

Systemic-structural approaches, world-system analysis and the study of foreign policy

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Abstract

This article aims to review and compare the systemic-structural approaches to international relations, and their impact on the study of foreign policy. Yet, the specific objective of this essay is to discuss, 'The Modern World-System Approach' which has been, mostly, less well understood or misunderstood, or misinterpreted by the students of international relations and foreign policy analysis. In the era of 'globalisation', re-visiting the systemic-structural approaches, and especially 'the modern world-system theory' may provide us with the necessary tools and insights for a better understanding of the dynamics of the 'globalisation process'.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to review the systemic-structural approaches and specifically the world system approaches to international relations and their impact on the study of foreign policy. Despite their central place in the discipline of international relations the systemic-structural theories have always occupied a marginal place in the field of foreign policy analysis. It is perhaps because that systemic-structural theories explain the structures, the processes, and the working of the international system but do not specifically deal with the external behaviour (foreign policy) of the individual states. However, the interaction between the system-structure and the behaviour of the actors is an important factor in understanding the foreign policy of the state actors. Thus, the main objective of this essay is first, to show how various systemic-structural approaches conceptualise and explain the international environment and second, what kinds of frameworks they provide us with for studying foreign policies of states. In this general framework, a second objective of this paper is to discuss and emphasise the significance of Immanuel Wallerstein's comprehensive 'modern world-system' approach to international phenomena and its usefulness in the study of foreign policy. Accordingly, in this paper I shall discuss the 'level of analysis problem' in international relations, 'early systems approaches',

‘Waltz’s systemic-structural approach (neo-realism)’, and the ‘world system analysis’ of both George Modelski and Immanuel Wallerstein.

2. The level of analysis problem in international relations

Since the publication of Singer’s well-known article in 1961 (Singer, 1961), the level of analysis problem has been one of the major issues in the study of international relations. Originally, it was concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of two levels in analysing international relations: the international system and the national state as levels of analysis. The central concern was the level at which one can best describe, explain and predict international phenomena. In fact, since each level has merits as well as disadvantages, the problem was to clarify the issue of whether a researcher should interpret reality in terms of the whole or in terms of parts of the whole in the study of international relations. This differentiation between the levels of analysis corresponds to the classical division of the field of International Relations into the main subfields of International Politics and Foreign Policy.

It is widely accepted that while international politics focuses on the structures, processes, and working of the international system, the subject matter of foreign policy focuses on the external relations of individual states. Hence, it becomes important for students of international relations to differentiate between the analysis of the international system and the analysis of the foreign policy of individual states.

The International System as Level of Analysis: Since it covers all the interactions within the system, the system level of analysis is considered the most comprehensive level. It encompasses all the international actors (mainly nation states) and focuses on the patterns of interactions among the actors in the system. Accordingly, it studies the forming and dissolving of alliances in the international system, the maintenance of stability, crisis, war, balance of power, international organisations, etc., and makes generalisations about these phenomena. In this way it allows us to study international relations in a totality. Yet this encompassing character of system level analysis leads the researcher to overemphasise the impact of the system on the state actors, on the one hand, and to undervalue the autonomy of states in the international system on the other. Moreover, while the notions of national autonomy and freedom of choice are ignored at the systemic level, a strong deterministic orientation often becomes dominant. A kind of ‘invisible hand’ which determines the behaviour of states appears as one of the main characteristics of system level analysis. Furthermore, in relation to foreign policy it leads to the understanding that there exists a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy behaviour of state actors. This level of analysis, therefore, allows little

room for divergence in the behaviour of states, and hence conveys a homogenised picture of states in the international system.

The National State as Level of Analysis: This particular level of analysis in international relations focuses on the primary actors of the international system, namely the nation state. In contrast to the international system level, the national state level of analysis allows the researcher to study the differences between state actors. An emphasis on the different foreign policy goals of different nations permits detailed examination of individual states, and accordingly leads to significant differentiation among the behaviours of the actors, in contrast to the similarity-seeking nature of system level analysis. State level analysis stresses the primacy of internal factors in the formulation of national foreign policies; hence, rather than the international interaction and its systemic outcomes, the influences of decision makers, pressure groups, classes, public opinion etc., are considered as the determinants of the behaviour of state actors. The problem is, however, that the focus on differences at the national level leads to an underestimation of the role of systemic outcomes on the behaviour of the actors.

3. Identifying the external and internal sources of foreign policy behaviour

One of the central concerns of students of foreign policy has been to identify the external and internal sources of state behaviour. The division between the two sources of foreign policy behaviour is known as the division between the external/systemic and internal/societal factors affecting foreign policy. Although the answer to the question of which one of these two factors has generally become dominant in the formulation of foreign policy is an open one, or at least depends on the situation at hand, most foreign policy studies have been dominated by the internal/societal factors approach, while the use of external/systemic factors has remained marginal (McGowan and Kegley, 1983: 7).

Studies which investigate the role of internal/societal factors in foreign policy focus on the variables that are internal to societies. In other words, they focus on the effects of the individual characteristics of leaders and decision makers, on decision making processes, governmental and political structures, pressure groups, classes, national history and so on. Changes in general foreign policy orientation are attributed to forces internal to society, without paying sufficient attention either to the restrictive or to the facilitative nature of the world context on the internal sources of change.

Accordingly, it becomes difficult to establish connections between foreign policy behaviour and the world context. System studies, on the contrary, give priority to external/systemic factors in the explanation of foreign policy behaviour and orientation, emphasising the determining role of the world context on foreign policy. Changes in the international system or in the political and economic structures of the international system are considered to be the primary sources of changes in foreign policy behaviour and orientation.

In comparing the two approaches it is clear that since the internal/societal approach focuses on internal variables, the inevitable differences between states cannot lead to generalisations and theoretical studies. Hence, the focus on internal/societal variables leads to the detailed case studies of foreign policies of individual states. The external/systemic approach, on the other hand, provides more opportunity to make generalisations about the foreign policy behaviour of states and makes theoretical studies possible. In contrast to the rather particularistic and discriminating characteristics of the internal/societal approach, the highly deterministic nature of external/systemic variables on foreign policy results in the probability of similar foreign policy behaviour and orientations of at least similar types of states. In other words, the impact of external/systemic influences on national states leads to similar foreign policy orientations and behaviour, and the degree of this similarity increases as the resemblance of individual states' internal organisations and positions in the international system increases.

4. Systemic/structural approaches

One of the most important issues in foreign policy studies which seek for explanations to the behaviour and orientations of states in the external environment is to conceptualise that external environment. In other words, a picture of that environment must be given in order to understand the relationship between the foreign policy and its larger setting. Let us start with the early systems approach.

