

SPATIALLY SEGREGATED AND SOCIALLY EXCLUDED TURKISH MIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This study attempts to analyse the migration flows from Turkey to Northern Cyprus since 1974 which are historically different in nature and have different significances in different periods. Out of the three migration waves that can be identified since 1974, the first and the third waves are the subjects of this study. The analysis includes integration/segregation processes of Turkish migrants in Northern Cypriot society and their position in the re-construction of economic, social and spatial division of labour which had started to disintegrate in 1963 and collapsed in 1974 after the division of the Island as two separate political geographies. This study argues that migrants were the main pillars of the re-construction of division of labour process in the Northern part of the Island and it tries to elaborate a migrant-biased perspective instead of looking through the strong strategic and political presumptions, which can easily conceal the social reality of being a migrant and their reality as a class in the society.

Keywords: Labour Migration, Northern Cyprus, Social Exclusion, Spatial Segregation, Population Engineering.

KUZEY KIBRIS'TA MEKANDA AYRIŞAN VE SOSYAL OLARAK DIŞLANAN TÜRKİYE'Lİ GÖÇMENLER: ALTERNATİF BİR YAKLAŞIM

Özet

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'den Kuzey Kıbrıs'a 1974'den itibaren olan göçleri, tarihsel olarak nitelikleri ve farklı dönemlerde anlamları değişen göç dalgalarını, 1974'den itibaren analiz etmeye kalkışmaktadır. 1974'den beri saptanan üç göç dalgasından birinci ve üçüncü dalgalar bu çalışmanın konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Çalışma, Türkiyeli göçmenlerin Kuzey Kıbrıs toplumuyla bütünleşme/ayrışma süreçlerinin ve 1963 yılında dağılmaya başlayan ve 1974'de Ada'nın iki ayrı politik coğrafya olarak ayrılmasıyla çöken ekonomik, sosyal ve mekansal işbölümünün yeniden inşasında göçmenlerin konumunun analizini kapsar. Makale, göçmenlerin Ada'nın Kuzey kısmında işbölümünün yeniden inşası sürecinde ana aktörler olduklarını öne sürer ve onların, göçmen olma durumunu ve toplumsal sınıf konumları ile ilgili sosyal gerçekliklerini kolaylıkla gizleyen güçlü stratejik ve politik önyargılar yerine, göçmen yönlü bir perspektif sunar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İşgücü Göçü, Kuzey Kıbrıs, Sosyal Dışlanma, Mekansal Ayrışma, Nüfus Mühendisliği

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Introduction

The process of re-establishing social, economic and spatial division of labour in Cyprus after the division in 1974 as two separate political geographies has been mostly treated with its international political dimension in the related literature. But in reality the division led to a difficult process of re-constructing new division of labour and socio-spatial scales in Cyprus. The issue of forced/political internal and foreign migration flows received by both sides has always been kept as a hot quantitative-demographic issue in the debates of Cyprus Question. Migration flows and migrants that were received by Northern Cyprus from Turkey after the partition have been treated (as population engineering or politically settled population) essentially in a very similar way in both sides as one of the most important subjects of political-intellectual agenda.

De facto spatial segregation that took place as a result of bi-communal conflicts before 1974, transformed into a politico-geographical segregation as well as spatial one with Turkey's military intervention and Turkish Cypriots gained disproportionate territory compared to their population. Turkish Cypriots sheltering in the congested enclaves in the North since 1963 for security reasons started to move out and turned back to their villages or to the houses left behind in the Greek villages. Turkish Cypriots living in the South migrated to the North to settle in the abandoned Greek properties following the Turkish military intervention. According to a report prepared by Gürel and Özersay (2006: 3), 142 thousand Greek Cypriots from the North migrated to the South (30 percent of total Greek Cypriot population at the time), and 45 thousand Turkish Cypriot from the South migrated to the North (40 percent of total Turkish Cypriot population at the time). This population exchange had actually started just before Turkey's intervention in 1974 and until the Vienna Treaty in 1975, 30 percent of the total population of the Island was displaced between the South and the North parts and the Island was divided into ethnically homogeneous two parts. The return of forced domestic migrants to their original homes in both sides has not materialised in the absence of a treaty to end the division that took place in 1974. Since this kind of a treaty was not complying with political, strategic and economic interests of both the sides and international dominant powers at the time. As a result, while Southern Cyprus' economy continued growing constantly after the division in 1974, using Greek immigrants from the North as a source of development (Zetter, 1992: 7-39; 1994: 307-322); Northern Cyprus was in the process of re-constructing its economic and socio-spatial scales as an independent nation-state, and it provided its most urgent necessity, which was a labour force from Turkey.

Controlling geographically 34-36 percent of the Island while consisting of 18 percent of the population brings about dramatic socio-spatial outcomes in terms of human geography. Societies are formed through relations of production and socio-spatial scales both in turn are based on division of labour in the society. Socio-spatial scales in Cyprus had started to deteriorate in 1963 and radically collapsed in 1974. Since then the process of the re-construction of these socially constructed scales has been continuing on both sides of ethnically homogeneous Cyprus. In this re-construction process, Northern Cyprus was faced with mainly two serious problems which could not be solved in the short term: The

first one was the still ongoing economic isolations forced by the international community as a result of non-recognition; the second one was disintegrating social division of labour as a result of the dramatic loss of the Greek Cypriot population. Since population exchanges between the Northern and the Southern parts of Cyprus led to deep fissures in all the socio-spatial scales constructed on the basis of social division of labour, it should be clear that the most pressing necessity of reconstruction of these scales was labour with various skills¹. As a result of the division when almost all the Greek Cypriots living in the North migrated to the South, on the one hand, a serious labour gap emerged in urban and rural areas in professions previously performed by Greek Cypriots such as artisanal, agricultural, professional and mercantile works; on the other hand, international economic relations of the North deteriorated. A political geography that is not recognized by the international community cannot provide necessary labour with different skills from the regional and global labour markets. Because socio-spatial economic division of labour before 1974 had been based on inter-communal specializations, Turkish Cypriots migrated from the South could not fill this labour gap in terms of quality and quantity. Therefore, the Northern Cypriot Community tried to meet this labour gap from Turkey.

