

TO WHICH EURASIA DOES TURKEY BELONG? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH EURASIANIST GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES*

EBRU EREN-WEBB**

Michigan State University

ABSTRACT

*This study argues that there are two prominent Eurasianist discourses in Turkey, the Kemalist and the Ottomanist, and that these traditions draw on three geopolitical traditions: the nationalist, the socialist, and the Islamist. The contents of three representative journals (the nationalist *Türk Yurdu*, the socialist *Teori*, and the conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü*) are analyzed, investigating their issues published between 1990 and 2010, in order to seek answers to three main questions: First, what distinguishes these three types of geopolitical traditions? Second, did the nationalist and socialist Eurasianist views in recent years converge on each other, thereby forming the *Ulusalçı* view, while the Islamist Eurasianists became the new opposing pole? Third, insofar as the answer to the second question is yes, why did this realignment take place? In response to the first question, this study shows that the geopolitical visions of these three groups and the way they imagine the past help to explain their respective perspectives of Eurasia and how they place Turkey in these perspectives. In response to the second question, again this research shows that the nationalist and socialist visions of Eurasianism did indeed converge on each other. The research then maintains that this happened because the Islamist circles in the Post- Cold War allied with the liberal groups and developed a “counter-memory” of the past that became an alternative to the Kemalist historiography, while the nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions remained faithful to the Kemalist narrative of the past.*

Keywords: Turkish Eurasianism, Ulusalçılık, critical geopolitics, collective memory, Post-Cold War Turkish politics, historiographical dispute, Turkish geopolitical tradition.

TÜRKİYE HANGİ AVRASYA 'NIN PARÇASI? TÜRK AVRASYACI JEOPOLİTİK SÖYLEMLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

ÖZET

*Bu çalışma Türkiye’de milliyetçi, sosyalist ve İslamcı jeopolitik gelenek üzerinden şekillenen biri Kemalist diğeri ise Osmanlıcı olmak üzere öne çıkan iki Avrasyacı söylem olduğu iddiasındadır. Bu üç geleneği temsil eden üç süreli yayının (milliyetçi *Türk Yurdu*, sosyalist *Teori* ve İslamcı *Türkiye**

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** Ebru Eren-Webb is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, U.S.A. E-mail: erenwebb@msu.edu

Günlüğü) 1990- 2010 yılları arasında yayınlanmış sayılarına uygulanan içerik analizi aracılığı ile şu üç temel soruya cevap aranmıştır: birincisi, bu üç jeopolitik söylemi birbirinden ayıran faktörler nelerdir? İkincisi, yakın dönemde milliyetçi ve sosyalist grupların görüşlerinin birbirlerine yaklaşım ulusalçı adı verilen duruş altında birleşirken İslamcı grubun bu iki gruba karşı yeni bir fikir kutbu oluşturduğu iddia edilebilir mi? Üçüncü olarak, eğer bu yeni kutuplaşma meydana geldiyse altta yatan sebepler nelerdir? Bu çalışmanın birinci soruya cevabı bu üç grubun jeopolitik vizyonları ve geçmişi nasıl kurguladıkları, onların bugünkü kendi Avrasyalarını nasıl oluşturduklarını ve Türkiye'yi bu kurgulanmış Avrasya'ya nasıl yerleştirdiklerini belirliyor. Bu çalışmanın ikinci soruya verdiği cevap ise milliyetçi ve sosyalist jeopolitik gelenekler arasında Avrasyacılık noktasında bir kesişme yaşandığı iddiasının doğru olduğudur. Bu çalışmanın bulgularının da desteği ile görüldüğü üzere Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin Türkiye'sinde bu yeni ortaklık ve beraberinde gelen bir kutuplaşma yaşandı çünkü İslamcı çevreler liberallerle yeni bir ortaklık geliştirdiler ve Kemalist tarih yazımını hedef alan alternatif bir tarih arayışı içine girdiler. Bu arada sosyalist ve milliyetçi gruplar ise bu arayışa karşı çıkıp Kemalist tarihe sadık kalmayı tercih ettiler.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye Avrasyacılığı, Ulusalçılık, eleştirel jeopolitik, kolektif hafıza, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Türk siyaseti, tarih yazımı tartışmaları, Türk jeopolitik geleneği.

A basic Google search with the key words of Eurasia and Eurasianism (Avrasya- Avrasyacılık) in Turkish, provides a wide range of results about how these terms are perceived in academia and the media. One writer from an Ankara- based think tank describes Eurasianism as a dream, which is far from realization. Nevertheless, he still realizes Eurasianism's role in Turkish politics as an important bridge between the radical left and the radical right. He defines Eurasianism as “both socialism and nationalism; both rejection of the Western hegemony and centralizing Eurasia's place in world politics” (Berkan, 2009). According to this view, Eurasianism appeared to be the antidote of the West in Turkish politics. Berkan (2009) asserts that *Ulusalçılık* means Eurasianism, which has also appeared under the name *Kızıl Elma* (Red Apple) Coalition. Socialist İlhan (2004) sees it as a common hope for Russia and Turkey, while liberal Berkan criticizes Eurasianist groups claiming that they use geopolitics as a so-called “scientific approach” in justifying their “anti-democratic” claims. While some see *Ulusalçılık* and Eurasianism as almost the same thing (Üşümezsoy and Doğan, 2008), others add the so-called “*Ergenekon* terrorist organization” to these two and blame Eurasianists by being outmoded and anti-democratic groups embedded in the deep state tradition of Turkish politics (Çandar, 2008; Korkmaz, 2010).

Another commentator, Çomak (2011) from the nationalist Eurasianist wing, defined Eurasianism as the meeting point of anti-EU groups who would never come together under normal conditions. Çomak questions, accordingly, whether a term which is defined differently by different people can play a unifying role or not. Another nationalist figure, the head of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Homes), Kavuncu (in Yıldız, 2009), shows hesitation in approaching Eurasianism which he sees as a wrong route for Turkists to follow; they should rather work for a unification of Turkey with Turkistan. However, he still underlines a potential pragmatism in cooperating with Russia in Eurasia if the two countries' interests overlap.