4.1. The early systems approach

One of the consequences of Singer's (1961) article was the emergence of systems analysis which emphasised the importance of identifying various interaction patterns in the international system. The systems approach was a new way of looking at the relations among the actors of the international system. The primary aim of the 'early systems theorists' was to explain system-wide phenomena rather than to study the foreign policy of individual states. Accordingly, the conditions and patterns of international stability and

instability, conflicts, alliance building, and the concepts of balance of power, bipolarity and multipolarity became a central concern. The new understanding was "...that interaction sequences (among the states) have a logic of their own and that their outcomes can thus be explained - and perhaps even anticipated - by examining the patterns they form rather than the actors who sustain them" (Rosenau, 1969: 289).

However, the 'early systems theorists' referred to the internal forces of individual states which could affect the international system in their attempts to explain the international interaction patterns and their outcomes. In other words, the foreign policies of individual states which reflect their internal attributes were seen as the causes of those system-wide phenomena that the early system theorists claimed to explain (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1981:134-80 and Rosenau, 1969: 289-335). For instance, according to McClelland (1966), conditions and events in the international system were generated within the nation states by interest groups, political parties, public opinion, etc. In a similar manner, Rosecrance (1966) emphasised the determinant role of domestic elites for the establishment of international stability. Furthermore, according to Kaplan (1957), international patterns of behaviour were related to the characteristics of states. In all these examples, internal forces within states were thought to exert major effects on the functioning of the international system. The impact of the systemic understanding of international relations on the foreign policy studies of individual states appeared as the study of the influences of different domestic factors on international systems and/or international interaction patterns, rather than vice versa. For instance, since there were differences in the interaction patterns and workings of balance of power, bipolar, and multipolar international systems etc., early system theories tried to explain the impact of internal forces on the formation of different international interaction patterns and system-wide phenomena rather than the influences of those different international systems and interaction patterns on foreign policy orientations and behaviour.

The main contribution of systems studies to international relations is that it shifted the attention of scholars from studying the actions of individual states to the study of interaction among states. However, these early systems approaches defined a system 'as a totality composed of its parts'. In other words, the international system was composed of nation states and only their 'interactions' were central to systems studies. Furthermore, basically the interactions between great powers were considered important rather than the interactions among all states - great, medium or small powers - in the international system.

If we turn back to the original concern of giving a picture of the external environment in order to explain the foreign policies of states in relation to their larger environment, the early systems approach's conceptualisation of that environment can be summarised as follows;

1. The main actors of the international system are nation states, and the international system is the aggregate of these nation states and their interactions.

2. There are regularities and patterns in the interactions of states.

3. There are different types of international systems and they are characterised by hypothesised patterns of interactions. Thus, each system has its own interaction patterns.

4. Interaction patterns and outcomes are greatly affected by the domestic forces within states. Accordingly, the foreign policies of national political units are to be studied in order to understand and explain international systems. In other words, they are the causes rather than the effects of the systems.

5. Superpower and/or great powers, rather than small states are central to the interactions in these systems. Hence, there has always been an implicit hierarchy among states.

4.2. The systemic-structural (neo-realist) approach of K. Waltz

The conceptualisation of the external environment by the early systemic school was somewhat simplistic and blurred, primarily because the system was defined through its constituent units and their interactions without including any system level component. However, it paved the way for more advanced contending attempts at theorising the external environment.

According to Waltz (1979), theories of international politics examine international phenomena through one of two major avenues which he defines as 'reductionist' and 'systemic' approaches. Reductionist theories of international politics concentrate on the individual or national level, while systemic theories conceive of causes operating at the international level. According to Waltz, the early systems theories fall into the reductionist category. Reductionist theories are not really national level analysis since they do not necessarily explain national level influences on the foreign policy behaviour of a particular state, but try to explain the totality of international politics through examining the properties and the interconnections of states. Thus, reductionist approaches have holistic characteristics in the sense that they claim to explain international events rather than foreign policies. In reductionist approaches the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts. Accordingly, international politics are

explained in terms of individual leaders, decision makers, national bureaucracies or national political and economic characteristics etc., and their interactions. Hence, from the systemic standpoint the reductionist explanation of international events can only become meaningful when system level effects are absent.

In fact, international events are affected not only by the properties and interactions of states but also *by the way in which they are organised*. In other words, a system is defined as a set of interacting units, but it also consists of a *structure* which is the system level component. Structure is not something that can be seen. It is an abstraction. However, it is defined only through the arrangements of the system's parts. It is this structure which makes us think that a system is more than a collection of its parts. Accordingly, "any approach or theory if it's rightly termed systemic, must show how the system level, or structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units" (Waltz, 1979: 40). Early system theories, which were based on national attributes and the interaction of states but failed to show systemic properties that could affect international outcomes, cannot thus be considered true systemic theories. Reductionists fail to differentiate the interactions of states from the arrangements of that interaction.

The primary task of a system theory is to conceive of an international system's structure, and to show how it affects the actions and the interactions of the states. Its emphasis is on the forces that operate at the system level rather than at the level of the nations. The structure, being the system level component, is a constraining and disposing force on the behaviour of its parts. In other words, structures belong to the organisational realm of the system and are considered the forces to which states are subjected. Hence, the essential thing in the system theories of international relations is the existence of a system level component called 'structure', and the determining role of that structure on the outcomes of the interacting units as a constraining and disposing force.

Structural/systemic theories explain continuity rather than change within a system. They seek for recurrent patterns and features of international politics. Because of this regularity-seeking characteristic, structural approaches lack detailed analysis. Instead, they explain broader patterns of international political life. In other words, in such theories what is to be explained is "why do different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges?" rather than "why do different units behave differently despite their similar placement in the system?" (Waltz, 1979: 72).

In order to reach generalisations, structural approaches observe large regularities and patterns and ignore differences at the national level. The national system level is taken for granted, in the sense that change at the national level has nothing to do with the changes at the system level. In relation to the foreign policies of individual states they can only emphasise how structural/systemic conditions generally play a role in the formulation of similar national policies. Another aspect of structural/systemic theories is their emphasis on the primacy of great powers in the international system. The assumption is that the structures of the system are generated by the interactions of its principal actors, in other words, the great powers of the system set the environment for the lesser actors (other medium or small powers) as well as for themselves.

