

Was realism and state really sacked by capitalism?

Reconsidering realism, interdependence and globalization

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Abstract

The paper contemplates on the multiple and often paradoxical relationships between major theories of international relations (IR) and states in the progress of capitalism. It particularly attempts to reconstruct the missed link between realism and capitalism. On the one hand, *ad hoc* policies in compliance with realist theory have strengthened the state; on the other hand, the nation state has played an historical role in the standardization of values, norms, and rules within different territories, and so paved the way for interdependence and globalization. However, realism fallaciously conceives of the state as a metaphysical or eternal entity by ignoring the historically embedded link between the state system and capitalism. As capitalism matured and felt itself squeezed within national territories, realist theory has been declared dysfunctional and new theories that justify the expansion of capitalism all over the world have come into agenda. Dialectically, realist theory, via its support for the state, has contributed to the formation of interdependence and globalization, and, in their turn, those theories have transformed realist theory through the route.

1. Shift in IR Theories: Dialectical or Paradigmatic?

The sharp emphasis of realist theory on the state, has not only created a setting for the development of interdependence and globalization¹, but

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¹ Since the 1980s, much of the controversy in international relations theory has been concerned with a major debate between globalism and realism. For a sophisticated group of essays, see Maghoori and Bennett (1982), and Wright and Kaplan (2001: 51-60). These debates, however, do not necessarily exhaust all arguments. For instance Little and Smith (1994) recognize three

has also paved the way for the counter arguments of interdependence and globalization. Applying an evolutionary or dialectical approach (Sjolander, 1996: 604) to international relations (IR) rather than searching for new paradigms (Kegley, 1993: 131-46; Cerny, 1996: 617-37) under the influence of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) can shed much more light on the evolution of national and international structures as well as the mutually reinforcing relationship between IR theories and IR itself (Nye, 1988: 235-51; Walt, 1998). This does not mean that Kuhn's methodological arguments concerning scientific revolutions are null but defining globalization as a completely new paradigm sounds unsatisfactory. Realism, interdependence and globalization are integral but historically quite different parts of the capitalist world-economy in Wallerstein's terms (Wallerstein, 1979; 1984). In this context, interdependence between the modern state and capitalism profoundly affects both individual states and the accompanying state system in which they act. While former phases of capitalism were correlative to the realist theory and sovereign nation states, its more recent phases have been associated with interdependence and globalization, bringing about significant changes in the form and content of the state system. Hence, in this study, it is contended that the major IR theories deal with and justify different stages of the same phenomenon: the development and transformation of a state system vis-à-vis the expansion of the capitalist world-economy. Their relations can be outlined as follow:

(i) The everlasting emphasis of realism on sovereignty and the security of state as well as the nation have facilitated the standardization that serves the nascent interests of mercantilist and industrial capitalism during absolute monarchy and modern nation-state. So, realism has indirectly provided substantial support for capitalism at the national level.

(ii) Interdependence deals with more sophisticated and developed forms of capitalism and state; hence its emphasis naturally exceeds the scope of realist theory. It still observes states as important international actors, but considers other actors as well in congruence with the advance of capitalism.

(iii) The theories of globalization, especially those based upon the premise of interdependence, incline to surpass the scope of realism and interdependence in such a way that they begin to de-emphasize the role of the state in the international system and focus on multinational or transnational corporations instead. So these theories particularly elaborate on the further expansion of finance capital across the world.

perspectives, namely, 'power and security', 'interdependence and transnational relations', and 'dominance and dependence'.

(iv) As an explanation of the third item, the theories of globalization are not uniform but rather divergent. Even though some, especially those based on dependency theory, attempt to expose the inconsistencies of the contemporary capitalist system, those who get stuck to the vague concept of 'global governance' cannot entirely avoid getting criticized for playing a role in disguising the asymmetrical relations between strong and weak states or centre and periphery. These theories might be thought of as ideological approaches that distort reality on behalf of the strong parties.

The dependency theories were developed during and after the 1960s against the linear modernization theories that were developed for strengthening the asymmetric ties between developed and underdeveloped countries. Among the dependency theories, two are quite considerable: Neo-Marxist dependency theories, namely those of Paul Baran's causes of economic underdevelopment (1957), Andre Gunder Frank's development of underdevelopment (1967; 1972; 1986), Samir Amin's unequal development (1977), Arrighi Emmanuel's unequal exchange (1972), Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system and world-economy analyses (1979; 1980a; 1980b; 1984; 1988), and structural dependency theories of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979), Celso Furtado (1963; 1965), and Oswaldo Sunkel (1969). What is common in dependency theories is that they have attempted to explain the dynamics and main mechanisms of the capitalist world economy in terms of center (metropolis) and periphery (satellite) relations.