On the other hand, some nationalists have already embraced Eurasianism as a potential foreign policy option for Turkey (Eslen, 2008; Külebi, 2006; Özdağ, 2004; Taşçı, 2010; and Yeniçeri, 2004, 2010). Some of these nationalists describe Eurasianism as an option insufficiently considered for Turkish foreign policy (Külebi, 2006), while others see it as a historical fact (Yeniçeri, 2010), a geopolitical necessity (Bulut, 2010; Eslen, 2008) and an emergency for Turks. Some, on the other hand, see Eurasianism as a more important goal for Turkey than democracy (Eslen, 2010). Finally, there are comments about Eurasia from liberal business organizations like the *Marmara Grubu Vakfı* (Marmara Group Foundation) which organizes business meetings with Eurasian countries and has the slogan of “the Future is Eurasia!” (Süver, 2008).

These dense discussions prove one thing if nothing else, that in Turkish politics Eurasianism has triggered a lot of interest. People from a wide range of the political spectrum wrote about it, even though some of them do not have faith in it. This study will refer to data collected from three journals which represent three geopolitical traditions, socialism, nationalism and Islamism, from which these discussions are mainly triggered. This study combines content analysis with qualitative data collected from the three journals: the nationalist (*Ulusalçı* today) *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), the socialist (also *Ulusalçı* today) *Teori* (Theory) and the Islamist-liberal (conservative democrat today) *Türkiye Günlüğü* (Diary of Turkey).

Content Analysis: Theories and Terminology

This study refers to theories as well as past research in selecting its variables. The aim is to test hypotheses and find quantitative data confirming that the chosen variables are statistically important (Neuendorf, 2002: 168). This research looks for a relationship between the representation of history and geopolitical discourse for the related three geopolitical traditions in Turkey. The content analysis is made of key ideas, key reference points (thinkers, events and journals), and key subjects from the three journals.

The goal of this study is twofold: first it aims to describe different categories of Turkish Eurasianism, benefiting from the tools of critical geopolitics theory. Second, its purpose is to deconstruct the reasons which lay behind the overlapping and clashing discourses among the three geopolitical traditions. There are two main steps in the data analysis: descriptive and explanatory. The descriptive part uses the critical geopolitical theory’s analytical tools. The explanatory part, on the other hand, makes use of the social representation/collective memory studies, because this study claims that what defines these groups’ borders are their clashing/overlapping representations of the past. Accordingly, these groups’ collective memories in relation to Turkish history will be analyzed to scrutinize the causal mechanism behind their geopolitical discourse dynamics.

By using the constructivist as well as the rationalist tools of critical geopolitics for descriptive purposes, this study expects to understand who the Turkish Eurasianists are, how they can be categorized, and why there is more than one Turkish Eurasianism. As a second step, it adapts collective memory studies for explanatory purposes in finding out the hidden causal mechanism behind polarization and rapprochement dynamics among Eurasianist groups’ geopolitical discourses. It explores how Eurasianists perceive each other and themselves. Accordingly, this research aims to contribute to the relevant literature via a content analysis supported by qualitative data on who the Turkish Eurasianists are, how different they are from each other and why.

Critical Geopolitics Theory

Stone (2004: 9) underlines the idea that traditional geopolitical discourse has almost a monopoly in Turkish politics, both in academia and in practice. Constructivist models are rarely adapted to political studies. Vague terms like “Turkish national interest” are highly common without concrete definitions but in shifting contexts (Stone, 2004: 10). About Eurasianist discourses in Turkey, Stone says, “Eurasia is a porous conception, then and remains ensnared within shifting geographist or ideological positions.” This study agrees with this idea and that is why it benefits from the tools of the critical geopolitics theory which provides the opportunity for the researcher to conduct a constructivist analysis on traditional geopolitical discourses as in the case of the Turkish intellectual tradition.

Critical geopolitics sees classical geopolitics as a pseudoscience and it provides the tools to critically analyze traditional geopolitical discourses and the geopoliticians who develop these discourses. Turkish Eurasianists are geopoliticians in this sense (See Bilgin, 2005, 2007, 2007b, 2008). That is why the key concepts that critical geopolitics scholars provide will be this research’s key concepts in supporting the descriptive hypothesis which is that there are two key Eurasianist groups in the contemporary Turkish intellectual arena: the Kemalist Eurasianists coming from nationalist and socialist (or the so named *Ulusalçı*- geopolitical traditions) and the Ottomanist Eurasianists coming from Islamist geopolitical tradition –(in today’s terms the conservative democrats).

Traditional Geopolitical Way of Narration: The Case of Turkish Eurasianism

The geopolitical type of narration has two main characteristics: it is declarative (this is how the world “is”) and it is imperative (this is what “we” must do). The “is” shows commitment to unchanging objectivity of truth, while the “we” shows the geographically bounded community and its cultural/political version of truth. Sacralization and historical narrativization are the two tools used by traditional geopoliticians in influencing their followers. These criteria were observed frequently in all three journals. With minor differences from one journal to the others, all were proven usually to be declarative and imperative in their discourses in major amounts. This data proved that it was a suitable choice to work with the critical geopolitics theory in categorizing the Turkish geopoliticians of Eurasianism.

As mentioned before, the primary goal of this study is to test two main arguments: one descriptive and one explanatory. Accordingly, as primary resources, three journals were scanned representing three main geopolitical traditions in Turkey: *Türkiye Günlüğü*, which represents the Islamists (today’s conservative democrats), *Teori*, which is the official journal of today’s *ulusalçı* socialist Worker’s Party and finally *Türk Yurdu*, which is today’s *ulusalçı* nationalist right wing journal. Because of the fact that Turkish Eurasianism is a post-Cold War phenomenon, only post-Cold War volumes of these journals published between the years of 1990 to 2010 were scanned. Not all the published volumes between these years were read. Rather, some were eliminated via an index scanning of all volumes published in these 20 years. Accordingly, only the relevant articles were read; they were on the following topics:

1. Ideologies in Turkey
2. Turkish history (Ottoman and Republican)
3. Geopolitics
4. Eurasia/ Eurasianism
5. Ottomanism

6. Turkism
7. Turkish foreign policy
8. Turkish domestic policy
9. The West

After the eliminations according to these criteria, there were 113 articles remaining from *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 109 from *Türk Yurdu* and 81 from *Teori* of different lengths ranging from one to twelve pages. On average the articles were between five to ten pages each.

This study claims that there are two distinctive geopolitical discourses of Turkish Eurasianism: Kemalist and Ottomanist. In addition, it purports that Kemalists and Eurasianists come from two separate geopolitical traditions: socialist and nationalist. This might sound like a bold claim, because these two traditions used to be the clashing parties of a virtual civil war during the Cold War years in Turkey. Accordingly, this study will try to deconstruct the change and persistence dynamics in the construction of today's new and unexpected polarization among Turkish Eurasianists.