Starting from the dichotomy between reductionist and systemic theories, Waltz outlines the general framework of his theory of international politics which is called the neorealist approach. In sum, according to Waltz;

1. International politics must be studied in the framework of systemic approaches but not in the reductionist manner that conceives the system as an aggregation of nation states and their interactions.

2. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units and the structure is the system-wide component that make us think of the system as a whole.

3. A system-level approach must show the structure of the system and examine their constraining and disposing roles on the behaviour of nation states.

4. A systemic study seeks to discover regularities and patterns in international politics and ignores differences at the national level.

5. A system-level study is interested in national foreign policies in order to examine how, in general, structures determine foreign policies.

6. The structure of the international system is generated by the actions and interactions of the great powers of the system.

Since the 'structure of the system' is the system-wide component that differentiates systemic theories from 'reductionist' ones, in Waltz's theory the structure appears as the central concept to be explained (Waltz, 1979: 101). But Waltz distinguishes between structures and is concerned with one particular type of international system. First of all, in the neorealist approach the international political system is considered as a distinct system from the economic, social, or other international systems. This means that neo-realist theory confines itself to the political realm, and thus focuses on '*international political structures*'. Second, in order to define a structure one should ignore how actors interact and instead concentrate on how they are arranged or positioned. This is primarily because while interactions occur at the national state level, the arrangements take place at the system level. The

arrangements are system-level properties. Third, structures are abstractions that we cannot see. One can identify structures through the material characteristics of the system. Thus structures are defined through the arrangement of the units of the system. In other words, international political structure is not a collection of nation states but the arrangement of them, and defined by the organising principle of that arrangement.

Waltz's definition of international political structure is based on three components.

1. The principle according to which the system is ordered or organized.
2. The differentiation of units and the specification of their functions.
3. The degree of the concentration or diffusion of capabilities within the system.

1. Ordering Principles: According to Waltz, international political systems are decentralised and anarchic. Formally the nation states, the constitutive units of the system, are considered as equals. There is no hierarchy among the states. None of them is formally entitled to command and none of them is obligated to obey. In other words, there is no system-wide authority that could promote super and subordinate relations among states. In such an anarchic environment the first aim of the state is to survive. And, in such an environment in which no one takes care of others but only itself, self-help becomes the organising principle.

2. Differentiation of units and specification of functions: As for the second component of the international political structure, Waltz proposes that since the anarchy endures and self-help remains the organising principle, the states will remain functionally similar units in the tasks they pursue. They are alike since every state is an autonomous unit. The objectives that they try to reach are similar. Each state duplicates the activities of others; each state has its institutions to govern, execute and legislate; and they are all involved in economic regulation, social welfare measures, cultural affairs, etc. Even the lines of development that states follow become very similar. Waltz contends that the functions of states are similar and the differentiation among them is due to their varied capabilities. Accordingly, since no functional differences exist, there is then no need for this second component, 'differentiation of units and specification of functions' at the international level.

3. The distribution of capabilities: The units of system are distinguished according to their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks. This is the most important component of Waltz's 'international political structure'. Since the ordering principle of all international systems is anarchy and states are functionally alike, an international system can only be differentiated through the distribution of capabilities among its units. Only a

change in the distribution of capabilities of states can lead a change in the structure of the international system. Although the capabilities of units are considered as unit-level attributes the distribution of capabilities of states is a system-wide component. The distribution of capabilities gives us the positional picture of how states in the system stand in relation to one another in terms of their relative power.

In relation to the foreign policies of individual states the picture of the external environment presented by Waltz's structuralist approach appears highly deterministic. The constraining characteristic of the international system results in similar foreign policy orientations and behaviour despite wide variations in their internal attributes. The structure of the international system limits the varying aims of states and shows them the ways to be followed that would lead to common qualities in the outcomes. In other words, the orientations and behaviour of states are to a great extent determined by the political structure of the international system. Accordingly, the foremost aim of every state appears to be survival in the centuries-long anarchic arrangement of the international system. The organising principle of self-help and the need for security direct the efforts of different states towards national policies that ensure their survival in the system. The structure of the system forces all states in the system to cope with this structural principle.

4.3. World system analysis

Apart from Waltz's attempt, two other similar but somewhat rival structuralist conceptualisations of the international system or world context come under the heading of 'world system approach'. Similar to Waltz, the leading figures of the 'world system perspective', Modelski and Wallerstein, also emphasise the structuralist motto that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts'. According to world system theorists international phenomena should be studied in terms of the determining nature of world system structures. In this way Modelski and Wallerstein conceptualise the external environment around the global political and economic structures respectively. Now let us turn to these two approaches.

4.4. Modelski's political structure and conceptualisation of the world context (world system approach)

Modelski's aim is to establish a systemic understanding of world politics based on observable recurrences in long cycles (Modelski, 1978, 1987a, 1987b). The study of long cycles is the study of world politics on the basis of the relationship between the recurrence of world wars and the emergence of world leaders. One of Modelski's major contentions is that there are repeating patterns in the relationship between great wars and world

leadership, and further that these patterns are related to major trends of global development. Hence the long cycles become more than repetitions in the sense that they embrace evolutionary development in the global political system.

According to Modelski, world systems are “social systems constituted by states and processes of social interaction among acting units” and “... the world system is a device for viewing the world’s social arrangements as a totality, and for investigating the relationship between world-wide interactions and social arrangements at the regional, national and sub-system levels” (Modelski, 1987a: 20). He distinguishes different world systems throughout history and considers that the modern world system emerged around 1500.

The global system is the most comprehensive level of interaction among vertically differentiated global, regional, national and local levels. In the context of the global system (as at the other levels) there are also horizontally differentiated functional sub-systems of polity, economy, societal community and pattern maintenance. In the framework of these vertical and horizontal differentiation at the level of world system, the global polity, or the global political system, appears as the most important political structure of the world system and becomes the focus of Modelski’s approach to the study of international phenomena. The global political system is the topmost structure of the world system, and the organisation of the world - the definition and the clarification of all global problems and of action in relation to them - takes place at this level. Modelski defines the global political system “as the institutions and arrangements for the management of global problems or relations, or alternatively as the structure for the management of global interdependence” (Modelski, 1978: 214). However, although its functioning is dominated by all the major powers of the time, the most crucial interaction in the global polity is the interaction between the world leader and its challenger.

The study of the global political system considers the whole world as one non-territorial political unit and focuses on intercontinental, oceanic patterns of interdependence and on a global reach (Modelski, 1978: 214). Yet it is a political system and it must be separated from global economic networks, global elite connections and core alliances (global societal community), and information and education (global pattern maintenance) whose functions are basically differentiated.