In this article, the dependency theories are not analyzed but their arguments are considered throughout the paper. Even, the major thesis of the article is drawn from the analyses of Immanuel Wallerstein that a capitalist mode of world-economy has existed since the 16th century and today the entire world operates within the structure of a single social division of labor. Hence, the chief actors and institutions of the capitalist world-economy—states, classes, peoples and households—are formed and transformed by the everlasting progress (not always linear but from time to time cyclical and/or with secular trends) of the world-economy (Wallerstein, 1979; 1984). Since there have been acute debates among realist and liberal scholars on the nature of international relations and actors for the past two decades, the article challenges both of them insofar as they are not actually conflicting paradigms. Hence, treating each theory as transitional yet complementing the phases of the modern state and capitalism, this study primarily seeks to depict how realist assumptions and the consolidation of state, described as the unique or major actor by realist theory, have contributed to interdependence and globalization, to what extent realism and capitalism have collaborated with each other, and whether or not this alliance has really ended. For

this, the article intentionally focuses on the realist-interdependence-globalization literature.

2. Realist Theory Pivots on the Nation State

The roots of the realist approach to IR might be found in early, ancient societies; however, Machiavelli and Hobbes' analyses, which were mainly inspired by Thucydides's works, constituted the background of realist theory. Classic theorists of realism were concerned with power or rule without differentiating whether it is internally or externally oriented. Although they established a strong association between national and international politics, contemporary realists began to emphasize external factors, especially after the Second World War. Hence IR and so realism became a distinct discipline of political science, presuming to identify and explain the dynamics originating from the international system itself (Clark, 1993: 493). Hence, realists like Morgenthau, Waltz (2000: 5-41) and their disciples stressed the importance of power and the national interest, and put to one side not only the variations and conflicts in domestic politics and societies but also beliefs and values which policy-makers hold. These theorists tried to justify themselves by clinging to the assumption that since the international environment exercises much more pressure on its members, internal factors may only peripherally influence their behavior (Jervis, 1994: 858-859). In this regard, the pioneers of realist theory, despite their strong influences, have been ignored, or meagerly taken into account (Forde, 1992: 372-93 and 1995: 141-60).

Yet, their arguments on foreign policy have been supported in different ways as the following argument illustrates. According to Joseph M. Grieco (1988: 487, 496-7), neo-liberal institutionalists describe the interests of states in strictly individualistic terms; states as 'rational egoist' actors care only about their own gains and do not consider whether their partners achieve any gains, or whether their gains are greater or less than they achieve. On the other hand, for Grieco, realists, opposing this assumption and resorting to the 'balance of power theory' (Papayouanou, 1999), argue that states may focus both on their absolute and relative gains from co-operation, and a state might exit from it if the partner achieves relatively greater gains. This argument, Grieco supports, enables him to prove the superiority of realist theory over neoliberal institutionalism. Here it suffices to mention that this is not a new approach but a repetition of Thucydides's well known assessment regarding the cause of the Peloponnesian War. According to Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War was made inevitable by "the growth of Athenian power, which inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians and compelled them to

go to war” (Forde, 1992: 374). Yet, as will be analyzed later, liberal institutionalism supports the possibility as well as the desirability of co-operation. For instance, Robert O. Keohane (1998: 88) and Russett and Oneal (2001) criticize the relative gains argument of realism; likewise, Robert Wright insists on the invalidity of the ‘zero-sum’ game in IR, and builds his analysis especially on the notion of the ‘non-zero-sum game’ (Wright, 2000a; 2000b; Wright and Kaplan, 2001: 51-60). Yet it must be noted that such approaches still recognize the core assumptions of realism by treating states as unitary rational actors. Furthermore, it is not questioned whether the so-called co-operation is an actual co-operation among equals or whether it is rather a subordinated or directed co-operation from which the strong states benefit more than the weak ones. In other words, there is no satisfactory answer to the question whether interdependence or co-operation in itself is a reality or merely a discourse that conceals the asymmetrical relations among nations and societies.

Machiavelli, whom realist theory owes a lot, adopted an instrumental rationality and put all means in the service of a unique end: all goals of state policy must be subordinated to survival, longevity or power. Other goals that violate it are ruled out. Machiavelli, like modern realists, was guided by a concept of national interest, and admitting prevalence of power over justice in international politics, stressed the priority of international anarchy over the balance of power, international peace or stability (Forde, 1992: 378, 387). Realist theory remarkably grounded its arguments on a pessimistic conception of human nature and generalized it to IR. Conception of human nature as ‘corrupt’ led Hobbes to establish a Leviathan; then, drawing an analogy between individuals and states Hobbes deduced that international structure reflects the anarchic situation in nature (Hobbes, 1991: ch. 13-17), but he did not go a step further and propose another Leviathan for the international system.