Migration waves from Turkey to Northern Cyprus started with political, geographical, historical and contingent circumstances as mentioned above in 1975. The main reason for these migration waves not being analysed in detail is approaching these migration waves from the strong strategic and political presumptions that easily conceals the social reality of being a migrant. According to this presumption migrants from Turkey are seen as settlers artificially settled by Turkey to dominate the area and/or as vote reserves brought from Turkey to facilitate the continuity of local political power and to manipulate the political decision making². This approach carries the risk of downgrading the population movements into “numbers” by overlooking the human essence of migration. Hence, this strategic and political approach by not accepting the migrations as movements of labour and migrants in their classical meaning, it also carries the risk of stigmatising them with a much more negative and inferior status than the migrant status. Alongside providing a labour force to fill the labour gap in different sectors of the Northern Cyprus’ economy, the intention of transforming this newly acquired territory on the North of Cyprus into a Turkish land is obvious from the oral history interviews of political leaders and prominent bureaucrats at the time who were the engineers of the Turkish Federative State of Cyprus (TFSC). But emphasising this policy and approaching migrants as Turkey’s agents to implement colonial policies instead of people with no other means to survive but migrating to another country, as mentioned above conceals their reality as a class in the society they live and work.

¹ For example, until 1974 in industrial production, services, tourism and finance Greek Cypriots, in agriculture and bureaucracy Turkish Cypriots were dominating (Akgün, Gürel, Hatay and Tiryaki, 2005: 8, 21, 24; An, 2006: 67). After 1960, national economic development model was based on industrial production, services and finance. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots specialised in agriculture and bureaucracy were losing ground. Especially after 1963 when Turkish Cypriots took refuge in the enclaves they couldn’t get their share from new economic possibilities and capital accumulation processes and became poorer (Hocknell, Calotychos ve Papadakis, 1998: 147-168). Greek Cypriots on the other hand, represented skilled labour specialised in modern sectors of the economy.

² This argument is proved otherwise by Hatay, (2005).

In this study, while we are aware of population engineering intentions of the political leaderships of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey at that time, we will especially focus on two migration waves from Turkey to Northern Cyprus since 1975 to emphasize their position as migrants and as a social class in Turkish Cypriot society which is immensely overlooked in the related literature. To be able to do this we will try to analyse two different types of migrant conditions briefly and then we will mainly try to reveal their positions in the economic and social division of labour, their spatial segregation and social exclusion processes. The second migration wave has very different characteristics than the first and the third migration waves and deserves to be the subject of another study.

The social and cultural contact of migrants from the migration waves mentioned above with Turkish Cypriots has been generally weak even though the degree of it changes depending on the migration wave. This has caused spatial, social and cultural segregation especially for the first and third wave migrants. They are excluded as “other Turks” and Turkish Cypriots have felt as white Turks in comparison to these “inferior” migrants from Turkey.

Methodology

This study is based on the data obtained from the field research which was implemented in the framework of a more comprehensive project prepared for the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK).

The empirical research which includes qualitative and quantitative research techniques implemented in four dimensions by employing different techniques for each of them. The first dimension consists of 35 oral history interviews carried out with the first wave migrants in 17 villages and in two urban neighbourhoods in June and July 2007. Data was obtained in the framework of the second dimension by using research techniques in the form of qualitative, in depth interviews and focus group meetings in 5 urban neighbourhoods in Famagusta, Nicosia and Lefke with second and third wave migrants in July 2007, and in January, February and May 2008. The Third dimension of the field research includes in-depth interviews and focus group meetings with the third wave migrants in Kyrenia, Mersin/Turkish port of Taşucu and Nicosia in July 2007 and January-February 2008. The Fourth dimension encompasses in-depth interviews and oral history interviews with officials, representatives of institutions, and administrators of democratic mass organisations.

Dramatic Collapse of Socio-spatial Division of Labour

The Division of Cyprus caused a dramatic change in the distribution of population in 1974. There were villages, towns, shops abandoned by Greek Cypriots who were forced to migrate to the South and they left behind a collapsed social division of labour. This *de facto* new political geography in the North suddenly removed ethno-political exclusion Turkish Cypriots exposed to it since the end of 19th Century and gave a strong self confidence to Turkish Cypriot political leaders about realising their Taksim Thesis³. Behind

³ Taksim Thesis is the formulation of Turkey’s official Cyprus policy which claims the division

this self confidence there was a belief that the majority of the Turkish Cypriot population living abroad would return as well⁴.

We argue that alongside the political and military control of this new political-geographical entity, there was a need of population with certain quantity and quality to be able to control it as an economic geography as well. A very small percentage of necessary labour for agriculture, animal farming and especially citrus fields in the villages left behind by Greek Cypriots was met by the Turkish Cypriots who came from the South. During Turkey's military intervention some Greek Cypriots had taken refuge in the South and some Turkish Cypriots had taken refuge in the North. When the Vienna Treaty was signed in 1975 the rest of the populations living on both sides were exchanged and the numbers of Turkish Cypriots coming from the South reached almost 65 thousand. But this number was not even half of the population loss North had suffered⁵. Besides, the rural population that came from the South was not specialised in citrus farming but in vine cultivation and therefore wanted to settle in urban areas instead of rural areas where citrus and grain farming were practised previously. Loss of Greek Cypriot population in the urban manufacture and service sectors alone was about 60 thousand in the North. The skilled and unskilled labour gap in urban sectors led to a profound fracture in these sectors especially when Turkish Cypriots living abroad did not answer the "return" call as expected. Therefore, the division of Cyprus resulted in a geographic re-distribution of labour which was homogenised in terms of ethno-religious differences, and this caused a serious labour gap and a dramatic collapse of socio-spatial division of labour in the North.

Unfavourable conditions generated by the radical labour shortage as a result of the division and population exchange started to be felt in the first one or two months when the irrigation season of citrus fields began. Necessary labour to meet this shortage in the citrus fields of the North at first was provided from Mersin and Antalya, which are important citrus fruit production centres of Turkey, in the form of seasonal agricultural labour. But half of this labour returned back to Turkey before the season was over. At the same time, labour shortage in the production of the other agricultural products was also continuing. There was a need for bilateral agreements with Turkey on providing labour to boost the agricultural sector in Northern Cyprus and villages abandoned by Greek Cypriots, since Turkey was the only source to fill the labour gap in different sectors of the Turkish Cypriot economy. A special protocol called "Agricultural Labour Agreement" was signed between Turkey and the TFSC to get approximately 30 thousand migrants from Turkey in February 1975. Soon after the Protocol was signed announcements were made by settlement agencies and governors of the villages that were suitable to settle in Northern Cyprus. The first migrants started to arrive on ferryboats about four months after the Protocol was signed.

of the Island between Turkey and Greece against the armed struggle of Greek Cypriots aiming to achieve the Enosis, which refers to the movement of the Greek-Cypriots to incorporate the Island of Cyprus into Greece.