Collective Memory/ Social Representation Theories

Epistemic realism is a concept explaining how the rationale of threat construction via specific foreign policy discourses and practices works in international relations (Campbell, 1992: 1). Epistemic realism sanctions in two analytical forms: i) narrativization of historiography in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves and ii) logic of explanation whose purpose is to identify these self-evident facts and material causes for them. In this analysis, all three geopolitical traditions carry these two criteria.

Collective or social memory means a remembering process, of not only what we have experienced during our life time, but what we have also thought via history teachings, both as parts of our ancestral past (Laszio and Liu, 2007). On the other hand, autobiographical memory is memory of those events that we ourselves experience, and historical memory is the one that reaches us only through historical records. History is the remembered past to which we no longer have an "organic" relation, while collective memory is the active past that forms our identities. Historical memory can be organic or dead: we can celebrate things that we have not directly experienced, as in the case of all three geopolitical traditions.

Another helpful definition is the "mnemonic communities" which are groups who remember what they have not directly experienced, but what they are told via generational story lines about a shared past. In the Turkish Eurasianist case the socialist and nationalist Eurasianists are expected to be the mnemonic communities who share the Kemalist historiography as their primary source of information about the past. On the other hand, the conservative democrat Eurasianists are expected to play the role of a counter memory which is not satisfied with the Kemalist understanding of Turkish history and works to reimagine it as a social and political counter-force. Kemalist groups seem to be defensive, while the Islamist Eurasianist group seems to be offensive in this fight over a collective memory of the Turkish society.

Construction of collective identities via national heroes, golden ages, myths or suffering, point out one fact about the characteristics of social identity: it is a field of ongoing debate, just like the battle of Kemalist historiography vs. Islamist historiography. History provides "narratives of origins" (Hilton

and Liu, 2005: 3), which work as *quasi-legal charters* establishing rules, norms, moral codes, and do's and don'ts. Accordingly, this study focuses on the perceptions of history of the three groups to understand the mechanisms of change and persistence among and within them. This is because representations of history are contested when it comes to applying them to current events. Social representations of history may be hegemonic (consensual through society), emancipated (different versions in different parts of society) and polemical (conflicting across different groups) (Hilton and Liu, 2005:6). In the case of Turkish Eurasianists, Islamists and Kemalists are expected to clash over polemical representations of history while the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists seem to share a hegemonic representation.

In preparing the content analysis in line with this theory, all the three journal writers' imaginations of and the ways they narrativize Turkish history were investigated. How hegemonic, emancipated and polemical different groups' storylines are and how this reflects to their categorization as conflicting and overlapping geopolitical groups constitutes an important part of this analysis. This is because this kind of data gives important clues about the causal mechanism lying on the grounds of the group dynamics among Turkish Eurasianists.

How the Representation of the Past can Change and Persist

To define malleability and persistence of collective memories, presentism is a helpful theory which puts forward alternative ways in which images of the past change over time. It is also an instrumentalist theory aiming to deconstruct how groups use the past for present purposes and holds that the past is generally a useful resource for expressing and justifying current interests (Olick And Robbins,1998). Within presentism, it is possible to emphasize the instrumental or semantic dimensions of memory... For the instrumental dimension, memory entrepreneurship is a manipulation of the past for particular purposes, while for the semantic dimension; selective memory is an inevitable consequence of how we interpret the world.

Instrumental persistence happens when actors intentionally seek to maintain a particular version of the past; while cultural persistence refers to a particular past which is perpetuated because it remains relevant to later cultural formations. More general images are more likely to adapt to new contexts than more specific ones. For instrumental change to occur, actors intentionally change an image of the past for particular reasons in the present, though we cannot always predict the results of our efforts; and finally cultural change happens when a particular past no longer fits with present understandings or otherwise loses relevance for the present (See Table 1)

My expectation is that cultural change happened for the socialist and nationalist Eurasianists in Turkey. The ending of the Cold War made these old ideologies irrelevant in various terms. For socialists, communism lost its power as an alternative way of life and political ideal after the demise of the Soviet Union. However, the Workers Party, which is the institution publishing the socialist *Teori* journal, is still a political party which wants to get votes of people. That is why they had to change their discourse so that it would fit the current conjuncture. A similar situation is applicable to the nationalist geopoliticians of Eurasianism. They lost their anti-communist position after the disappearance of the Soviet Union as an enemy. To prevent themselves from becoming irrelevant, cultural change also

occurred for nationalist Eurasianists. Cultural change for both of these groups is also accompanied by instrumental change. Both groups have direct or indirect political aims that shape the policy decisions about Turkey's future.

Table 1
Dynamics of Persistence and Change in the Image of the Past
(Olick and Robbins 1998:129)

	Instrumental	Cultural	Inertial
Persistence	Self-conscious orthodoxy, conservatism, heritage movements	Continued relevance, canon	Habit, routine, repetition, custom
Change	Revisionism, memory entrepreneurship, redress movements, legitimation, invented tradition	Irrelevance, paradigm change, discovery of new facts	Decay, atrophy, saturation, accidental loss, death

In the macro level, with the ending of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy perspective changed dramatically. The politicians realized that it is not necessarily an inseparable part of the West: the idea that Turkey's national interests might not always fit with the interests of the West was confirmed by various incidents. On the other hand, Turkey's newly founded relations with the Central Asian countries brought some disillusionment about these countries specifically and about the East in general. As a result, nationalist and socialist Eurasianists tended to rely on anti-Westernism while looking for some ways to integrate Turkey into alternative alliances. For these two groups, Eurasianism worked as a roof under which they meet via cultural and instrumental changes (Cengiz and Ersanlı, 2000; Ersanlı, 2001; Marlene, 2008).

Cultural and instrumental persistence occurred for the conservative group whose sub-national identity became even more relevant in the post-modern context of localization. Conservatives became more relevant in the post Cold War's postmodernist world where hegemonic state discourse is challenged by sub-national forces everywhere in the world (Mamadouh, 1998). As a counter memory, this research claims that Islamists met on the ground of change and democracy with the liberals of Turkey and constructed the Ottomanist Eurasianism alternative. In instrumental terms, they also became powerful with the success of the AKP government which confirmed the wisdom of persistence in terms of a social representation of history.