Tightly relying on such concepts as security, power, anarchy and conflict, realist theory developed its basic postulates (Grieco, 1988: 488; Forde, 1995: 143-145; Preda, 1984: 861; Wendt, 1987: 340-44; Gusterson, 1993: 284-89; Lebow, 1994: 250-52; Walt, 1998; Shuja, 2001; Ashley, 1984: 225-86; Gilpin, 1984: 287-304)² as follows:

- (i) States are the major actors in world affairs.
- (ii) States pursue the preservation their own national interests, and hence behave as unitary rational agents.
- (iii) International anarchy is the prominent element that guides the actions of states.

² The Ashley-Gilpin debate on realism seems exhaustive. Ashley (1984) contends that neorealism is itself an ‘array of errors’, a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist, and structuralist commitments. On the other hand, Gilpin (1984) defends realist assumptions.

- (iv) States in anarchy are preoccupied with power (Guzzini, 1993: 443-78) and security, and so are amenable to conflict and competition rather than co-operation.
- (v) International institutions do not effectively ensure co-operation; they may only marginally do so.

Realist theory interprets international system and stability on the basis of atomistic states' micro motives or unintended behaviors (Cederman, 1994: 506). As summarized below by Kenneth Waltz, for realists the system is not the consequence of a conscious concern for global stability:

International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city-states, empires, or nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained. International-political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. In both systems, structures are formed by the co-action of their units (Waltz, 1979: 91; also see, Waltz, 2000: 5-41).

Actually, Waltz underlines or narrates only one side of the story, and inclines to ignore the other part. By treating international political systems and economic markets as if they are irrelevant categories, Waltz dismisses the mutually reinforcing relationship between economic markets and national/international political systems—as the following sections will show, this is a common fallacy of realism that goes back to Hegel. However, realist theory has recently tended to consider international co-operation and security. Theories of hegemony and international regimes can be conceived as a part of this reorientation. The rise of international regime theory (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 495-96) especially marks the transition from traditional realist theory to neorealist and interdependence theories. Before analyzing interdependence or globalization, the legacy of realism and the realist postulates—particularly those regarding state as a meta-historical entity—should be reconsidered from a historical point of view and the question of how realism collaborated directly with state and indirectly with capitalism should be answered. For attaining a general scheme of events, the following section particularly seeks to underline the connection between sovereignty and homogenization pursued by the state in alliance with the emergent capitalism.

3. Unraveling the Missed Link between Realism and Capitalism


The nation state has become the essential framework for the modern world and the driving force of social change since the 18th century. Today, it is frequently acknowledged that the sovereign nation state is entering a new phase. To understand this change, not only the earliest factors that had played a determining role in the formation of the modern state, but also the subsequent factors that nowadays stimulate the transformation of modern state are to be considered. In this way, the decisive role of the state in the crystallization and realization of the factors, which once realized immediately set to reshape state, can be properly determined. Thus, it would be easier to exhibit how historical characteristics of the nation state (Hobsbawm, 1996: 267-78; Stoessinger, 1994: 23-35) have enhanced interdependence and globalization and contributed to the emergence of new theories, and to settle the question of how globalization—or a new form of the world system in Wallerstein's terms—has become possible from the anarchy which realists have inclined to emphasize. As just underlined, all these require reconstruction of the missed link between realism and capitalism; to some extent, Figure 1 below serves the purpose.

As the historical graph roughly figures out, the roots of the linkage between realism and capitalism surely lie in the great transition from feudalism to modern state en route absolute monarchy (Huberman, 1969; Sabine and Thorson, 1989: 311-15). Early forms of both the capitalist economy and state spontaneously appeared with the gradual collapse of the feudal system. Since both have been historically interdependent, it is no surprise that demands of both, then, were articulated and supported by realism. As a prominent theorist of not only realism and absolutism but also to some extent, of liberalism, Hobbes's acknowledging (1991: ch. 24) that money is the blood of a society ironically characterizes and sheds light on the historical alliance between state, capitalism and realism.

In a work on the complex history of state and capitalism, Gianfranco Poggi especially distinguishes *standestaat* or the system of estates from feudalism. Where there was no systematic use of money or freedom of movement and commerce—if there was any, wholly irregular and local—feudal institutions were able to maintain their own existence. The estates played a decisive role in the transition from feudalism to absolutism (Poggi, 1978: ch. 3; Pierson, 1996: ch. 2). In this system, the main concern was the institutionalization of trade networks; so, the question that seemed to be resolved urgently is the impediment of the division of lands among feudal lords. It was not merely a problem pertaining to land but had important implications for the political authority as well because

division of lands meant before anything else disintegration of political power. As Poggi (1978: 48) points out, the characteristic of the *standestaat* was its dualistic structure in which monarch and estates represented two different centers of political power.