⁴ Oral history interviews with political leaders and bureaucrats of the time: Hakkı Atun, Rauf Denктаş and İsmet Kotak.

⁵ It is according to different sources between 150 and 180 thousand.

Different Migration Waves and Different Types of Migrants

Migrations that started in 1975 have continued by forming three different waves depending on their distinct nature according to the changing global and local conditions in the course of time. The attempt to analyse migrations from Turkey to Northern Cyprus and social conditions of migrants in the receiving society should start with some key assumptions: The first is the distinctive nature of the first migration wave and migrants who were settled in Northern Cyprus with special status and with some incentives just after 1974, than those migration waves and migrants coming afterwards. This difference arises from the various economic and political factors in the world, in Turkey and in Cyprus: Changes in global and national economic policies in parallel with the changes in capital accumulation regimes; transformations of labour markets in national, regional and global scales and new trends in international migrations in different periods. The second is different types of migrant profiles emerge depending on these varying factors, and these factors determine the position of migrants in the economic division of labour, their social status in the society, their integration, cohesion, socio-spatial segregation, social exclusion and the challenges they face within the receiving countries.




Figure 1 : Three Migration Waves From Turkey to Northern Cyprus Between 1975-2006

The primary economic factor in directing first wave migrants from Turkey to Northern Cyprus was not the existence of surplus labour in Turkey but the radical labour gap which emerged in Northern Cyprus' different economic sectors after the division. The majority of these first migrants were the landless and poor peasants who had already demanded from the government to be settled in more fertile lands in other parts of Turkey because they were not able to survive where they lived as a result of dam constructions, floods, landslides etc., and they gave the decision of migration on the basis of their communities

instead of individually. On the other hand, there was another small group which consisted of people who wanted to leave their villages because of various kinds of local hostilities and because of repressive policies of conservative-rightwing governments on political (left) or ethno-religious groups (Alaouites and Kurds). Hence, whole Turkish village communities that consisted of families with all the necessary patterns/networks specific to an agricultural community were settled in Northern Cyprus in the villages abandoned by Greek Cypriots to revitalise them. But only a small percentage of them were also settled in urban neighbourhoods in Varosha/Famagusta.

The first wave migration ended at the beginning of the 1980's together with the incentives of agricultural land and houses, but this wave facilitated another type of migration by establishing migration networks and channels between Turkey and Northern Cyprus. The second migration wave was significantly different than the first and the third ones in its nature. It was triggered by the special economic and professional income opportunities in Northern Cyprus and radical economic changes in Turkey as well.

The last migration wave from Turkey to Northern Cyprus started towards the end of the 1990s and accelerated by the 2000s when neo liberal policies were well underway in Turkey. As a result of these policies and especially by the implementation of radical agricultural policies in line with neo-liberal project, income distribution has been worsened amongst different regions of Turkey and this process has created serious problems of unemployment. This process has also deepened the level of poverty in rural areas and this has led to a kind of displacement. People, who lost their means of subsistence and could not support themselves and their families where they had lived, primarily started to migrate from the East and the South East Regions of Anatolia to nearby cities like Adana, Antalya and Mersin, and afterwards overflowed to Northern Cyprus in order to work especially in the flourishing construction sector of Northern Cyprus. When this overflow of labour has coincided with the intensive demand of cheap labour for the construction sector in Northern Cyprus, which is the most important leading sector for capital accumulation in this country since 2002, it transformed into a very strong new migration wave.

Most of the time, this happened not by direct enforcement but of being left without any alternatives which has caused the displacement of people from rural areas. On the other hand the ongoing conflict in Turkey's South East and East regions has led to forced migration as well. Economic displacement together with political displacement has accelerated migration flows from the mentioned areas of Turkey to Northern Cyprus. Third wave migrants are employed very intensively in the construction sector as well as labour intensive parts of service sector jobs. Their migration has more parallelism with the other labour migrations throughout the world which have been accelerated by the globalisation processes. They generally settle in the Walled City/Nicosia; in the immediate periphery of the forbidden zone in Varosha/Famagusta where migrants from Turkey have been settling around the green line transformed into a space of urban poverty and a space for urban lower classes similar to the Walled City in Nicosia, and comparatively small urban migrant neighbourhood in Upper Karadağ/Lefke which is a space of urban poverty as well.

Migrants from different waves that settled in Kyrenia have not formed an urban migrant neighbourhood as such, rather they showed a scattered settlement pattern. This is because it did not go through the same abrupt division by the Green Line like Nicosia and Famagusta; it doesn't have a certain urban space which would function as an incubator for the late coming migrants. Even though, some of the migrants from the second and third waves settled in Kyrenia, their numbers were not sufficient to be able to form a migrant neighbourhood. But it can be said that the neighbourhood behind the Port is generally preferred by Turkish migrants to settle in. Skilled and semi skilled migrant labour working in casinos and tourism sectors generally live in the city centres dispersedly. Some of the informal migrants in the construction sector are living in building sites in very primitive conditions.

Challenges to Collective Identity and Citizenship of Spatially Segregated and Socially Excluded Turkish Migrants

The First Wave: Settlers!

Concept of citizenship has been formed in conjunction with the notion of nation-state and has increasingly become much debated conception with the declining welfare state in the neo-liberal round of capitalism. Formal citizenship that embodies a collective identity beyond identities of ethnic, religious and social class by making citizens equal in the eyes of the law has been replaced by new hierarchies of identities such as race, ethnicity, religion, sex and sexual orientation. These groups which are subjected to different forms of exclusion depending on their diverse identities are prevented from fully participating in public life as a result of a hierarchy created by legislation about their citizenship entitlements (Sassen, 2006: 180). Equality referred by the definitions of formal citizenship no longer means equality in economic, social, political and cultural senses. Hence, holding the nationality of the country of residence is not always a guarantee for migrants' actual access to the fully equal treatment it formally promises. Racism and discrimination, both within state institutions (e.g., the police) and from societal actors such as employers or landlords, can be important barriers to the actual realization of equal rights (Koopmans et al, 2005: 32). This attitude, at the same time, renders the role of migrants' in the production as labour and legitimacy of their class position in the society to worthless and invisible. Theoretical approaches on migration and migrants developed in the last twenty years present us extensive insights for analysing social, economic, political and spatial positions of foreign migrants in Northern Cyprus. Even though the majority of migrants from the first wave hold citizenship rights, they face numerous barriers in exercising these rights. Despite holding TRNC citizenship, channels for economic, social and political mobilisation are closed to a wide extent for themselves and for their children born in Northern Cyprus. Widespread cronyism among Turkish Cypriots partly as a result of living together some years in enclaves before 1974 prevent competition between migrants from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in certain professions especially in public sector jobs. These barriers are expressed widely in oral history interviews by migrants holding citizenship in Northern Cyprus for over thirty years:

“...when you apply for a position in public sector if there are two persons first preference is for them (Turkish Cypriots)...family connections, relatives...it is exactly

like regionalism in Turkey. It is no longer unusual for us. We have got used to it. At the end of the day they are in power. For instance when you have anything to do in a government office they go there wearing shorts and quickly finish their business but we wait in front of the door wearing proper suits and ties. We have to wait our turn, because they have relatives, uncles or somebody else to back them up. There is no place for us neither in public sector nor in the parliament. ” (Şerafettin Yavuz, 58, migrant from Konya/Turkey, lives in Kyrenia / July 2007).

“...discrimination is still continuing. My daughter has three licences. She is a graduate of the Eastern Mediterranean University. They said to her that “you can not be a teacher or work in a public sector job”. She took an exam for a position in public Office. Even though she was successful could not get in there either. She has a degree in computer sciences as well. If one diploma is no good how is it possible that the other two are also no good? Wherever she went she was turned down. Why? We have no body to back us. In the end my daughter found work in a private company three years ago. There are many people suffering like us” (Mehmet Alkan, 63, migrant from Manisa/Turkey, lives in Güzelyurt / May 2008).

The citizenship status alone is not sufficient to lift the barriers in front of the social and economic mobility channels for the migrants in Northern Cyprus as well as in other migrant receiving countries in the world. Besides, it doesn't remove social and spatial exclusion they are exposed to as a result of their poverty and different cultural capitals from the one that modern urban classes have.

According to our quantitative field study, from the migrants' perspective, the most important effects of having citizenship are lifting the legal (but not the social) barriers in front of the economic mobilisation and giving the guarantee of staying in the country. Foreign migrants in Northern Cyprus consider these two effects are the most beneficial aspects of holding citizenship in the country.

In spite of the difficulties they face with in practice, the majority of the migrants included in the questionnaire believe holding the citizenship of TRNC would facilitate finding work. Seeing citizenship as a guarantee for staying in the country is secondary. For more than half of the migrants holding the status of citizenship would also facilitate ownership of property and upward mobility in the social hierarchy as well as the two advantages mentioned above.

Citizenship status is one of the most important devices of exclusion by state regulations, which is amongst main axes of exclusion. State implement exclusion by discriminating against migrants through their legal status, putting restrictions on or denying acquirement of citizenship, keeping in an insecure status by issuing subsequent temporary work and residency permits, by not providing sufficient and good quality public services, excluding them from accessing social services and not accepting their qualifications. Not being able to acquire citizenship impedes migrants' already limited participation in social, economic and political processes as well as restricting their opportunities of finding work (Purkis, 2008: 28).

In the neo liberal era when modernity and nation state has been exposed to serious erosion, citizenship, as one of the main pillars of the modern nation state, instead of constructing inclusive common identity, it has been re-constructed as an exclusive privileged status (Schireup, 2007: 100). One of the most striking examples of discrimination by state regulations in Northern Cyprus is the Project named re-regulation of working life which was put into effect from the 1st of January 2009 by The Ministry of Labour and Social Security. According to the Project, minimum wages will be re-determined depending on two different groups of professions and sectors. Sectors and occupations included in the first category are jobs related to caring for the elderly and sick, domestic work (cleaning, gardening, etc); cleaning work in tourism sector (hotels, restaurants, etc.), waiters, commies, gardeners, agricultural workers and animal farmers. The second category includes all other groups of occupations not covered in the first one. Minimum wages for the second category jobs will be 10 per cent more than the first category jobs. As can be seen, the jobs that fall into the first category are labour intensive, unskilled or semi skilled jobs and these types of jobs are generally practiced by foreign migrants in Northern Cyprus (Purkis, 2008: 28). Productive capital is moving constantly all over the world after cheap labour, new markets, new production linkages and advantageous political environment creates spatial inequalities and deepens them at the same time. Economically and politically privileged classes and disadvantaged classes increasingly intensify in separate spaces. Social and cultural contact of villagers from the first wave with Turkish Cypriot society has been weak from the beginning on, due to the fact that they were settled with their fellow villagers and relatives in the villages completely abandoned by Greek Cypriots. This lack of contact affected migrants positively in the early years of migration by preventing them feeling a “stranger” in a foreign country, but in the following years, it has become a serious barrier for their social integration and has caused spatial, social and cultural segregation. This segregation at the same time is one of the reasons that gave rise to the exclusion of migrants as “other Turks”, as different people from TR⁶. Turkish Cypriots are generally feeling as superior ‘white’ Turks compared to these inferior foreign Turks.

Despite the fact that almost all the migrants from the first wave hold citizenship status, their degree of social and cultural integration is not much more than migrants from the third wave, the vast majority of whom have no citizenship status. In the oral history interviews, nearly all the first wave migrants expressed how they felt this exclusion directly, (social and cultural) or indirectly (economic and political), in multiple levels. Increasing contact in the public sphere (hospitals, schools, census bureaus, water works etc) over time revealed economic, social and cultural capital disparities between the first wave migrants settled in the villages and Northern Cypriots. At the beginning this situation was perceived as a contradiction of modern and traditional but in time it became the origin of increasingly deepening exclusion. This contradiction has prevented development of a collective civic identity in the re-shaping political and social geography of Northern Cyprus after 1974. While Northern Cypriots have always been the real owner citizens of the country, migrants from Turkey were left outside of the collective civic identity as aliens in spite of having citizenship status. This kind of exclusion was much unexpected by the migrants from the

⁶ TR is an abbreviation for Turkish Republic but it is used in different connotation by Northern Cypriots. They use this abbreviation for the migrants from Turkey generally to despise them as inferior others

first wave because they were brought in with various incentives. The long lasting effect of this confusing situation can clearly be seen in migrants' memories from the oral history interviews implemented with the first wave migrants:

"...we were going to hospital with our children tied on our backs. Believe me, elderly or other locals here all of them were saying 'God! They killed the child, broke the bones, gypsies' ... We do not have relatives or anybody favouring us, we do not know anybody. We came from the mountains. What else can we do! We pick our children put them on our backs and go to hospital" (Ayşe Hanım, 67, migrant from Mersin/Turkey- lives in Famagusta / July 2007).