Expectations about Data Findings

Before starting the content analysis, the expectations were that the nationalist and socialist Eurasianist journals' ideas would overlap to a major degree, especially on the issues of how Republican and Ottoman history is imagined, how Kemalism is defined and accordingly how ideal domestic and foreign policies are constructed in these discourses. The nationalist and socialist Eurasianists were expected to be faithful to Kemalist historiography and to describe Kemalism in anti-imperialist and anti-Western terms. Conversely, the Islamist Eurasianist group was expected to use the terms of Kemalism and Westernism interchangeably while opposing Kemalist historiography which they claim tried to delete the Ottoman and Muslim history of Turks from the collective memory of the society. As a result of these conflicting views of history, Kemalist Eurasianists were expected to have different political and social expectations from Ottomanist Eurasianists in terms of domestic and foreign policy.

In addition, the common reference points of nationalist and socialist geopoliticians were expected to be more frequent than their common reference points with the Islamist Eurasianists. The idea that these reference points matter comes from the constructivist theory of collective memory studies. The theory claims that in social and political life what matters is interpretation. There is no reality waiting out there to be discovered: interpretations make up our realities. That is why the basis of the different groups' "realities" lie behind their conflicting interpretations, for instance as in the case of Turkish Eurasianism's discordant imaginations of the past. One way to find out where these conflicting interpretations originate from is to look at these groups' main reference points.

As already mentioned, the explanatory hypothesis was that the reason behind the rapprochement of nationalist and socialist Eurasianists is their shared vision of Turkish history. In terms of Republican history, the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists were expected to have similar perspectives which are usually positive even if sometimes critical. On the other hand, Islamist Eurasianists were expected to express a tension regarding the Republican historiography which would reflect their negative perception of Kemalism. In terms of Ottoman historiography, the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists were again expected to have similar negative views, in contrast to the glorification of the empire by the Islamist Eurasianists. Finally, in regards to the data showing the three groups' perspective of each other, an increasing approach from nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions towards each other were expected in the Post- Cold period. This study contends that socialists and nationalists changed their perceptions in an evolving manner in a way that their interpretations of reality merged in time. On the other hand, nationalist and socialist groups were expected to have negative perception of the conservative democrat Eurasianists and vice versa.

Content Analysis Results

The sites of the production of geopolitics are diverse: they are both high (a national security memorandum), and low (a headline of newspaper), visual and discursive, traditional (religious motives) and postmodern (internet). They ask questions like: "What is the path for national greatness for a state?," "How can a state grow?," "How can a state be reformed in a way that it does not lose its greatness?" Accordingly, in the descriptive analysis, answers for the following questions from all three journals were searched in order to categorize them accordingly:

1. What is Turkey's national interest? What kind of a future are you working for?
2. What should change/stay the same for a better future of Turkey?
3. Where is your Eurasia? What countries are parts of it? Who are not Eurasian? Who are the enemies/opposites/Others of Eurasia?
4. What is the criterion of being Eurasian? (geographical, cultural, historical, traditional, civilizational, etc.) What should Turkey's approach be to Eurasia? (foreign policy recommendations)
5. What is the place of Turkey in Eurasia?
6. Are Turkish citizens also Eurasian? What is the cultural and political identity of Turks?
7. What is the importance of Eurasia for world politics? What is the importance of Turkey for world politics?

In answering these questions this research referred to key ideas that were noted down from each article. For the *Türkiye Günlüğü* journal there were 371, from *Teori* 276 and from *Türk Yurdu* 445 key ideas. The answers given to the nine questions by the journal writers vary, but some key tendencies of each journal towards addressing these questions can be determined. The aim is to find out whether the socialist and nationalist Eurasianist journals show any common approach to these questions, and whether the conservative Eurasianists' perspective creates an alternative to them.

Conservative democrat Eurasianists see Turkey's national interest in changing towards a more democratic, multicultural, and liberal state. The Özal type conservative liberalism and Ottoman type multinational, multicultural unity seem to be reference points of this group in domestic politics as a remedy. They also see Neo-Ottomanism as a way to democratize and form more effective relations in the international arena. They want to reorganize the state structure accordingly.

On the other hand, socialist Eurasianists ask for a "proletarian Republic" which values equality, democracy, independence, freedom, secularism and enlightenment. However, democracy does not seem to be a priority for this group as a national interest of Turkey. These socialists also value patriotism. They think secularism brings freedom of speech and that is why it should be protected. Even though they are internationalist, they seem to have become more statist in time. One of their key terms is anti-imperialism because they firmly believe that both the domestic and international problems of Turkey are traceable to the interests of the Western imperialists.

Similarly, the nationalist Eurasianist group is under the effect of the Sevres syndrome in interpreting both the domestic and international problems of Turkey. Nationalist Eurasianists think that Turkey is at the center of world politics and they are the only ones who realize this fact. That's why, they think, both the West and its domestic "supporters" are against the nationalists. These supporters of the West are the liberals and the Islamist Eurasianists. Nationalist Eurasianists, like the Socialist Eurasianists, value patriotism as well as the state. They have no problem with secularism and in general with the Kemalist doctrine, even though they do not praise it as much as the socialist ones do.

When it comes to the idea of change, conservative democrat Eurasianists are strong supporters of it. They think that Turkish historiography should get revised in a way that it is more at peace with the Ottoman history. They do not like the Kemalist doctrine which they do not find democratic enough. Conservative democrat Eurasianists ask for a synthesis of the periphery and the center via further democratization: "Turkey is looking for a synthesis to combine Turk and Kurt, periphery and center,

Islam and modernity via liberalism rather than authoritarianism: Turkey looks for Özal” (Göle, 1993: 24). They think nationalist and socialist Eurasianists are into conspiracy theories which make Turkey waste time: “It is pathetic to search for the West behind all of our problems” (Göle, 1993: 26).

On the other hand, socialist Eurasianists define democratization as freeing proletariat from its ties with its exploiters (Perinçek, 1994: 8). They think that the Republican reforms did not get completed, rather they were manipulated, and that is why Turkey struggles with many problems today. To overcome this, Turkey should return to being guided in light of the Republican revolution. Turks and Kurds should also form a fraternity which will lead to a fraternity of Turkey with the Eurasian countries: “Our fraternity can be a model for the world and we will solve the problems in the Chaos Geography” (Perinçek, 1994: 5). The nationalist Eurasianists’ approach to the Kurdish issue is different: they think Kurds are tricked by the West, so this is a fake problem created by imperialists: “The state accepted Kurds as Turks and never discriminated against them” (Türkdoğan, 1991: 2), “There is a possibility that Kurds came from a Turkish origin” (Köseoğlu, 1995: 5), “Imperialists want to do today what they did with the Montroe Treaty yesterday by using Kurds” (Onat, 2006: 60). One other important national interest for nationalist Eurasianists is for Turkey to realize its strength and cooperate with Russia and China to be a Eurasian power. Socialist and nationalist Eurasianists’ ideas overlap here, too: regionalization in Eurasia promotes a better future for Turkey.