Figure 1
Historical Relations among State, Capitalism, and IR Theories



Especially the emergent bourgeoisie, organized as the third estate to protect the interests of its members, generally and naturally collaborated with monarchs. The bourgeoisie in no way thought to assume political power directly because this would be contrary to its alleged interests. Although estates carried out substantial political and economic functions at the closing moments of feudalism, the dynamics of economic advance and its dualistic nature would necessarily make them obsolete. In parallel to traders' beginning to run businesses and interacting within different markets and exchanging goods and commodities for the pursuit of profit, the local or regional arrangements could not cope with increasing demands for standardization or homogenization. For a sustainable trade and lively economy, further measures had to be taken; rules and regulations had to be standardized, property rights and security guaranteed, natural law replaced with positive law and political authority

definitely concentrated in the hands of secular rulers instead of dispersed to competing local lords or transcendental clergy.

No doubt, nascent interests of developing bourgeoisie of mercantile capitalism required before anything else a centralized government. For this, the bourgeoisie placed its preference on behalf of the monarchs against the feudal lords and the church; in this respect, it was frequently described as the genuine founder of absolute monarchies (Poggi, 1978: ch. 4; Huberman, 1969: ch. 7). The compelling demands of the bourgeoisie did not confront with difficulties in finding echoes in political theory. The main objective of the thinkers, e.g., Jean Bodin in France, Niccolo Machiavelli in Italy, Thomas Hobbes in England, was the creation of absolute political agents that claim to be sovereign both externally and internally.

Apparently, the scope of the concept of sovereignty covers both external and internal sovereignty; whereas the former requires the ability to exclude, the latter depends on the ability to include (Reinicke, 1997: 127-38; Manicas, 1988: 186-7, 190, Hobsbawm, 1996: 269-71, Pierson, 1996: ch. 2). While absolute monarchy achieved physical standardization in terms of territoriality, external sovereignty and centralization of power in monarchs, the modern nation state, besides preserving external sovereignty, further developed both the extent and scope of internal sovereignty. It has particularly undertaken an active role in standardizing its subjects, equipping them with a new identity, and creating totally a compact society as frequently called the nation. That is, the nation state eagerly pursued the creation of a people that would think, act and behave similarly, and march altogether whenever necessary (Stoessinger, 1994: 23-4; Wallerstein, 1984). Standardization of the country's inhabitants by the state was accompanied by the development of the public sphere, citizenship and so representative government during the last two centuries (Habermas, 1994). The achievements in citizenship and the welfare state led to a popular illusion that finally exposed its dark face after the 1980s. The welfare state has been considered a universal phenomenon, as if it be never challenged by capitalism. However, the collapse of the eastern block definitely signaled the retreat from social policy programs developed especially for alleviating the negative effects of the capitalist economy on citizenship and participation. The credo and programs of the welfare state have been replaced by those of neoliberalism after the 1980s; acceptance of deregulation policies has meant the end of optimism about citizen participation in the public sphere. Apparently, neoliberalism has challenged these achievements by introducing a new formula: 'no external threats to the functioning of the capitalist system, no need to alleviate its defects'. It is not inconsistent with the premises of capitalist

rationality when we remember its alliance with the fascist movement of the 1930s.

4. Hegel and Marx: Who is Right?

In a great number of studies, different phases of the state are competently drawn and it is revealed that the modern state is a product of certain historical circumstances (Eisenstadt, 1993; Tilly, 1990; Pierson, 1996; Anderson, 1974, Mann, 1986; Poggi, 1978; Giddens, 1985). This study also argues that the history of individual states is synchronically the history of a state system—more concretely recognized by the Westphalia treaty in 1648. Yet, it intends to reconsider the arguments of Hegel and Marx as two rivals and briefly review how Hegel conceived the issue, as one of the famous philosophers of state, and how Marx radically revised his arguments. Hegel (1974: 298) asserts that “the state has individuality” which “means awareness of one’s existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others”. So, Hegel conceives of state as an autonomous entity that necessarily exists in relation to other states. It follows that every state is autonomous vis-à-vis the others; in other words, sovereignty requires mutual recognition:

A state is as little an actual individual without relations to other states as an individual is actually a person without rapport with other persons. The legitimate authority of a state [...] is partly a purely domestic matter (one state should not meddle with the domestic affairs of another). On the other hand, however, it is no less essential that this authority should receive its full a final legitimation through its recognition by other states, although this recognition requires to be safeguarded by the proviso that where a state is to be recognized by others, it shall likewise recognize them, i.e., respect their autonomy (Hegel, 1974: 302-3).