At the heart of Modelski’s politics-dominated world system approach there lies the question of authority. In other words, the question of “who governs that non-territorial but supposedly unified global political system and how”,

becomes a critical issue. Indeed, a striking feature of the global political system is the lack of a central authority that would dominate it. There is no world empire or world state in a superordinate position to enforce rules and give orders to be obeyed. On the contrary, the system is politically decentralised. However, for Modelski the lack of an overriding authority does not necessarily mean that there is no order or authority at all. Although there is no formal authority, the global political system is governed by a global leader, and its very existence provides order and stability to the international system. Global leaders are ‘those units monopolising (that is controlling more than one half of) the market for (or the supply of) order-keeping in the global layer of interdependence’ (Modelski, 1978: 216).

Modelski confines his study of the world system to global politics, and he defines and explains how it works through long cycles. It is a study of the rhythm of global politics. Long cycles are the recurrent patterns in the life of the global political system: at certain periods of time the system passes through the same stages that it has passed through before. It describes periodicities of a social system; the patterns of global wars and the rise and the decline of world powers in relation to one another. According to Modelski “long cycles are sequences of events that repeat in regular pattern” (Modelski, 1987b: 3).

The global powers are the dominant units in the system. They are those powers whose patterns of interactions structure the global polity. They supply order to the global system by organising and maintaining alliances and deploying forces in all parts of the world. The state of politics at the global level is determined by their actions and interactions. There are three categories of global powers; ‘the world power’ (historically, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States), ‘the challenger’ (historically, Spain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union) and ‘the other global powers’.

The world power is the leading unit in global politics. It is the most powerful political unit at the global level and accordingly has the superior position in terms of global reach. The ascendancy of a world power begins at the end of a global war and it organises the global political system and coordinates it with other global sub-systems. The existence of world leadership indicates that the global system is not anarchic. Global leadership not only corresponds to superiority in power but also to the accomplishment of global services. These services are basically the political services which make the global system work. For instance, a global leader defines the global problems and analyses them according to their priorities; it creates coalitions as the basic infrastructure of world order; makes the decision to fight a war for leadership; and it puts a world order into practice that mainly administers the international economic order. Moreover, a world power fulfils the function of

global innovation, a function which cannot be predicted but a quality that all the global leaders have met. Basically, innovations are great projects (like the industrial revolution of Britain) which are identified with the world powers. Innovations are the essence of the evolutionary potential of the global political system. In sum, it can be said that the global leader produces order and the other units (from nation states to individuals) consume it.

The function of world powers as order producing units further indicates the functional differentiation among the nation states in Modelski's conceptualisation of the world system. According to Modelski, world powers have common characteristics (Modelski, 1987a:16). Modelski's world powers, namely Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States, all have shared common leadership characteristics. Accordingly, the global leaders have;

1. a favourable geographical location, preferably insular location.
2. a cohesive, open, stable, and coalition capable society.
3. a lead economy.
4. a politico-strategic organisation of global reach, specifically a powerful navy which is able to implement its power on a global scale.
5. the capacity to innovate.

On the other hand, the challenger is a global power aiming at global leadership. It is thus the major source of tension and destabilisation in the system because it challenges the order established by the world power. Its most dramatic challenge comes in the phase of global war. Historical experience shows that no challenger (Spain, Germany and the Soviet Union) has managed to attain the status of world power. The new leader has emerged among the coalition allies of the former world power. Like the world leaders challengers also exhibit common characteristics;

1. they occupy continental location;
2. they have incohesive societies with significant political, social and internal divisions;
3. they have a big economic capacity but unable to compete with the lead economy;
4. they have a powerful army but lacking the capacity for effective global reach (Kuman, 1987: 60).

Another central point in Modelski's analysis is the nature of long cycles. Basically, long cycles are not exceptions but the result of the normal functioning of the world system. They do not explain everything in the world system, but they give a better understanding of international political processes in their totality over time. The long cycles are the processes of

global politics. In principle, they shape the politics at the global level, but they may also affect the politics at the regional, national and local levels (Modelski, 1987a: 9).

Temporally, each long cycle is divided into four distinct successive systemic phases. These phases are the principal events of a long cycle, and global politics moves through these four successive phases in its life time. A long cycle starts with the 'phase of global war' where an intense conflict in the form of a major war prevails. As a result of the weak organisation of the global political system the strengths of the global powers are put to the test in order to determine who will shape the new organisation of the world order. The next phase is called the 'phase of world power'. At the end of a global war, a powerful nation state emerges as the new global leader and establishes the new order. In the third phase, called the 'delegitimation phase', the power and authority of the world power begins to erode and signs of weakness and decline appear in the orderly working of the system. Challengers appear and the authority of the global leader begins to be questioned. The final phase of the long cycle is the 'deconcentration phase'. Here, increasing competition among the world powers leads to the building of rival coalitions, and consequently the order of the system totally collapses. Hence, the cycle moves towards its initial position of global war, and with the outbreak of war another long cycle begins.

The cyclical processes of the global political system do not mean that the long cycles are static. On the contrary, although the phases remain the same, the contexts are fundamentally differentiated in each long cycle. The dynamism of the long cycles basically corresponds to the ways that the global powers organise the system and their specific innovations. Accordingly, the long cycle is not only a replacement of world power but at the same time it is the major source of political and social development in the system (Modelski, 1987a: 34).

Modelski also argues that the linkage between global politics and global economics and culture is strong and important (Modelski, 1983:134-135 and Kuman, 1987: 61-63). The most advanced and active sectors of the world economy are located in the world power's domain and the world political leader is, at the same time, the world economic leader. It is primarily because a strong economic base is needed in order to carry out world leadership. Moreover, the organisation of the international economy is realised to a great extent by the world powers which play a decisive role in setting the rules of international trade, investment and finance. Hence changes in the positions of the global power in different phases of long cycles can easily be associated with changes in global economic relations. On the other hand, in Modelski's work, the global culture does not have a significant role in the organisation and functioning of the modern world system (Kuman, 1987: 62). In contrast

to the global political and economic systems, cultural integration at the level of world system has been very weak. Hence it is a crucial factor only in providing internal organisational unification at the national state level.

Modelski attaches importance to the role of the nation state in the functioning of the global system (Modelski, 1978: 230-235 and 1987a: 144-160). The nation state occupies the key position in Modelski's system of world order in two ways: first, all world powers are nation states and second, nation states are the main actors in the working of the world system. In fact, Modelski's analysis of the world system is based on the nation state. Being a nation state is a precondition for becoming a world leader because only the internal organisation and attributes of a nation state could lead to successful action. In effect, the other states competing for the status of the leadership or global power develop similar internal organisations and they also become nation states. In time the nation state become the universal form for political organisation in the international system irrespective of the power and the intention of the political units. Thus, being a nation state becomes the way to survive in the world system.