The following table (See Table 2) summarizes the results of the descriptive questionnaire about the political expectations of the three geopolitical traditions. In line with the discussion, this summary also confirms that in terms of domestic politics expectations, the Islamist tradition draws a highly alternative line to the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists, which overlap frequently, as expected.

Table 2
Clashing/Overlapping Political Expectations of the Three Geopolitical Traditions

Islamists

Change towards a more democratic, multicultural. liberal state
 Özalıan type of Neo-Ottomanism
 Kemalist historiography should be revised
 Distaste with conspiracy theories

Socialists

Democracy is not the priority (Negative connotation)
 Kemalist historiography should remain
 Patriotism, statism, anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism
 Sevres syndrome

Nationalists

Democracy is not the priority (Negative connotation)
 Turkey as the center of world politics
 Inner and outer enemies, anti-Westernism, anti-liberalism, patriotism, statism, secularism, (peace with) Kemalist doctrine
 Sevres syndrome

Eurasia for conservative democrat Eurasianists means the geography of the former Ottoman Empire, namely the Middle East. For socialist Eurasianists, on the other hand, it is a wide area which includes Russia, China, India, Central Asia, Iran, Middle East and even Latin America and Africa. Socialist Eurasianists see all the countries except the Western ones as potential allies for Turkey in Eurasia. They refer to various alternative regionalism ideas for Turkey like Mustafa Öztürk's Southwest Asia (Turkey, Syria, and Iran), Anıl Çeçen's Central States Union (Turkey, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan) Doğu Perinçek's Big Asia Union (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan), or Hakan Albayrak's Turkey-Syria Union to include some concrete overlapping plans for Turkey's future foreign policy direction.

For nationalist Eurasianists, Eurasia is primarily the so called "Turkistan," they add all the areas where Turks live, and finally Russia is included in their vague definition of Eurasia. "The new world order of Turkism" and "the sun country" are some alternative names nationalist Eurasianists offer for a new Turkish future ideal. Ambiguity in defining where Eurasia is seems to be common to all three groups. For the socialist and nationalist Eurasianists, though, there is an overlapping mistrust of the West, which they think has only bad intentions towards Turkey and Eurasia. On the other hand, this ambiguity can be interpreted as a natural result of instrumental reasoning: a not well defined Eurasia is more practical for political purposes than a well defined one.

When it comes to Turkey's role and importance in the region, all the three groups seem to have a similar perspective in terms of referring to history. However the histories they refer to are not the same. Conservative democrat Eurasianists see Turkey's historical role in reference to the Ottoman Empire, and they think having an active role in the region is both a right and a duty for Turkey. Socialist Eurasianists also refer to history but to the Republican revolutionary history instead of the Ottoman one. They focus on the anti imperialist unity of the Eurasian countries against the West, of which Turkey has to be a part because of its revolutionary past. Nationalist Eurasianists also refer to history, but they go beyond the Ottoman history and refer to the previous existence of Turks in the region. In addition to the other two groups, nationalist Eurasianists also underline the ethnic, linguistic and cultural commonness of Turkey with Eurasian countries, making regionalization in Eurasia a sociological, historical and political necessity.

Among the three, only socialist Eurasianists openly claim that Turks are Eurasians. To conservative democrat Eurasianists, Turks are Ottomans (a reference to religion) and for nationalist Eurasianists Turks are Turks (a reference to ethnicity). Conservatives state that Eurasia can work as an alternative civilization for the countries such as Turkey that do not belong to one civilization only. They show their difference from socialists by asserting that countries like Iran, Russia, Turkey and China cannot be considered as exploited or underdeveloped: their history of self modernization makes them special.

For socialist Eurasianists, definitions of Eurasia should be considered on two levels, security and necessities. Socialist Eurasianists see regionalization in Eurasia as the unique pragmatic option for Turkey and the entire exploited world. This group embraces Eurasianism both as an identity for Turks and as a pragmatic option. Nationalist Eurasianists' view of Eurasianism, on the other hand, is only a means to reach their ultimate goal of uniting with the Central Asian Turkic countries. They even claim that calling these societies "Turkic" is discriminatory because they are as Turkish as the Turks in Turkey.

For conservative democrat Eurasianists, Eurasia is the former Ottoman lands because Turkey needs to regain its historic honorable role. However, for nationalists and socialist Eurasianists, Eurasia means even more: it is the global key point in which all the big states have interests. They refer to its rich energy resources as well as its glorious history and highly developed culture as the reasons why it is the center of the world.

Socialist Eurasianists define this area as the “Chaos Geography.” To them Turkey and Russia, which have cooperated during the Bolshevik and Republican Revolutions, should come together again for the sake of guiding a long term wide ranging regionalization in Eurasia. On the other hand, nationalist Eurasianists state their plans of using television, sports and art as potential means for integrating the Turkic countries. Turkey, to them, needs to be the most critical power behind this integration. Similarly, socialist Eurasianists recommend that Eurasian countries construct common Eurasian media sources. They need to learn each other’s language and build Eurasian universities. This is the only way to fight the American propaganda that sets Eurasians against one another. The following table summarizes the overlapping/clashing geopolitical visions of the three traditions, again confirming this study’s expectations about the overlapping visions of nationalist and socialist Eurasianists which are countered by the alternative vision of the Islamist Eurasianists.