What the above quotation definitely disproves is the basic premise of realist theory that international anarchy impedes co-operation of states. Although every state’s sovereignty against its neighbors could be interpreted as a manifestation of international conflict and anarchy, coexistence of sovereign states in a state system symbolizes an original situation which embraces the roots of co-existence or co-operation. Yet, Hegel’s philosophy of state tends to mask the inherent link between realism and capitalism. While contrasting the relations of individuals in a civil society with that of states in a state system Hegel overconfidently argues that,

[t]he immediate actuality which any state possesses from the point of view of other states is particularized into a multiplicity of relations which are determined by the arbitrary will of both autonomous parties and which therefore posses the formal nature of contracts pure and

simple. The subject-matter of these contracts, however, is infinitely less varied than it is in civil society, because in civil society individuals are reciprocally interdependent in the most numerous respects, while autonomous states are principally wholes whose needs are met within their own borders (Hegel, 1974: 303).

Hegel, even though comprehensively described the state system, nevertheless failed to grasp “the mind of history”. Inasmuch as sovereign states, as seen before, attempt to guarantee their self-existence they adhere to such mechanisms that enforce homogenization or standardization within their boundaries. Yet, a certain degree of homogenization in the treatment of the inhabitants (Hobsbawm, 1996: 269) and standardization in all—economic, social, legal, and educational—aspects of life, meanwhile, pave the way for the institutionalization and expansion of capitalist relations. The complex interactions in civil (or bourgeois) society, in turn, dialectically start exerting a strong pressure on states. No doubt, as Hegel’s foremost critic, Marx, prophetically declared in the Manifesto what Hegel failed to foretell or left incomplete:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere...

It compels all nations [...] to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image...

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto (Marx, 1977: 224-5, 235).

It should be noted that the thoughts of Hegel and Marx, in principle, are not contradictory but related to different phases of capitalism and state. Hegel’s understanding symbolizes the realist phase whereas Marx’s implies interdependence and globalization. Or more accurately, we might say that while Hegel is not cognizant of what he philosophizes upon, Marx diagnoses the inner nature of capitalist economy, so speculates on the future of industrial capitalism. To sum up, as Hegel does, realist theory strengthens the state, but the state, in its turn, significantly encourages and expands the capitalist economy by imposing much more homogenization. Here, the missed link between realism and capitalism becomes visible; dialectically, realism matures the conditions that will negate or at least transform its own very existence. However, a conflict inevitably arises because former theories become obsolete in a new

phase; substitution of realism with neorealism or introduction of new theories or perspectives symbolizes the attempts to resolve these conflicts.

5. Negation of Realist Theory: The Rise of Interdependence and Globalization

Interdependence refers to a relational situation of states. It is a scheme—including preceding variants like functionalist or regional integration theories of the 1940s and 1950s—held especially by liberal institutionalists. Liberal institutionalism principally assumes the co-operation of states against the anarchy of realism: Institutionalists argue that capacity of international institutions help states achieve international co-operation. As argued before, this perspective tends to overlook the asymmetrical relations between strong and weak states, and describes any kind of relationship as a verification of interdependence and co-operation.

In the 1980s, a number of core assumptions of realist theory—such as that anarchy restrains international co-operation—fused into liberal institutionalism, which may be seen as an implication of the connection between realism and liberalism. According to this theory, even though international anarchy limits the willingness of states to co-operate, states can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions (Grieco, 1988: 486; Keohane, 1998: 85-6). Institutions produce an appropriate setting for the co-operation of states and encourage them to work together in mutually beneficial ways by reducing ‘transaction costs’ (Keohane, 1998: 86). For instance, Morgenthau, as a prominent figure among realist theorists, in his later analyses began to de-emphasize the anarchic situation of IR, and declared the possibility of co-operation among states. According to Morgenthau, economic interdependence has drawn the developed states closer together, increasing the benefits of peace and the costs of severed relationships (Morgenthau, 1975; Jervis, 1994: 871). Hence, realists have slightly turned their thoughts to the role of international institutions on the establishment of a peaceful international system and regime as it is conveniently depicted by Haggard and Simmons:

The sharp contrast between the competitive, zero-sum ‘anarchy’ of interstate relations and the ‘authority’ of domestic politics seemed overdrawn in explaining cooperative behaviour among the advanced industrial states. The policy dilemmas created by the growth of interdependence since World War II generated new forms of coordination and organization that fit uneasily in a realist framework” (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 491).