When it comes to the question of 'how Modelski conceptualises the world context, for him there is a world system functioning on the political structure and it is more of a product of world powers (Modelski, 1978: 216). Although the world powers are subject to the structural/systemic processes of long cycles, they have the power to determine their context and their quality. Thus, the world leaders emerge as the central units around which all functional divisions of the global system (polity, economy, culture) converge. In fact, the world powers are both political and economic leaders. The world system is basically a political system which functions in an orderly way through the informal authority of the world powers. In this sense it is not anarchic. The world powers establish world order as they consolidate their informal authority. They supply and maintain order in the system mainly through their powerful naval forces that have the capacity for global reach and through innovations that could overcome unusual global problems. This, in turn, exhibits the functional differentiation among the nation states in the tasks they pursue. The authority of the world powers and the order in the system begin to collapse when the leaders lose their energy and no longer overcome global problems easily. This leads to a competition for leadership and a challenger appears. The competition for leadership becomes intense as global problems increase and give way to the establishment of major rival alliances that result in global wars. Global wars are a selection mechanism, and at the end of a global war a new world power emerges. This new world

power has always been an ally of the ex-leader's coalition rather than an original challenger. In this way a long cycle ends and another one starts.

However, Modelski's conceptualisation of the world context does not make clear cut statements about the foreign policies of individual states. At best, since only great power actions and interactions structure the global political system, one cannot study the foreign policies of nation states directly except for those of the great powers in Modelski's world system analysis. However, he provides us with a regional level of interaction where one might study the foreign policies of lesser states, but he does not give us any clue about how to study politics at the regional level (or at the national and local levels). In other words, if you want to study the foreign policies of individual states Modelski has little to say about the regional level other than that regional powers have powerful land armies which might indeed also be characteristic of a global power. Furthermore, he does not specify whether all small states without exception are to be included in the regional level of interaction.

As a result, Modelski's world system approach does not provide an easy framework for foreign policy studies, especially for studying the foreign policies of medium or small states. It is primarily a framework for the study of great power politics. Yet this does not necessarily mean that we cannot study the foreign policies of medium or small states in this framework. Indeed we can. First, for Modelski "In as much as the long cycle also affects politics at the regional, national and local levels... its role might be studied in the broader context of world politics" (Modelski, 1987a: 9). Secondly, one can also undertake foreign policy studies of medium or small states in the framework of Modelski's approach by examining the behaviour of these states besides the behaviour of great powers in the different phases of long cycles.

Having argued the basic assumptions of Modelski's 'world political structure' and his systemic-structural (holistic) understanding of international relations, now, let us turn to Wallerstein's world-system analysis which, in the framework of world economic structure, presents a more complex analysis of interstate relations.

4.5. Wallerstein's economic structure and conceptualisation of the world context (modern world-system approach)

Wallerstein's world-system analysis is the most advanced challenge to the 'theories of modernisation' which focus on nation states and their development. According to modernisation theory, the world consists of autonomous national societies each following a similar developmental pattern on the evolutionary ladder from tradition to modernity, although they started this process at different times and speeds. Modernisation theorists argue that every state must pass through the same stages that today's

advanced (Western) societies once experienced in order to reach a position of relative well-being.

The first challenge to the developmentalist view of modernisation theory came from the '*dependency school*'. Dependency theorists argued that there is no such thing as a linear developmental pattern through which every society should pass in order to become an advanced society. On the contrary, they claimed that a capitalist world-economy exists, and that the present backward position of many countries is due to the disadvantageous relations they have had with advanced countries within the capitalist world-economy rather than a question of internal structures or starting late. In other words, they focused on the theme of the 'development of underdevelopment' and emphasised that the historical development of advanced societies and the underdevelopment of backward ones are two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, they used this framework in order to analyse patterns of underdevelopment in the Third World (especially in Latin America) countries in which they were primarily interested.

Wallerstein's challenge came as a major step forward on the path opened by the dependency school. Wallerstein's '*modern world-system*' analysis is one of the most comprehensive approaches to social phenomena in the social sciences. It also establishes links between historical sociology, large-scale historical change and the complex web of international relations (Little, 1994:12-14). In general terms, the central understanding of Wallerstein's approach is that any social phenomena can only be understood properly through examining the totality called 'social system' rather than by investigating arbitrarily constituted units of that totality. In fact, there are two kinds of totalities; 'mini-systems' and 'world-systems', but since the mini-systems no longer exist, the world-system is the only social system to be studied. For Wallerstein the phenomena in this world-system that should be analysed are the development and the functioning of the system itself, rather than the development of its major constituent units called nation states (Wallerstein, 1974: 390). Accordingly, world-system analysis contends that there is something happening beyond the individual societal level and hence there exists a collective reality at the world level of analysis. However, this does not include the study of international relations in the sense of multiple sovereign states interacting with each other. The world level collective reality is somewhat exogenous to the nation states; it has its own laws of motion which determine the social, economic and political phenomena in the national societies it encompasses. The modern world-system has structures such as 'core-periphery relations', 'the division of labour', 'unequal exchange' and 'cyclical motions of expansion and stagnation', and 'the rise

and fall of hegemonic powers'. These properties can be studied in their own right or in terms of their effects on the development of national societies. Modern world-system analysis is basically synchronic; it investigates the structural relations among different societies in the same time periods (Bergersen, 1980: 6). It thus tries to understand the question of how nations are interrelated with each other in the world-economy. The concepts of core-periphery relations, the division of labour and unequal exchange etc., are the main concern of the modern world-system analysis in explaining the interconnections among nations, and long-term social changes in the capitalist world-system. In Wallerstein's words "if there is one thing which distinguishes a world-system perspective from any other, it is its insistence that the unit of analysis is a world-system defined in terms of economic processes and links, and not any units defined in terms of judicial, political, cultural, geological etc., criteria" (Hopkins, quoted in Bergersen, 1980: 8).

Nevertheless, the world-system perspective claims that economics and politics are not separate phenomena. A social system can only be understood by analysing how both power and production are organised. In this context, it looks at the political economy of the modern world-system which focuses on the interaction and interdependence between economic and political activities. In other words, the world-system school investigates the "specific ways in which economic and political action are intertwined within the capitalist world-economy" (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 107). Accordingly, it argues that the 'interstate system' which is composed of unequally powerful and competing states is the political body of the capitalist world-economy, and that the capitalist institutions of this system are central to the maintenance and reproduction of the interstate system, as well as vice versa (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 107).