Table 3
Which Eurasia does Turkey Belong to:
Three Geopolitical Traditions, Three Eurasias

Islamists

Eurasia: ex-Ottoman geography

Turkey’s role: Historical responsibility coming from Ottoman history

Cultural Identity: Ottomanism

Socialists

Eurasia: non-Western exploited world

Turkey’s role: Historically shared leadership with Russia

Cultural Identity: Social Eurasianism

Nationalists

Eurasia: Central Asia (and Russia, if necessary)

Turkey’s role: Historical and cultural leadership

Cultural Identity: Turkism

Data on Causal Mechanism

As its second hypothesis, this study discusses how three Eurasian geopolitical traditions differed in the past and shows that geopolitical perspectives of nationalist and socialist Eurasianists (*Ulusalçis* of today) have grown closer to each other in recent years, while Islamist Eurasianists (conservative democrats today) have become the new opposing pole. Why did this alignment take place? This research argues that the political elites of these three ideological camps self-consciously construct these geopolitical discourses. These discourses help them to serve their political aims, but the ensuing historiographical disputes and competing collective memory constructions create conflict among

them. In the last two decades, the right and left wing have approached each other under the names of *Kızılelma Koalisyonu* (Red Apple Coalition), *Kuva-i Milliye Birliđi* or *Ulusalcılık* (Patriotism), while the conservative democratic circles stay out of these rapprochements. Attila İlhan’s works on constructing an alternative history line of Eurasianism as well as the Workers Party which led international conferences and produced publications have been effective in bringing nationalist and socialist Eurasianists together; they also have contributed to the increasing popularity of Eurasianism in Turkey.

An example of this cooperation is the series of books published under the leadership of Attila İlhan named *Bir Millet Uyaniyor, 2005-2007* (“A Nation Awakening”) In this series, famous thinkers from the socialist Eurasianism circle such as Atıf Behramođlu, Mehmet Perinçek, Erol Manisalı, Vural Savaş and Sina Akşin, and writers from the nationalist wing such as Sadi Somuncuođlu, Arslan Bulut, Suat İlhan and Ümit Özdađ came together and contributed to it. These *ulusalcı* people came together with the aim of protecting the Turkish Republic (Bilgi Publishing House, 2005: 6). No matter what their divided views are, they state that they should come together to wake up the society and let it know about the dangers to its sovereignty and independence.

These writers perceive the nation being in a war with the West that some of the people are still not aware of: “the US and Europe are in an economic recession period. In such periods world wars are started by the West. They want to prevent the Shanghai Union to get stronger and that is why they want to create hostilities in Eurasia. This is going to be a new global crusade. We should prevent this” (Bulut, 2005: 6). Four of the twenty books in this series are devoted specifically to the issue of Turkish Eurasianism.

Key Ideas on Republican Historiography and Kemalism

The following six area and pie charts show the three groups’ key ideas on the Republican history. How these ideas evolved in time in the post-Cold War period can be read in the area charts, while the pie charts show these three journal writers’ approach to the Republican history in terms of number of the articles written on that issue and the percentage of positive, negative and neutral perspectives related to that issue. Positive key ideas on the Republican history can also be read as a positive approach to the Kemalist foundational principles of Turkey, Republican historiography, Turkish Independence War, treaties signed after it, reforms made between the years of 1923-1938, and all other relevant political developments during the Republican foundation.




Chart 1




Chart 2

The two charts numbered 1. and 2. belong to the conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü* journal. In both charts the dark grey, which represents negative ideas, outweigh the others. The area chart shows that from the 1990s to 2000, there are only a couple of positive views about Republican history, while after 2000 there are no positive views at all.⁽¹⁾ In *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 75% of ideas on the Republican history are negative, while only 9% are positive. For the nationalist Eurasianist *Türk Yurdu* and socialist Eurasianist *Teori*, on the other hand, there is a different perspective towards the Republican history, Republican elite and their reforms (See Charts 3, 4, 5 and 6).




Chart 3




Chart 4




Chart 5




Chart 6

In *Teori*, the outweighing color is medium grey which represents positive views about the Republican history. Even though there are some negative and neutral views in the early 90s, we see them almost totally disappear with passing time. However, as said before, what mainly matters for this study are the pie chart results. This is also because what is needed to be compared in terms of time is the Cold War period with the post-Cold War one. Even though there is no available data from pre-1990, the situation during the Cold War years among these three groups is well known today: the conservative and nationalist Eurasianists were in the right wing and they were in an intense fight with the socialist Eurasianists, which used to include today's liberals also. However, in the post-Cold War period, these categorizations changed dramatically. This study shares data devoted to pinpointing this change.

In *Teori* 77% and in *Türk Yurdu*, 58% of views about the Republican history are positive: for *Teori* only 8% and for *Türk Yurdu* only 14% of the views are negative. Compared to the *Türkiye Günlüğü*, there is an obvious similarity among socialist and nationalist Eurasianists in terms of having a positive approach to the Republican historiography. Looking at the area chart of *Türk Yurdu*, this research

maintains that the nationalist Eurasianist writers' ideas on the Republican history have become more positive in time and the negativity in their perceptions has decreased.

Key Ideas on Ottoman History

It was expected that, while the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists have become closer in terms of their positive approach to the Republican history, they also share a negative approach towards the Ottoman history. On the other hand, the conservative democrat Eurasianists were expected to remember Ottoman history in mostly positive terms, distinguishing them from the two *Ulusalci* groups. Here are the relevant data and the interpretations of it:



Chart 7



Chart 8




Chart 9




Chart 10

At variance from what was expected, the conservative democratic Eurasianist group seems to be approaching Ottoman history in a more neutral way (50%) than a positive way (35%) (See Chart 7). Their disagreement with the Republican historiography, which they claim ignored and deleted the Ottoman past from the social memory of the society, does not necessarily reflect in the data as an over-exaggerated glorification of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the socialist Eurasianist *Teori* group seems to have some problems with Ottoman history, to the extent that 90 percent of the 20 key ideas about Ottoman Empire are negative (See Chart 10).

There is another surprising result on the side of *Türk Yurdu*. Their approach to the Ottoman Empire seems to be even more positive than the conservative *Türkiye Günlüğü*: 62% of key ideas are positive (See Chart 12). However, nationalist Eurasianists are also more critical of Ottoman history, with 24% negative views compared to the 15% of the conservatives. Important additional information to keep in mind, though, is the fact that *Türkiye Günlüğü* talks more about the empire history (40 key ideas) than the other two: *Teori* (20) and *Türk Yurdu* (21). Accordingly, the data from the three journals' approach to the Ottoman Empire does not necessarily confirm this study's prior expectations about a visible overlap between the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists.




Chart 11




Chart 12



Chart 13




Chart 14




Chart 15



Chart 16

Key Ideas of the Three Journals about Each Other

Another type of data shared below, which shows each group's perspectives about the other two groups, shows some overlap among the two *ulusalci* groups in terms of their negative perception of the conservative democrat Eurasianists.