In this regard, scholars have tried to refine the advancing situation of IR by proposing new concepts; among these, the ones volunteered by Barry Buzan, i.e., international and world society, immediately attract attention. According to Buzan (1993: 338-9), the main difference between world and international society is that the former is based on units at the level of individuals while the latter, at the level of states: "international society rests on common norms, rules, and identities among states, whereas world society would rest on common norms, rules, and identities held by individuals across the system". Keohane, alike, employs the concept 'transnational society' to describe the networks among individuals and nongovernmental organizations. Yet, Keohane further implies the facilitating role of intergovernmental settings because the growth of such networks among scientists, professionals in many fields, and human rights and environmental activists has been aided to a great extent by new technologies of telecommunication and by institutional arrangements (Keohane, 1998: 93).

The globalization models perceive the world emerging as an interdependent unit with international organizations and multinational corporations, which put an end to the privileged position of the nation-state as the only actor in the world (Williams, 1993: 165; Evans, 1997: 65, Campanella, 1993: 194). Optimists anticipate a world state that could deal with growing levels of international interdependence (Preda, 1984: 861; Lloyd, 2001: 19-20; Drucker, 1997: 159-71).

In a variety of definitions of globalization (Huysmans, 1995: 471-87; Marshall, 1996: 195-205; Gill, 1995: 404-11; Milner, 1998; Lloyd, 2001: 19-20), the one offered by the OECD highlights three main factors (United Nations, 1988: 77; Campanella, 1993: 192): entrance of new powerful actors such as the transnational corporations into the political arena; rapid diffusion of soft technologies in communication and information; approval of deregulation policies in several countries. This definition can be criticized due to having a limited scope reflecting almost only economic concerns. Yet, it outlines the leitmotif of globalization and points out the most controversial issue that almost all scholars to some extent are preoccupied with, namely, the role and future of state in the process of globalization. From now on, I will briefly reconsider the literature on globalization so as to determine its multifaceted and problematical relation to the state. It is expected that a one-dimensional causal relationship between globalization and the state is inadequate for understanding such a transformation. But rather, there is a dialectical and multidimensional relationship between these variables; each recasts, but in turn, is recast by the other one unceasingly.

6. Globalization: Ideology or Utopia?

Although most of the theories somewhat consent on the transformation of the nation state, they differ due to their outlooks: they embrace either a pessimistic or an optimistic standpoint. The hypotheses, identified by Linda Weiss (1997: 6), concerning globalization, illustrate the range of variations: first, ‘strong globalization—state power erosion’ (Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1991, Horsman and Marshall, 1994); second, ‘strong globalization—state power unchanged’; third, ‘weak globalization or strong internationalization—state power reduced in scope’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996); and the last, ‘weak globalization or strong internationalization—state power adaptability and differentiation emphasized’ (Weiss, 1997: 6). Weiss in her comprehensive article focuses on the question whether the state is a victim or facilitator of globalization. She argues that “domestically strong states may be able to adapt, and to assist firms to adjust, more effectively to the external environment by creatively adapting its tools and ‘internationalizing’ state capabilities” (1997: 21). Weiss, especially taking East Asian states into consideration, claims that the favored image of states being passive victims of powerful ‘transnational’ forces is indefensible. Instead, she proposes that the classic definition of state is changed and now we confront with a new form of state:

We are witnessing changes in state power; but these changes have to not with the diminution but with the reconstruction of power around the consolidation of domestic and international linkages...

To the extent that states are seeking to adapt and reconstitute themselves in these ways, they can perhaps best be seen as ‘catalytic’ states ... [which] seek to achieve their goals less by relying on their own resources than by assuming a dominant role in coalitions of states, transnational institutions, and private sector groups (Weiss, 1997: 24; see also, Fukuyama, 1992: 24-32; Kupchan, 1988: 585-611; Lefebvre, 1991: 211-2).

In parallel to the mentioned views, some of the analyses tend to emphasize the changing role of states and assert that “the view that globalization has made the nation state irrelevant is particularly wrong today” (Tanzer, 1995: 1-15, Sweezy and Magdoff, 1992a: 1-18; Sweezy and Magdoff, 1992b: 1-18). They maintain that state institutions are still expected to play an important role in the new context of globalization although the politics adopted by vulnerable actors are generally ineffective in reducing the negative consequences of interdependence. Sensitive actors are more successful in adjusting their own domestic economy to the global environment (Campanella, 1993: 195, 197, 200). Interconnected with the views presented above, many scholars particularly ponder over the disappearing of the welfare role that the

modern state once played. Due to the systematic approval of deregulation policies, it is argued that the welfare state is replaced by a neoliberal, competitive, or neo-utilitarian form of state (Evans, 1997: 74-5; Cerny, 1996: 633-7; Dahrendorf, 1996: 232-3, Held and McGrew, 1993: 261-88), having further negative consequences for the performance of a democratic government. This view has grounded its claims on the idea that there is a positive association between nationality (sovereignty, territoriality) and citizenship. In the progress of globalization, contemporary democracies are bound by complex channels of interdependence and few states can see themselves to be completely independent of external pressures (Keohane, 1998: 92; Keohane and Nye, 1998: 94). It is worthwhile to briefly re-evaluate the arguments of this approach.

