот тип объекта, воспринятого сознанием и душой, «психологическим объектом». Интеллект(ум) создает представления и понятия о вещах вне самого предмета; ум создает собственные понятия и объекты. Все математически-логические понятия, объекты, произведенные ими операции, определения, демонстрации входят в данный тип. Также идет речь о еще одном виде объекта, который является комбинацией объекта причины и объекта интуиции. Эти объекты, которые существуют в науке как принципы, мы называем «объектами вывода», в смысле того, что они являются объектами, первопричиной которых являются объекты интуиции или, другими словами, объекты, созданные умом через вывод. Как последний вид в нашей классификации рассматриваются «объекты воображения». Объект воображения визуализируется субъектом не под влиянием своего тела или не под влиянием чего-либо извне, а создается посредством воображения. Объект воображения – это объект, который можно всегда можно создать перед глазами.

Ключевые Слова: Классификация, предмет, объект интуиции, объект изображение, мысленный объект, психологический объект, умственный объект, объект вывода, объект воображения.

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