As expected, both *Teori* with 93% and *Türk Yurdu* with 75% have overwhelmingly negative views on the conservative democrat Eurasianists (See Charts 17 and 23). For *Teori*, this negative perception has been stable for twenty years, as the Chart 13 shows, but for *Türk Yurdu* the negativity seems to have increased with time. While in the 90s there were still some positive thoughts about them, in the 2000s these positive perceptions seem to have disappeared (See Chart 23). This is important information because over time it shows a change among the nationalist Eurasianists' view about the conservatives.

Qualitative data suggest that this growing negativity is caused by the idea that conservatives cooperate with the West if they are not cheated by it, and they started to support the Western as well as liberal views that come from abroad. Unfortunately there is no quantitative data available to support this claim but qualitative data shows this direction. Accordingly, notice the following quotations from some of the writers of the nationalist Eurasianist *Türk Yurdu* that clarify this study's claim: "Marxists, Neo-Marxists and political Islamists converge on the idea of being bothered by Turks to exist in this geography and wanting to replace Turkish Republic's main principles with their own intentions for ten years. They see Turkish nationalism as their enemy. They come together via newspapers and TV and share their ideas through the means of media." (*Türk Yurdu* Editor, 2007). "These groups that are bothered by our existence in this geography have a long history" (Ercilasun, 2007). "There are three main categories of the supporters of the West, 1) the ones who do not feel Turkish, 2) the ones with weak personality and 3) the youth who fall into internationalist ideologies." "The Westernism of the Ottoman years evolved into the Marxism of the Cold War, which then evolved into liberalism after the end of the Cold War. They became supporters of the Kurds, the Armenians, the EU and the Alevis." (Hocaoğlu, 2007: 76) "After 28 February, the anti-EU Islamists became pro-EU in order to fight against the state" (Bayram, 2007: 77). "These groups did not intentionally come together but they are brought together by the global market which has vital interests in Turkey" (Yeniçeri, 2007: 79). "The main aim since Sevres is the same: to separate Turkey into religious and ethnic parts. Yesterday's *İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti* is today's liberal groups... *İslam Teali Cemiyeti* was using Islam to demand protection from England. Today's usage of Islam is the same and has nothing to do with the real Islam... These groups are brought together by the plans of the superpowers." "Second Republicans and Islamists want to create a memoryless, historyless society. Nationalists are the main powers against them. That is why they hate nationalists... These groups misunderstood both liberalism and Islam ... They are slaves of the West and we have to cooperate against these Neo-Ottomanist traitors" (Kodaman, 2007: 83). "Islamists paradoxically cooperate with the liberals because of the common foreign resources they have. They are traitors because they work against their own state" (Atasoy, 2007: 88).

When it comes to how the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists see each other, *Teori* has 50% positive and 33% negative views on nationalists (See Chart 21). Looking solely at this data might make one think that it is not positive enough to conclude that there is a rapprochement between the socialist Eurasianists and the nationalist Eurasianists. At this point, Chart 20 helps us see the increasingly positive perception of socialist Eurasianists about nationalist Eurasianists starting around the year 1993 and continuing through the 2000s, while the negative views disappear in time.




Chart 17




Chart 18




Chart 19




Chart 20




Chart 21




Chart 22




Chart 23




Chart 24

In addition, the qualitative data gives us some satisfactory clues about the instrumental and pragmatic change mechanism among the socialist group which advises its members to embrace nationalist symbols and philosophy to gain the support and trust of the society. These instrumentally motivated discussions among the socialist Eurasianists confirm this study's expectation driven from the presentist theory. Revisionism in this group's geopolitical discourse happens in a way that they legitimize change via memory entrepreneurship to adapt to the changing conjuncture:

Workers Party has to be supporter of national symbols against imperialism; we cannot leave this duty to the reactionary forces... These symbols and feelings must be taken away from the reactionaries and should be given to the society as weapons... One cannot have a future without having a past... We have to refer to our history positively so that we can give the courage to the society for another revolution to happen. They would not trust people who are against everything they respect and who are critical of all the past achievements that they are proud of... Nations with a glorious history are more likely to accomplish a lot in the future. Islamists and fascists are using history as their main weapon. We should embrace these values and not let them use them against the people... Our internationalist red flag is of course always will be prior to us but we should also consider people with attachment to national symbols... I do not tell you to sing the Ottoman army anthem but the national anthem because Ottoman one does not have any progressive side but the role of the national anthem in the Liberation War is obvious (Güntekin, 1994: 15-19 and 31).

Investigating the nationalist Eurasianists' ideas about leftists, there is some supporting data for this study's hypothesis (See Charts 21 and 23). Even though the 64% negative views of nationalist Eurasianists about leftists might not seem promising at first, the increase in their positive views from 1993 to 2005 can be interpreted as critical also. Here again, the qualitative data says more than the quantitative ones. Qualitative data suggest that the rapprochement from nationalist Eurasianists to leftists is mainly constructed and developed by some specific individuals among the nationalist Eurasianists such as Arslan Bulut and Özcan Yeniçeri from *Yeniçağ*, the famous nationalist Ümit Özdağ, who opened many think tanks in Turkey and Ali Külebi, another think tank founder. There is another important fact about Ali Külebi. He worked as the director of the think tank TUSAM (Turkey National Security Strategic Analysis Center), which used to publish the weekly journal *Strateji* on foreign policy analyses for Turkey. This journal was distributed by the socialist newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. TUSAM is a good example of the practical institutionalization of the socialist- nationalist Eurasianist alliance.⁽²⁾

Even though the number of these leader figures from the nationalist Eurasianist circle is not great, their effectiveness is enough to shape the perceptions of the whole group. They are active figures who produce a lot and reach the masses through TV programs, newspapers and books. The TV channel called Eurasia TV (*Avrasya TV*) has been the leading meeting point for famous figures from both right and left wing *ulusalcı*s who share their ideas with each other and with the masses via various political discussion programs. *Ulusalcı* cooperation is triggered even more by figures like Attila İlhan and Doğu Perinçek. The book *Türkçü- Devrimci Diyalogu Doğu Perinçek ve Attila İlhan ile Söyleşi* (Türkçü- Devrimci Diyalogu "Turkist- Revolutionist Dialogue Talks with Attila İlhan and

Doğu Perinçek”) written by the nationalist Arslan Bulut is a good example of the *Ulusalçı* ally where nationalist and socialist Eurasianists seem to have come together with the help of a perception of a common enemy. Even though there are still some issues where they have non-matching ideas, like the Kurdish issue and the situation of Turkic people in China, they seem to focus on cooperation more than competition. This book is a good example of these attempts: “We have to reconsider our terminology and redefine our values and goals in light of the changing conjuncture and guidance of our leader: Atatürk’s ideals. Our common reference points are the sacred existence of Turks and Turkey, its independence and sovereignty... We should work together for the leadership of Turkey in this region: for ourselves, for the region and for humanity’s sake” (Bulut, 1998: 9).