Historically, commercial and industrial capitalism integrated local markets and politics at the national level and adapted unskilled rural population into the system. However, today, globalization integrates markets but fragments politics. Along with the erosion of external sovereignty, the power of elected representatives in shaping public policy is also restricted. National leaders are confronted with difficulties in ensuring the welfare and security of their own citizens (Schmitter, 1994: 63; Reinicke, 1997: 127-38; Epstein, Crotty and Kelly, 1996: 376-81; Evans, 1997: 80-2). Hence, the erosion of the capacity of the state and the weakening of the state's responsiveness give way to instability in public life as well as new forms of inequalities and disorder that reflect the declining trust in democratic institutions of governance (Dahrendorf, 1996: 232-3, 235, 238; O'Donnell, 1993: 1357-8; Bardouille, 2000; Cerny, 1996: 631-2; Keane, 1988: 135-6, 218-9). However, when the historical link between state and capitalism is ignored or the state is isolated from its historical context, such changes are seen as a vicious circle that only increases anxieties.

The progress of globalization is not smooth and also not without serious contradictions. However, the story is incomplete when one considers only the side of the medallion that mainly focuses on the negative effects on state and citizenship. The other side includes theories that hold a sympathetic approach to events, emphasizing environmental, social and cultural aspects of globalization (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 106-7). Optimist theorists of interdependence and globalization³ consider the present as really a continuation of the Western order established during and after World War II. It is overconfidently anticipated and

³ For arguments that attempt to differentiate interdependence, globalization, globalism and deglobalism, see Reinicke (1997: 127-38), Keohane and Nye (2000: 104-7) Nye (2001: 82-3).

asserted that all countries and peoples are moving toward democracy and capitalism⁴ (Ikenberry, 1996: 90; Bronk, 2000: 12), and realist premises are becoming obsolete and being replaced by the close co-operation and co-ordination among democratic and democratizing states (Lebow, 1994: 269). By constructing an analogy between these approaches and Mannheim's (1936) famous concepts, ideology and utopia, it may be suggested that the former approach to globalization holds a utopian standpoint that inclines to ignore positive sides of globalization—even though they may be slightest gains—while the latter one represents the ideological outlook which tends to entirely overlook the negative and destructive dimensions of globalization. This second perspective does not ask the question who gets the benefits and who gets the burdens in this game but ideologically defines the game only as a positive-sum game in which all actors supposed to get benefits (for these theories see, Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1990: 75-84).

Moderate interpretations attempt to reconcile both approaches. In this context, Roger Williams insists that technology has not yet made the state an anachronism, nor has it wholly destroyed sovereignty. According to this view, it has put a premium on interdependence, both positive to realize its fruits and negative to avoid its dangers (Williams, 1993: 169; also see, Keohane, 2001). Similarly, David Held and Anthony McGrew assert that globalization, namely the internationalization of production, finance and exchange, is unquestionably eroding the capacity of the individual liberal democratic state to control its own economic future. Yet, they do not abstain from declaring their optimism toward the achievements of interdependence and globalization:

The development of international law has subjected individuals, governments and non-governmental organizations to new systems of legal regulation. Powers and constraints, and rights and duties, have been recognized in international law which transcend the claims of nation-states and which, whilst they may not be backed by institutions with coercive powers of enforcement, have nonetheless far-reaching consequences (Held and McGrew, 1993: 270, 273).

As illustrated, an actual consensus is yet to be reached among the scholars of globalization on the future reorganization of the world. In the 1960s, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn in their *World Peace through World Law* committed to the formulae, 'no peace without law'. They held the idea that no peace can be ensured by a continued arms race, by an indefinite balance of terror, or by diplomatic maneuvering. Instead they believed that peace can be achieved only by universal and complete

⁴ These neoliberal theories might be classified as new forms of positivist modernization.

national disarmament. Moreover, these authors suggest the creation of a world government with institutions corresponding to those that maintain law and order within nations (Clark and Sohn, 1966: xv-xviii; for similar views see, Hardt and Negri, 2000). Today, such a proposal sounds unsatisfactory because it conceives of the state as a perfect organization and only extends its physical scope. Nevertheless, any student of social science knows the basic preposition of structuralism that in case a change occurs in functions, structures respond accordingly. Yet, the idea of world governance, not in the sense of a single centralized authority or world government but rather meaning a flexible mixture of global and regional organizations that institutionalize co-operation among nations and contribute to global justice and democracy, gets popular support (Wright and Kaplan, 2001: 52; Lloyd, 2001: 20). Interest in ecological and environmental problems (Litfin, 1999: 367-370) all around the world—which once stemmed from rapid industrialization to meet the needs of capitalist economy and rival nation states—signals that major changes are on their way.