One of the most important structural characteristics of world social systems is the existence of a division of labour within them. This means that different geographical areas in the system specialise in the production of different goods, and consequently each region becomes dependent upon economic exchange with others in order to supply the continuing needs of that region. However, there are two kinds of world-systems where this economic exchange operates in different frameworks: 'world empires' with a common political structure, and 'world economies' without a common political structure. In the first case the economy is basically a redistributive one. This means that the whole economy is administered by a central political authority, and the economic benefits are redistributed from this centre to different regions. In other words, political structures dominate the functioning of the system. The second kind of world-system, which is known as the capitalist economic system or the modern world-system, is an historical system which came into existence in the 16th century in north-west Europe through a series of historical, geographical and ecological accidents

and which developed into a world-economy in the 19th and 20th centuries. In it the capitalist economic structure (as opposed to the world empires) determines the operation of the system. The world-economy is defined without a common political structure; there are multiple political structures. Since the primary structure of this world-system is the economy, politics takes place primarily within and through state structures whose boundaries are much smaller than the economy. In the modern world-system it is not the political-military competition but the interaction between states and capitalist commodity production which occupies the central place (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 111).

However, a world-economy does not mean an international economy. The theory of international economy assumes that separate national economies exist and that they trade with each other under certain circumstances. The sum of all these interstate economic contacts is called the international economy. The concept of world- economy, on the other hand, means "...an ongoing extensive and relatively complete social division of labour within an integrated set of production processes which relate to each other through a market which has been instituted or created in some complex way" (Wallerstein, 1984b: 13). Today we call this the capitalist world-economy, and its boundaries are far larger than any political unit. There is no common authoritative political body encompassing the whole area but within it there are multiple political structures known as states. Within this system, there is a single division of labour among core and peripheral zones.

The division of labour within the world-system implies that different geographical areas in the system specialise in different productive tasks. These productive specialisations may change over time, but it is always the case that different specialisations receive unequal economic rewards. Whatever the goods produced, the core area has always specialised in relatively 'highly mechanised', 'high profit', 'high wage', 'highly skilled labour activities' in contrast to the totally opposite specialisations in the periphery. In other words, in the world capitalist economy the division of labour and complementarity goes along with inequality.

According to Wallerstein, the defining characteristic of the capitalist world-economy is production for maximum profit in the market. Production is based on the capitalist principle of maximising capital accumulation, which means reducing costs to the minimum and raising sales prices to the maximum feasible. The reduction of costs is maintained mainly by reducing the income of direct producers to a minimum and allowing the capitalist to appropriate the remaining value. In order to reduce costs, a legal system based on unequal contractual property rights becomes an essential element,

and the state plays the most important role in the enforcement of these laws. On the other hand, the second principle of accumulation, the expansion of sale prices, is ensured by creating quasi-monopolies in the world market. In the absence of a common political structure, only quasi-monopolies can utilise state power in order to constrain potential competitors in the world market. This means the intervention of the state in the normal functioning of the market in order to create favourable conditions of profit for some economic actors.

In the world-economy production is organised in a cross-cutting network of interlinked processes called commodity chains. This means that in the production process there are multiple product entry points. For instance, as Wallerstein oversimplifies this process, “there is a commodity chain that goes from cotton production to thread production, to textile production to clothing production ...[and] at each of these production points there is an input of other productive materials” (Wallerstein, 1984a: 4). On the other hand, almost all commodity chains cross national boundaries at some point. The most important point here is that “at each point that there is a labourer, there is state pressure on the labourer’s income...[and also] at each point that there is an exchange of product, there is state pressure on the price” (Wallerstein, 1984a: 4). These two kinds of state pressure regulate the relationship between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the relationship between the different groups of bourgeoisie respectively. This means that while the state ensures the appropriation of value by the bourgeoisie, it might favour some group of bourgeoisie more than others in this process. The crucial role played by the state leads to two kinds of politics in the capitalist world-economy: a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat; and political struggles between different bourgeoisie. In the world-economy various groups of bourgeoisie compete within a single world market in order to get the largest possible portion of the world-economy’s economic surplus. And since states are the most effective expression of power and political organisation of the world-economy, different bourgeoisies located in different states use their state’s power in order to influence the market for their own benefit. In other words, the world bourgeoisies compete with each other and try to distort the normal functioning of the world market through state mechanisms. Accordingly, the relative strength of the states becomes very important in this task.

In Wallerstein’s modern world-system approach states are classified according to two overlapping criteria. First, they are divided according to their relative strengths into strong or weak and secondly, they are categorised according to their structural positions in the world-economy as core, periphery and semiperiphery. A state is defined as strong or weak in relation to its relative strength vis-à-vis other domestic centres of power, other states and external non-state forces (Wallerstein, 1984b: 20). The power of a state

can be measured by the amount of resources it can mobilise relative to the amount of resources which can be mobilised against it during a crisis period (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 113). Here, the crucial elements that determine the power of a state are twofold: the magnitude of resources, and the relative unity within and among classes (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 114). In order to gain the highest possible competitive advantage in the world market, the bourgeoisie want to strengthen the state's political structures, and hence its constraining power in the world market.

This drive to increase the power of states is greatest in states where core-like production is dominant. A strong state mechanism is the primary tool with which the bourgeoisies of core states can control the internal labour force and manipulate and distort the world market in their own favour vis-à-vis the competing bourgeoisies of other states. Thus, strong states are strongly supported by an alliance of their economic elites with large resources, because the state supplies sufficient protection for successful capitalist accumulation (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 114). In a competitive world market, state protection becomes an important component for the profits of the economic elites. On the other hand, state power is also crucial for protecting domestic infant industries from foreign competition, especially during the industrialisation of semiperipheral states. Consequently, while strong states fall into the core state category, the periphery contains weak states. Thus the strength of states can be explained through the structural role that they play in the world economy at any moment in time. However, the initial structural position of a state is often decided by historical accident or by the geography of a particular country. Yet once it is decided, the market forces operating in the world-economy emphasise structural differences and make them almost impossible to overcome in the short term.

There is a hierarchy in the structural positions of states in the world-economy, and at the top of this hierarchy are core states. Core states are those in which production is most efficient and other economic activities are most complex. Politically, they have strong state machineries which provide them with the power to accumulate greater amounts of capital and to receive the lion's share of the surplus produced in the world-economy. At the bottom of the hierarchy are peripheral states. In a sharp contrast to core states production in the periphery is the least efficient, and it specialises in much less rewarded goods.