On the Neo-Ottomanist Challenge of the Kemalist Turkey

According to Çolak (2006: 587), recently the perception about Ottomans in Turkey has dramatically changed and a new focus on the tolerant (instead of reactionary) and refined (instead of cruel) sides of the empire have been emphasized. This new perception has been reflected on Turkish architecture, media, art, fashion, popular culture and most important of all the daily politics. This new phenomenon started with Turgut Özal’s initiative. He and his supporters tried to invoke a collective cultural memory via constructing a nostalgic narrative of Turkey’s Ottoman past. Çolak defines this attempt as a deliberate one to recreate the present in an intense competition with the Kemalist elite groups.

Neo-Ottomanism as an idea that first came about in the 1950s with the Democrat Party, which gave more space than the previous government to the religious/Ottoman past of the Turks both in public life and education. Özal was the one who institutionalized these ideas politically as a new form of collective memory, foreign policy and social contract (Çolak, 2006: 591-592). Özal, in formulating his doctrine, was in close cooperation with the journal *Türkiye Günlüğü*, which became the voice of Neo-Ottomanist ideas. The Ottomanist doctrine is institutionalized via the writings of people like Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Altan (Çolak, 2006: 593). This is why *Türkiye Günlüğü* was chosen as the representative of the Ottomanist Eurasianist group in this content analysis.

After the Özal period, the Welfare Party continued using Neo-Ottomanism as their official ideology. In particular, some mayors from this political party worked on reviving Ottoman arts, calligraphy, food and architectural forms and they sought ways of integrating the Ottoman past into the daily life of the Turkish society. Alternative commemorations appeared with reference to the Ottoman and Islamic culture and history. By 1994, Istanbul’s mayor of the Welfare Party began to organize a set of commemorations of this type (Çolak, 2006: 596).

These attempts of the Neo-Ottomanists made Kemalists feel threatened. Accordingly, in the second half of the 1990s Kemalists also started to reemphasize Kemalist memory and the Republican past. This is the time when competing pasts and memories of the two groups became an intense topic in Turkish daily politics. One Kemalist writer from *Hürriyet* newspaper wrote about Ottoman pluralism where he blamed it as not being suitable for today’s politics because it was a primitive doctrine which could not adapt to the developments of modern times (İnce, 2002 in Çolak, 2006: 598). The Kemalist remembrance process was heightened in 1990s via the efforts by groups like the Society for Atatürkist Thought and the Society to Support Contemporary Life. They organized rallies, conferences, concerts and balls to remember the Republican past and to forge stronger ties between Kemalists to compete more strongly against the Neo- Ottomanists.

This is the time when the term “*ulusalci*” suddenly became a widely accepted social term. As an answer to the question of why *Ulusalcılık* has blossomed into such a potent political force today, Uslu (2008: 81) claims the fundamental causes are the overwhelming and ongoing success of the AKP and the fast reform process that AKP has started with the cooperation of the EU.

To Uslu (2008: 87), even though *Ulusalcıs* are not represented by a single political party, there are some groups and organizations which can be considered as *ulusalci*: *Kuva-i Milliye Hareketi* (Nationalist Forces Movement), *Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi* (Patriotic Forces United Movement), *Büyük Hukuçular Birliği* (Great Movement of Jurists), *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (Atatürkist Thought Foundation), *Yeniçağ* (New Age) Newspaper, *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left), *İleri* (Forward), Turkish Workers Party and its journals, Eurasia Television Channel, and *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) Newspaper.

CONCLUSION

Similar in analysis to Çolak and Uslu, this study followed a constructivist route in examining the dynamics of Turkish ideological groups which, in this study, turned into geopolitical traditions. One hypothesis was that the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists can be considered Kemalist in that they are at peace with the Kemalist historical construction of Turkey. However, the conservative Eurasianists have a counter memory which tends to challenge this state-led Turkish historiography by hoping to redefine it in a way that it glorifies Ottoman history as much as the Republican history. Their definition of Eurasia’s borders is also shaped by their historical narratives which make their perception of history the main explanatory variable for this study.

The content analysis provided some support for these expectations the researcher had before starting the analysis, while sometimes not reflecting what was hoped for, as explained before. This study made use of the tools of collective memory studies in investigating the dynamic relationship between socialist, nationalist and Islamist geopolitical traditions which make up the Kemalist and Ottomanist Eurasianist geopolitical discourses. Before starting the content analysis, it was expected that there would be two different representations of national history and that these conflicting representations shaped their collective memory. Accordingly, representation of history takes a central role in how these groups define themselves, their goals and expectations. This is where conservative circles differ from the socialist Eurasianists and nationalist Eurasianists who more or less stay faithful to the state-led version of history, while the conservatives embrace an alternative version of historical imagination.

In addition, qualitative data showed that the representation of the West in the positioning of nationalist and socialist geopolitical discourses also played an important role in uniting them against the conservative democratic Eurasianist coalition of liberals and Islamists. *Ulusalcıs* see this coalition as a natural continuation of the Western imperialism inside of Turkey. This common enemy perception seems to be playing an influential role in integrating the key ideas of nationalist and socialist Eurasianists with each other.

NOTES

1. The fact that there is no data between the years of 2000- 2003 and after 2005 does not say much to us because it is probably because of the editors and journal owners’ choice on which topic to write for each volume. The non-existence of data as well as the increases and decreases are probably

related to this very fact about journal writing. Journals do not necessarily follow the daily politics of the country but rather writers share ideas on topics chosen by editors and journal owners. This situation can be seen as a limitation of journal-based archive scanning. Another limitation in this study's data selection was that the researcher, who is the author, did not read all articles published between these years, which would be the ideal case. However, in this study's case, the author only read the relevant articles which were chosen by going through indexes and reading article names. The author hopes that the data set available is representative enough. This is why the pie chart results are more critical than the area charts for the purposes of this study, even though some area chart results contribute a lot to the falsification process.

2. The writer of this study has worked at TUSAM as an intern for one month from June to July 2008.

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