7. Conclusion

Throughout the article, it has been argued that even though the controversy between realism, interdependence and globalization is sharply exaggerated, these are complementary (for a similar approach, see, Nye, 1988: 238). Most of the theories of interdependence and globalization recognize generally the positive side of evolution, which generates international and global structures that encourage peaceful behavior and co-operation among governmental and nongovernmental communities (Lebow, 1994: 277). However, few consider the negative side of the process that entail serious problems especially for countries that fail to respond effectively. It must be admitted that the progress of the world-economy produces much more destruction and less solution for underdeveloped countries, and vice versa for developed countries. The flexible usage of the notion of co-operation itself carries the risk of keeping on asymmetrical relations historically embedded in this process.

The crux of the study is that unless the nation state had played a historical role pertaining to the standardization of values, norms, and rules in all economic, social, and political spheres within different territories all around the world, interdependence and globalization probably could not have been realized. The long period roughly between sixteenth and twentieth centuries can be regarded as the formation and consolidation of both the state system and the capitalist mode of production. Throughout the article, it is particularly argued that in their course both capitalism and the state have been supported by the realist outlook, either directly or indirectly. The achievements of the nation state

enabled the survival of the capitalist economy at the national level. Meanwhile the nation state was amply strengthened by realist theory via its permanent commitment to nationality, sovereignty and territoriality. As the capitalist economy grew up and felt itself squeezed in national territories, it has begun to conceive national boundaries as barriers so that the congenial companions have reached a crossroads, especially realism and capitalism being at loggerheads as outlined in Figure 1. Recently, realist theory has been conceived by capitalism as dysfunctional and so thought to be replaced with new theories that successfully respond to the new conditions. However, the central fallacy of realist theory is its conception of the state as a metaphysical or meta-historical entity. As Reinicke (1997: 137) has conveniently determined, it has never noted that “the nation-state is relatively a recent form of governance and it has no claim to perpetuity”. Furthermore, realist theory has never recognized its embedded ties with capitalism via the nation state although realist theory and its unique IR actor, the nation state, have facilitated the formation of an international system and new theories in the course of their complicated interaction with capitalism.

To sum up, dialectically, realist theory formed interdependence and globalization, and, in their turn, those theories have transformed realist theory through the route. Capitalism benefited from realist arguments in its earlier stages and has declared realism and nation-state as dysfunctional in its advance. However, it must be noted that realism has been exploited by capitalism but not sacked completely. The alliance between realism and capitalism might last in neo-forms in a world where antagonistic classes and rival states exist, all kinds of exploitation and inequalities are justified through instrumental rationality that dominates all spheres of life, all kinds of social relations are reduced to seller-customer relations and Hobbes’s *homo homini lupus* continues to be the guiding principle of social relations.

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Özet

Realizm ve Devlet Kapitalizm Tarafından Gerçekten Kullanıldı mı?

Yazıda, kapitalizmin yayılışına bağlı olarak başlıca uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları ve devletler arasındaki çoklu ve paradoksal ilişkiler ele alındı; özellikle realizm ve kapitalizm arasındaki kayıp bağlantının yeniden kurulması amaçlandı. Makalede bir yandan realist kuramla uyumlu olan politikaların devleti güçlendirdiği, öbür yandan değerlerin, normların ve kuralların farklı bölgelerde standartlaştırılmasında oynadığı tarihsel rolden dolayı modern ulus-devletin karşılıklı-bağımlılık ve küreselleşmeye zemin hazırladığı tartışıldı. Buna karşın, devletler sistemi ve kapitalizm arasındaki tarihsel ilişkileri göz ardı ettiği için, realizm devleti metafiziksel veya ebedi bir varlık olarak yanlış kavradı. Kapitalizm büyüyüp kendini ulusal sınırlar içinde sıkışmış hissettiğinde realizmin disfonksiyonel olduğu ilân edildi ve kapitalizmin bütün yeryüzüne yayılmasını haklılaştıracak yeni kuramlar geliştirildi. Diyalektik olarak, realist kuram devlete sağladığı destek aracılığıyla karşılıklı-bağımlılık ve küreselleşmenin oluşumuna katkı sağladı; ancak sonrasında ise bu kuramlar realizmi dönüştürdü, yadsıdı. Bu tartışmalara açıklık getirmesi amacıyla, makalede devlet, kapitalizm ve kuramların tarihsel ilişkileri üzerine bir şema geliştirildi.