Since states play an important role in the process of capital accumulation (e.g., by providing external and internal protection and distorting the world market, etc.) economic elites wish to institutionalise their interests within the state structures. However, the relative power of the states and the nature of

the demands that the capitalists make on the state are determined by the nature of the dominant economic elite in a country. Accordingly, “(t)he [dominance of] industrial-commercial-financial block in core countries produces strong states, while export-oriented block in peripheral states produces weaker states” (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 240). In strong/core states where industrial-commercial interests are dominant, economic elites demand an aggressive foreign policy (commercial and military) in order to gain access to foreign markets both for raw materials and for the selling of both capital and consumption goods, and in turn they support increasing the strength of the state. On the other hand, in peripheral countries in which the dominant economic elite are producing and exporting primary products there will be no such demands for an aggressive foreign policy because it is not easy to increase the demand for such primary goods by state action. Thus, since there is less interest in an aggressive foreign policy, peripheral states are weaker.

Production processes are also grouped according to geographical location into ‘core-like’ and ‘periphery-like’ production activities (Chase-Dunn, 1980: 191). These production processes are defined according to the degree to which they incorporate ‘labour value’, ‘are mechanised’, and ‘are highly profitable’. In other words, while core-like production employs relatively capital intensive techniques and utilises skilled and highly paid labour, periphery-like production employs labour intensive techniques and utilises coerced low wage labour. However, the defining characteristics of any core or peripheral products may change over time because of product cycles. For instance, while textile manufacturing was a core activity in the 19th century, it became a peripheral activity in the 20th century. Similarly, wheat production in the late 20th century is a core-like production in contrast to its peripheral position in the past. This means that it is not the product itself which is core-like or peripheral: the nature of the production process determines its core or periphery-like qualities.

According to the world-system approach, the structural positions of both core and periphery are the result of a relationship based on unequal exchange. The appropriation by core states of the surplus produced in the periphery is called unequal exchange in the modern world-system approach. Without a periphery it is impossible to talk about a core and without either there would not be capitalist development. Once we establish a difference in the strengths of states and the operation of unequal exchange between them, we come to the conclusion that capitalism involves not only the appropriation of surplus value by the owner from the direct producer, but also the appropriation of the surplus of the world-economy by the strong (core) states from the weak (peripheral) ones. This also explains the advantageous position of the bourgeoisie of core area not only over the workforce of its own area, but also over the bourgeoisie of peripheral area. According to

Wallerstein, the phenomenon of unequal exchange has been a constant feature of the world-economy since its beginning. In other words, core-periphery relations have always been characterised by the mechanism of unequal exchange. As a process, unequal exchange has operated through different historical arrangements and institutions such as colonial trade monopolies, multinational corporations, or bi- or multilateral agreements among states. But whatever form it employs, the crucial thing is that it has always reproduced the basic core-periphery division of labour and integration despite the continual shifts in the areas and processes constituting the core, periphery and semiperiphery (Hopkins, 1982: 21).

However, there is an intermediate semiperipheral category between core and periphery. The production activity in these semiperipheral zones of the world-economy constitutes a mixture of core and periphery-like production. This category, being both exploited and exploiter, plays an important political role in balancing and reducing the amount of opposition directed towards the core by the periphery. Unlike core and periphery, it is much more of a political category than an economic one. I shall deal separately with this semiperipheral category below.

Membership in these three categories is by no means constant. Mobility in structural position is possible; states in each category might become upwardly or downwardly mobile. In world-system analysis national development is defined as upward mobility in the hierarchical divisions between core and periphery. And this upward mobility refers to the reorganisation of the relationship of the ascending state with the world-economy. Nevertheless, the world-system approach views upward mobility in the hierarchy as exceptional.

The growth and the development of the world-system has occurred in a process of ups and downs called 'expansion' and 'stagnation' (Wallerstein, 1984a: 6-8 and 1984b: 16-17). According to world-system analysts there are recurring bottlenecks in the capitalist world-economy when the total amount of production exceeds the effective demand resulting from the existing distribution of world income. Periods of stagnation restructure the previous order in the world-economy. The volume of overall production decreases and an intensified class struggle leads to the redistribution of world income to the lower classes in the core zones and to the bourgeoisie in the semiperiphery and the periphery. This redistribution process revitalises effective demand and consequently expands the market. Yet, this is achieved through the incorporation of new peripheral zones in the world economy where workers receive wages below the cost of production. For Wallerstein the important thing in this process is to understand that while the workers in the core

countries strengthen their political positions and raise their standard of living, the incorporation of new lower strata in the peripheralized countries keeps the real overall distribution of income in the world-economy almost the same as in the previous periods.

The periods of stagnation and expansion also lead to other changes in the world-economy. For instance, the production costs of pre-stagnation core products are reduced either through advanced mechanisation or shifting these activities to lower wage regions. Furthermore, at the end of stagnation periods new core-like activities which create high rates of profits are invented. In this process of restructuring, inefficient producers are eliminated. Wallerstein argues that those old enterprises and the states in which they operate are faced with steadily rising costs because of the cost of amortising older capital investment and rising labour costs resulting from the increasing political strength of the labour unions. As a result, newly emerged enterprises and the states in which they operate replace the old ones in the competitive quasi-monopolistic world market. Wallerstein calls this process a game of musical chairs at the top. In other words, together with changes in the production process, the positions of the core states in the world-economy may change. But the game of musical chairs is not only played by core states but also by semiperipheral and peripheral states. I shall return to this issue later in the discussion of semiperipheral states. However, the crucial point is that whether the game of musical chairs is played at the top or the middle of the hierarchy, the number of states in each category (core, semiperiphery and periphery) has remained proportionally constant throughout the history of the world-economy (Wallerstein, 1984a: 7).

As an historical system the capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical movements. One of the most striking cycles in the inter-state system of the world-economy is “the rise and decline of hegemonic powers”. This is the most critical type of mobility which takes place within the core area. There is a balance of power in the inter-state system which primarily regulates the power relations among the core states. This means that no individual state ever acquires sufficient capacity to transform the world-economy into a world empire. However, states have repeatedly attempted to achieve a hegemonic position in the world state system. In three instances they managed to do so for relatively brief periods: the United Provinces (the Netherlands), 1620-1650; the United Kingdom, 1815-1873; and the United States, 1945-67 (Wallerstein, 1984d).