"When we came here they did not want us. Turkish Cypriot migrants from the South were settled here before us. These people from Marya (village in the South) did not want migrants from Turkey....They cut our water supply and were very cruel to us. I can never forget this. They said 'you are primitive peasants' to our faces ... 'you came from caves'. We said we are not fellahs⁷ we are decent people" (Ümmü Alkan, 55, migrant from Manisa/Turkey, lives in Güzelyurt / May 2008).

Excluding and including aspects of citizenship carry different meanings for different migration waves from Turkey depending on their specific natures and distinctive geographical, historical, and political contexts. On the other hand excluding attitudes between classes that originate from not only physical capitals but also cultural capitals reduce citizenship to exercising some of the civic rights and put nationality (and national or ethnic origin) forward as a determinant factor for national identity. Migrants from Turkey whether they are citizens or not, are primarily excluded through their nationality (TR) and poverty in Northern Cyprus. Exclusion visible through these axes is essentially cultural and class based. Because national origin or ethnicity and poverty correspond to a certain class in Northern Cyprus as it is in the majority of migration receiving countries in the world. However, looking through the spectacles of nationalism to the migrants from Turkey by Turkish Cypriots and by migrants from Turkey to Turkish Cypriots as well conceals class character of migrants and paves the way for building a new exclusive Cypriot national identity on the part of Turkish Cypriots.

In Northern Cyprus differences of migrants' cultural capitals generally have been perceived as a lack of human capital and their full participation in production and consumption processes has been prevented on the grounds of not having adequate cognitive abilities. This is one of the most important dimensions of social exclusion. Social and cultural exclusion functions as an active process of assault on the collective values, aspirations and institutions of working class people as developed in industrial society (Byrne, 2005: 134). Currently poverty is not defined only in terms of economic conditions the concept also encompasses social, political and cultural dimensions. Hence there has emerged a broad consensus that in addition to basic income and consumption measures poverty must take into account social indicators such as education, health, access to social services and infrastructure. Similarly

⁷ Fellah means farmer in Arabic. They were brought from Egypt in 1832 during the Ottoman-Egypt war and were settled around Adana, a city in the south part of Turkey. Today the term is used in Turkey and in Cyprus to denigrate an individual or a group of people. The usage of the term is interesting here to show the hierarchy among socially excluded as well.

there is broad agreement that less tangible aspects need to be added - risk, vulnerability, livelihood insecurity, social exclusion, loss of dignity, humiliation, deprivation, lack of choice and powerlessness (Byrne, 2005: 61). Poor jobs not only give poor incomes but also disempower and devalue workers within the production process, with negative impacts on their autonomy, personal development and self esteem. The economy oppresses the poor not only materially but also culturally. Capitalism generates poor jobs, economic insecurity and unemployment (Gough et al, 2006: 60).

Exclusion experienced and felt by the first wave migrants also generates negative impact on their economic integration. Migrants faced with difficulties as a result of their low education levels and their skills, which did not match with the product and production methods in the villages they were settled in. The second factor that poses a problem for the economic integration of the first wave migrants is that they were from the poorest villages in Turkey with very little access to the public services. Hence, many of the illiterate migrants could not take advantage of the job opportunities in the non agricultural sectors such as services and industry. Non illiterate ones also were not able to get secure and high income jobs like public sector jobs due to their very low education levels. Education levels in 1975 were considerably high among Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, when the first wave migrants from Turkey could not support themselves in the agricultural sector, they could not compete with Turkish Cypriots for the industrial, commercial, or public sector jobs due to their comparatively high level education requirements. Very few first wave migrants who have the required degrees could not also get the public sector jobs because of the clientelist relations among Turkish Cypriots. Economic discrimination against the first wave migrants can be clearly seen from the oral history interviews:

“They gave us a piece of land to cultivate but it was not productive because of constant drought. We bought few animals and were making just enough to live. We could not sell them to make some money. Farming was dead even now it is dead. The soil was not productive like Turkish soil. We could not get used to it. We could not make vegetable gardens, did not know the method of it. Almost all the gardens dried out. It was also just enough for our consumption...Picking oranges continued for ten years. Afterwards some factories opened up. But they did not employ us because we were wearing headscarves; we were discriminated against like this. It was an orange packaging factory. But later on they needed us and I worked there one year...It was not easy, it took more than ten years before we could stand on our own feet...We have just managed to repair and made liveable this house they gave us more than 20 years ago” (Sündüz Gün, 55, migrant from Samsun/Turkey, lives in Famagusta / July 2007).

If holding citizenship was not sufficient to create a collective identity due to isolation created by being settled in villages as a whole community which made migrants’ social, cultural and economic integration difficult; competition to get a share from re-sharing process of property was another critical reason. From 1976 onwards Turkish Cypriots raised their expectations in the direction of getting higher share compared to others. The share taken from the property by Turkish migrants also annoyed Turkish Cypriots. Therefore a desire to send back these “uncivilised peasants” who were unsuitable for Cyprus was not only

originating from the idea of protecting modern Cypriot culture. This becomes clearer in the oral history interviews which are made with living witnesses of the period. Candemir Önhon, who was Turkey's Ambassador in Northern Cyprus between 1976 and 1979, describes this situation below:

"...Turks being settled in Cyprus in this way created a kind of atmosphere among Turkish Cypriots like 'we will get smaller share from the pie, then it is better if they did not come from Turkey any longer. We can look after ourselves here'" (İnanç, 2007: 35).

First wave migrants, who participated in the oral history interviews, also shared this opinion. They also believed that the main reason of their exclusion and discrimination by Turkish Cypriots is the unwillingness of sharing Greek Cypriots' properties with the migrants from Turkey.

"... After a certain year they started to say 'why did you come', because the battle for property rights had started. Nothing else but it is the property battle. For instance I came from Turkey as a migrant; the government gave me 100 donums (one hundred thousand square meters) agricultural land. But locals here say "I live here, I have 20 donums (twenty thousand square metres) agricultural land but you came from Turkey they gave you 100 donums (one hundred thousand square meters), isn't this unfair?" (Muharrem Söylemez, 52, Association of War Veterans, Famagusta / July 2007).

Hakkı Atun who was the Counsellor of Ministry of Settlement and the head of the plan for settling the first wave migrants, who were brought to Northern Cyprus in the framework of Agricultural Labour Protocol signed by the administration of TRNC and Turkey, narrated the competition for property sharing as follows:

"...But another political problem surged in the distribution of the resources. There was a jealousy about the property compensation of our people from the South. They said 'they did not have anything. They came from Turkey, you gave them property Mr. Hakkı but you did not give me'. Even now I come across this. We were a psychologist and at the same time a sociologist as well. Otherwise we would not be able to find a solution anyway. This was an arbitrary discourse. They say you did not give, but we did. It was not possible that we did not give, because we were there to do this. I can give you an example from 1975: There were migrants who were from the village called Tathisu in the South. So in the North we called the village they were settled in also Tathisu. This was the most productive area to grow vegetables, to build greenhouses because there was water and we decided to settle them there. They formed a commission among them and came to me and said 'Mr. Hakkı don't settle us in Tathisu'. There was a school friend of mine in the commission as well. So we were having relaxed and friendly conversation. I said "did you lose your mind". "We are settling you the most beautiful, the most productive place with abundant water where you can start production right away. You should thank us". They said 'we do not want to settle there, settle us somewhere close to Kyrenia. We can find work in tourism and support ourselves there. We do not want to do agricultural work'. We said okay and started to settle there the migrants from Turkey....." (Hakkı Atun, Nicosia / June 2007).

When migrants from Southern Cyprus turned down the proposal of Hakkı Atun about being settled in Tatlısu, migrants from Ilgın village/ Konya-Turkey were settled there instead. Because Tatlısu is a mountain village, villagers from Konya who were used to living on flat plains struggled to cling on to the space for long years in difficult conditions:

“In fact nobody likes migrants anywhere...Nobody likes to share his/her bread and butter. He came from the South as we came from Turkey. He does not possess anything either. He received 153 donums (153 thousand square meters) as I did. He does not consider what he receives but makes problem about what I receive. He says I got these as a compensation for my properties I left in the South. But you came here without possessing anything and received land. He thinks this is unfair.....have you asked me how I suffered in this country? I went hungry, my children did not have anything to eat.....after the Annan Plan when our land became more valuable they have got annoyed. These lands are the lands they did not want because it was on top of the mountain. We stayed here because we had to. Now it is valued they talk differently....” (Şerafettin Yavuz, 58, migrant from Konya-Ilgın/Turkey, lives in Kyrenia-Tatlısu / July 2007).

The identity gap the first wave migrants experienced can be observed clearly from the oral history interviews. They live in a country where they have never felt they belonged or it belonged to them, worst of all they do not feel that they belong anywhere. There are two main reasons of this gap. First is the social and cultural exclusion that makes them feel they would never be accepted as ‘Cypriots’; and the second is the uncertainty about their property rights and citizenship status. Knowing that a treaty which would solve the Cyprus Problem could give the land to the original owners and also invalidate their TRNC citizenship, prevents them feeling spatial and national belonging to the lands they will have lived on for more than 30 years.

“I can show you my identity cards (he puts three identity cards on the table: TR, TRNC and TFSC identity cards). Please take the photo of them. It shows our situation. Look at this, it is my TRNC identity card, it only shows that I am the citizen that’s all. It does not make me Cypriot... If we have the same identity cards as the Turkish Cypriots why we do not have the same treatment in the public offices or hospitals?’ You are not Cypriot. You are from TR’. In here I am from TR and look at this it is my TR identity card. It is no good other than travelling back and forth between Turkey and Cyprus. When I am in Turkey I am treated as a Cypriot. Everybody thinks like that. Of course it is 30 years now since we left there. They say he is Cypriot. But we could not feel attached here.... How could we? We are waiting here thinking this year or next year...If there is a treaty do we know where to go? Now there is the Annan Plan. They said ‘so many people will stay, and so many people will go’. Is it known who is going to go and who is going to stay? The list is in his pocket and my destiny is written on that list. Is my name on that list or not? It is not certain.....This is not new either it has been uncertain for 30 years, even then I voted ‘yes’ to the Annan Plan. It does not matter what happens anymore I want to know what is going to happen to me, I said ‘yes’ because of it” (Yusuf Bey, 49, migrant from Adana/Turkey, lives in Nicosia / July 2007).

Uncertainties about their future in the country and the social exclusion they are exposed to via their national origin affect migrants' political participation negatively. Even though male migrants especially speak about daily politics more than any other subject, their membership to democratic mass organisations and political parties is very limited. Even though a high proportion of the population is composed of migrants, memberships of migrants' associations are lower than expected levels. In spite of claims about determining the country's destiny with their votes there are only 2 and 4 MPs with Turkish origin elected respectively in the last two general elections for the TRNC parliament composed of 50 MPs. This can be an understandable situation considering migrants' low education levels and lack of cultural capitals. But the situation has not changed for their offspring with high education and this indicates a serious political participation problem on the part of migrants from Turkey. Such a low political participation of migrants as much as related to their lack of social, material and cultural capitals and citizenship status, it is also related with the barriers erected in front of their political mobility as well as social and economic mobility.

The Third Wave: Protracted Migration

Surging new migration waves all over the world give rise to spaces of urban poverty and informally working migrant labour mostly live in these spaces. These new migrants flow through ethnic networks into spaces of urban poverty and they are exposed to exclusion by the middle and upper-middle classes of that society wherever they go. This exclusion happens through segregation of spaces of urban poverty similar to enclaves as well as it happens through enclavisation of spaces of wealth (Byrne, 2005: 115-131; Kurtuluş, 2007: 320). This exclusion by the middle and upper middle classes prevents contacts between different classes in the urban-public sphere and intensify exclusion by reducing empathy between them. As happens throughout the world, segregation crystallizes spatially at first; afterwards ethnic groups living in these spaces become the subjects of public, social, cultural and symbolical exclusion. But this social exclusion follows certain patterns and some ethnic migrant groups are exposed to more exclusion than the others.

Turkish migrants in Northern Cyprus are discriminated against and socially excluded through two channels. The first of these is having TR citizenship and the second one is ethnic origin such as being Kurdish or being from Hatay. In the hierarchy of social exclusion, migrants from Hatay are the ones right at the bottom and therefore they are subjected to more exclusion than the other migrants. Perceiving migrants as *other* is a widespread phenomenon in all the societies receiving intensive migration. But hierarchies in exclusion of these *others* are constructed through contingent factors between the receiving and sending countries. For example according to Nicos Trimikliniotis (2004: 16, 17) children of Greek origin Pontusians and Greek migrants from Northern Cyprus are excluded spatially and institutionally in the Southern part of the Island but in the hierarchy of exclusion Pontusians are the most excluded migrant group. The interviews carried out with migrants and official or non official representatives in the framework of qualitative field research that this study is based on also clearly shows that migrants from Hatay are the most excluded group amongst foreign migrants in Northern Cyprus.

Almost all the Kurdish migrant workers said that they were socially excluded in Northern Cyprus as well as in Turkey but for different reasons. In Turkey they are excluded because of their Kurdish identity and in Northern Cyprus they are excluded because of their TR nationality. There are some differences in perceiving and assessing the exclusion between Kurdish migrants and migrants from Hatay. For example while Kurds think they are excluded because of their Turkish nationality and being poor; migrants from Hatay think they are excluded primarily because of being from Hatay and afterwards because of having Turkish nationality. Migrants from Hatay form the most crowded group of migrants in the second and third wave and they have a special position amongst migrants by being the cheapest and the poorest of all.

The majority of migrants living in the Walled City do not relate their exclusion directly with their class position; instead they connect their exclusion to Northern Cypriots' dislike of people from Turkey. This prejudice prevents them connecting their exclusion to their poverty and class position. This prejudice originates from another widespread prejudice. Because middle class Northern Cypriots look upon them as dangerous, dirty, uncouth and uneducated potential criminals. They construct their prejudice on TR nationality instead of on these migrants' poverty. In the global round of Capitalism migrant labour is exposed to exclusion all over the world. But as a result of contingent factors to Cyprus neither migrants from Turkey who are exposed to exclusion nor middle class Northern Cypriots who socially exclude those migrants can see the direct connection between exclusion and poverty. There are myths preventing the recognition of this direct connection. One of the most widespread myths amongst Turkish migrants is that Turkey saved Turkish Cypriots from the hands of Greek Cypriots but still Turkish Cypriots do not like them because they are very ungrateful people. This "saviour myth" reflects itself in the words of Turkish migrants such as *"even though we saved them from the hands of Greeks and we are still keeping them going economically, they are still looking down on us"*. *"We lost lots of martyrs to save them, while there are people in our country who scrape food from the rubbish, Turkey showers here (Northern Cyprus) with money but look how they are treating us"*. Even though these same migrants are socially and spatially excluded in their own country because of their poverty, through this saviour myth they identify themselves with Turkey's official discourse and they think they deserve special respect from the Northern Cypriot society not because they are all humans but because they are representatives of a saviour and protector country. On the other hand middle class Turkish Cypriots see these poor Turkish migrants through the spectacles of another myth and they treat them as representatives of Turkey, instead of seeing them as heavily exploited migrant labour as happens all over the world. The myth here can be called "the myth of innocence". Cypriots put the blame of division totally on the super powers without accepting any responsibility on Turkish and Greek Cypriots and look at the migrants from Turkey as foreign-demographic agents manipulated by Turkish government.

Another spreading myth originating from this myth is having common Cypriot identity. This new identity conceals inequalities in both sides between social classes and builds a new mythical national identity (Kurtuluş and Purkis, 2008: 93). This mythical national identity overlooks the class context of exclusion and legitimizes exclusion of these mi-

grants in terms of nationality. In spite of having a strong leftist tradition in Cyprus, the left formulates its migration policy via a mythical geographic–cultural identity axis instead of via class position in the society. From this perspective migrant labour from Turkey are seen as foreign demographic agents because of their TR nationality, instead of a working class who are the creators of surplus value. These mutual myths lead to a high tension between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish migrants.

The need for treating the issue of migrants in terms of class position, poverty and dynamics of capital accumulation shows up in the academic researches on racism and discrimination of migrants on both Turkish and Greek sides (Trimikliniotis, 2007: 55, 86; 2007a: 16). Because this is in fact the dilemma of regarding global phenomena such as condition of displacement and unemployment of labour as local phenomena.

A small group of self employed Turkish migrants, ones who managed to work in public sector jobs or skilled migrant workers with relatively secure service sector jobs do not see themselves socially excluded because of their TR nationality, and they develop social relations with Turkish Cypriots. But this minority migrant group is aware that the majority of poverty stricken migrants from Turkey especially the ones from Hatay are discriminated against by the middle class Turkish Cypriot society. The minority group with better economic conditions and relatively secure jobs have hopes and plans for the future and they are reluctant to go back to live in Turkey. For example 10 construction workers working on the construction of a private university in Nicosia with work permission and social security and with relatively high wages for ten years and with TRNC citizenship or skilled service sector workers again with high level of job security feel themselves as native Cypriots and they do not think they are excluded by Turkish Cypriot society.

On the other hand, a majority group of migrants, mostly consisting of construction workers, perceive themselves as slaves and complain that they are also seen as slaves by the society. This is a quite common feature with other informal migrant workers in other parts of the world. Indeed the Mücahitler Parkı near Girne Kapı (Kyrenia Gate) looks like a post modern slave market. Even at the weekends, workers chosen from here are taken to the construction sites to work. Some of the workers stay and live actually at the construction sites but because of the higher risk of inspection, most of them live in the Walled City even though they work in Kyrenia. This suits the employers as well and they collect the workers in the morning from Girne Kapı and bring them back in the evening.

Most of the construction workers, the most excluded and needy group of workers, included in the research had experienced migration previously. Almost half of them either migrated generally from Eastern and South-eastern Turkey to the metropolitan areas in Turkey or to Saudi Arabia. Most of the married ones had never lived continuously with their families since they were married. They have been migrating continuously trying to support their families and trying to survive. This situation of “protracted” migration is the main reason for the homelessness of migrant labour not only in Northern Cyprus but all over the world. This informal cheap labour live in segregated urban spaces all over the world and they are subjected to exclusion by the middle and upper classes of the society. This situation prevents

them from integrating into the society where they went to work. As is the case in the spaces of urban poverty all over the world, migrants in the Walled City of Nicosia perceive themselves homeless in the sense of feeling not belonging to anywhere and feeling disposable.

Conclusion

Cyprus is a socio-spatial scale where ethno-religious segregation has taken place since 1963, and this segregation resulted with the division of the island as Northern and Southern parts in 1974. While the formulation of this division has been negotiated since 1975 in the form of around the table talks, the process of re-construction as two separate social scales is still underway in Cyprus.

Although three migration waves are identified since 1975, two migration waves from Turkey to Northern Cyprus have been analysed in this study. Depending on different historical conditions each migration wave has specific characteristics; they also share significant common features such as every one of them is a labour migration and this can be seen in every aspect of economic and daily life of Northern Cyprus; they originate from mainly economic conditions in both sending and receiving countries; and migrants from two migration waves are subject to different levels of social exclusion in Northern Cypriot society. Most of the migrants from the third wave still haven't got citizenship, but even the migrants from the first wave who have citizenship status are also not feeling like first class citizens as a result of the social exclusion they are exposed to.

First wave migrants are stigmatised as "settlers" which puts forward the way they are settled in by the authorities at the time. Turkish Cypriot middle classes with high levels of income, especially public sector workers and the left intellectuals consider that migrants from Turkey are nothing but artificially settled population to establish and secure Turkey's domination of Cyprus. From this perspective migrants do not correspond to any social class. They are mostly seen as ignorant, ill-mannered foreign multitudes with a high tendency to criminal activities and they are merely accepted to the country by the Turkish Cypriot political elites who pursue the Taksim thesis to use them as vote reserves to guarantee their power. When it is considered the way this migration is planned and implemented by both the bureaucrats from Turkey and political leadership of Northern Cyprus it can be seen as demographic engineering. This intention was very obvious in the oral history interviews of political leaders and prominent bureaucrats at the time who were the engineers of Turkish Federative State of Cyprus (TFSC). On the other hand, labour with various skills was the most pressing necessity of the Northern Cyprus' economy for the re-construction of disintegrated socio-spatial scales after the population exchange between the North and South Cyprus. The first wave migrants were settled in villages abandoned by Greek Cypriots under these circumstances. The only urban neighbourhood they were settled in was in Famagusta. Oral history interviews with the migrants from this wave where they narrated their process of migration and settlement can also clearly show that they were the peasants who had no other alternatives but to migrate to another country to be able to survive because they had lost their means of subsistence where they had lived before. Hence, their migration can be defined as displacement.

Approaching migrants as Turkey's agents to implement colonial policies instead of people with no other means to survive but to migrate to another country, conceals their reality as a class in the society and downgrades them to numbers instead of necessary labour for different sectors of the economy. Therefore, migrants in Northern Cyprus are deprived of pursuing their rights against the barriers in front of their economic and social mobility channels. The social exclusion they are exposed to, as a result of their ethnic origins and nationalities, is also a common challenge for migrants all over the world. In the case of first wave migrants, even though they all have citizenship, in consequence of the social exclusion, building a common identity with Northern Cypriots as equal citizens has not been successful and they have remained as citizen foreigners in Turkish Cypriot society.

Similarly, the third wave migrants' representation in the society is constructed over their nationality and cultural capital instead of their class position in the society. Other than a small group of migrants with job security and high wages, it can generally be said that, even though with different degrees for each migration waves, migrants from Turkey are socially excluded through their nationality and/or poverty. The exclusion expressed through these axes is essentially class based and cultural. In the framework of a rising new nationalistic wave in Northern Cyprus, migrants from Turkey are seen as homogenous group through their TR nationality. This perception prevents seeing their different positions in the social and economic division of labour and their different experiences as migrants from different waves.

The third migration wave from Turkey to Northern Cyprus corresponds to labour migrations of a global round of capitalism in terms of its origins and nature. They meet the cheap labour demand of leading sectors of the economy. Construction and tourism are the leading sectors of the Northern Cyprus' economy especially in the 2000s that is where the speed of capital accumulation higher than the other sectors' in Northern Cyprus and migrants from third wave generally flow into these sectors mostly to work informally. In depth interviews and focus group meetings carried out with them showed us clearly that as a result of neo liberal policies implemented in Turkey, migrants from this wave became unemployed or lost their means of subsistence where they have been living and they had to migrate to another country to work. They meet the semi skilled and unskilled labour need of different sectors of the economy. Geographical, political and economic local contingencies have been effective on the speed of this migration wave. Migrants from this wave work generally labour intensive, unskilled or semi skilled parts of construction or service sector jobs especially in tourism. They work generally without work permits, long hours with low wages and live in very bad conditions to save money to send to their families. Informal working practises are gradually decreasing as a result of new legal regulations which connect work permission to the work and employers. Migrant labour has become more disposable with the implementation of these regulations. As soon as their work contract ends they have to leave the country. This increases the labour turnover, hence decreases the wages.

Third wave migrants are intensively living in the Walled City/Nicosia which is transformed into an urban transition zone after 1974 and functions as an incubator for the third wave migrants. The Walled City is a segregated space by Northern Cypriots as well as by the

former migrants from the first two waves. This spatial segregation has been formed through class based cultural symbolical barriers instead of physical barriers and it plays a significant role in social exclusion of the migrants from this wave.

Northern Cyprus has not been recognised as a juridical/legal entity by the international community after the division. This situation is one of the most critical factors that weaken the perception of it as a social scale in the re-construction of the division of labour process. Migrants from Turkey, whom are not responsible for the division of the Island, are downgraded to numbers without considering their class position in the society they work and live in only because they originate from Turkey. Approaches that ignore the fact those migrants from the first and third waves form the much needed labour force for the Northern Cypriot economy as a result of the collapsed division of labour after the division, making the mistake of not treating this political entity as a geography re-constructed with this labour force. First wave migrants who were encouraged to live and work in Northern Cyprus through the secret protocols signed by the political elites from Turkey and Northern Cyprus and the third wave migrants who meet the cheap labour necessity of certain sectors of Northern Cyprus' economy, belong to the working class who have no other alternatives but to migrate to another country to survive as other migrant labour in the world. There is a need of a new perspective for the Turkish migrants who have been the essential part of the social re-construction with their role in the economic division of labour for more than 30 years even though this political geography has not been recognised by the international community except Turkey. Lack of this kind of perspective on the one hand degrades migrants to agents of an imperial country, on the other hand lessens the possibility of realistic solution to the Cyprus Question.

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