Hegemony differs from imperium in that its functioning is primarily based on the market, although there are always politico-military and cultural dimensions. Hegemony means that for a brief period of time one of the core states appears as the dominant state in the interstate system and can impose its rules in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural

areas. Hegemony over the system is established when a core state demonstrates its superiority in productive, commercial and financial spheres:

Supremacy in the productive field means that the most advanced industrial production for a given period is preponderantly located in the state in question, and that it is capable of exporting such production competitively to other core states, as well as to the periphery and semiperiphery. Commercial supremacy means that the value of external and carrying trade is the highest in comparison with that of other core states, and that its services are used by other core states. Financial supremacy means that the value of capital being saved, lent or exported across state boundaries is the highest in comparison with others, and that it performs banking operations for other core states (Hopkins, Wallerstein *et al.*, 1982: 62).

Supremacy in those three fields constitutes hegemony and is reflected in political-military advantage in the interstate system. Hegemonic military power has primarily been sea and air power. According to Wallerstein, political hegemony refers to critical periods when allied core powers are client states and the opposing major powers are in a defensive position. However, fulfilling a hegemonic role is very costly and hegemonic states begin to lose their competitive advantages shortly after they acquire them. They lose them for two reasons:

(a) other core and even semiperipheral states improve their efficiency in production to the level of that of hegemonic power by exploiting the advantage of latecomers in acquiring the latest technology;

(b) the costs of production in the hegemonic state become vulnerable to wage demands coming from a well organised labour force (Hopkins *et al.*, 1982: 62).

In all three historical cases of hegemony, hegemonic position was acquired by a very destructive thirty year land-based world war in which all the major military powers of the era participated: 'the Thirty Years War'; 'the Napoleonic Wars'; and 'the German Wars (the First and Second World Wars)'. Each of these World Wars led to a major restructuring of the interstate system and the establishment of new alliances under the supervision of the new hegemonic power: 'Westphalia'; 'Concert of Europe'; and 'the UN and Bretton Woods'. However as soon as hegemonic position or advantage in the production sphere begins to erode, the alliances established by the hegemonic power also begin to erode and reshuffle.

The ideology and the policy of the hegemonic powers have always promoted global liberalism. The free flow of goods, capital and labour (production factors) in the world-economy is the central concern of the hegemonic powers. They advocate free trade and open door policies in the economic sphere. Hence, the strength of a hegemonic power can be

measured by its ability to minimise all the quasi-monopolies in the world market (Wallerstein, 1984a: 5). Furthermore, hegemonic powers extend this liberalism to the political sphere and become the defenders of liberal parliamentary institutions and civil liberties, while condemning political change through violent means. But Wallerstein also reminds us that the economic and political liberalism of hegemonic powers should not be exaggerated: they may make exceptions to their anti-restrictive principles, they may interfere in the political processes in other states, and further they may become repressive at home when their interests so dictate (Wallerstein, 1984d: 41).

During the long period that follows hegemonic decline two contending powers seem to emerge as the candidates for the next hegemonic cycle (Wallerstein, 1984d: 43). Historically, these two contending pairs were England and France after Dutch hegemony, the US and Germany after British, and now Japan and Western Europe after US hegemony. According to Wallerstein another historical tendency of newly emerged hegemonic powers is their strategy of co-operating with the old hegemon as the principal partner in the new world order. For example, Britain co-operated with the Dutch; the US co-operated with Great Britain; and perhaps, Western Europe will co-operate with the US in the future.

In world-system analysis the creation of the state is considered to be an effect of the development of the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1984: Ch.3). The state is the political expression of this world economic structure. The relative power of the state is its most important property and, as I implied earlier, it more or less determines the structural position of the state in the system. Different groups exist within and outside of the state which try to increase or decrease the power of any given state or states. Their aim in seeking to change the power of the state is to create favourable conditions in the world market for their interests since the state is considered to be the most convenient institution to distort the normal operation of the world market in favour of certain groups. In this process of increasing state strength, strong and weak states are created and hence a hierarchy appears in the inter-state system.

The key issues of state policy that occupy the attention of different groups are the rules that affect the allocation of surplus and the price structure of markets because the relative competitiveness of particular producers and their profit levels can be changed by playing with these two critical issues. It is states that make those rules in the world-economy and strong states intervene in relatively weaker states when they try to establish their own rules. In the capitalist world market strong entrepreneurs do not need state aid to create quasi-monopolies but they do need it to prevent others from creating monopoly privileges at the expense of their interests. Accordingly, in world-

system analysis, states are defined as “...created institutions reflecting the needs of class forces operating in the world-economy. They are not however created in a void but in the framework of an interstate system” (Wallerstein, 1984c: 33).

Classes (mainly proletariat and bourgeoisie) are defined as the classes of the world-economy because they are formed in the world-economy and their interests are determined by their collective relationship to the world-economy (Wallerstein, 1984c: 34). However, when the bourgeoisie felt that their interests vis-à-vis the working class and their competitors in the world market were best served by creating and using state machineries, they began to define themselves as national bourgeoisies. Moreover, since class consciousness is a political rather than an economic phenomenon, and since the most effective political structure of the world-system is the state, in practical terms classes are considered as national classes. In the capitalist world-economy since the state is defined as the expression of power, it becomes the most appropriate instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie for the appropriation of surplus from the working class of their country to the extent that they are not restrained by the organised resistance of the proletariat. Furthermore, the power of the state also ensures the appropriation of surplus by one group of bourgeoisie rather than another group. If different groups of bourgeoisie control different state structures, the fight for the appropriation of surplus may take the form of an interstate struggle. Working classes, through their organisations, may also attempt to influence the power of the state for their own ends. Since states are an integral part of the production relations in the world-economy, the nature and the degree of the relationship between various kinds of groups and state are an important phenomenon.

On the other hand, world-system analysis argues that states may act both to control markets and to create them (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 120). Those states which successfully promote capitalist development not only supply social order but also create necessary structures that promote profitable enterprises. Accordingly, state capitalism, instead of waiting for entrepreneurs, creates opportunities for them and furthermore, it sometimes assumes the entrepreneurial role itself.

Although states came into existence to promote the needs of certain groups in the world market, they are by no means the mere puppets of their creators. Once created any social organisation has a life of its own and acquires a certain autonomy, in the sense that various groups exploit it for various and contradictory ends. Moreover, all social organisations generate a permanent staff (bureaucracy/state managers) whose interests lie in the further

strengthening of the organisation independent of the varying interests of their creators (Wallerstein, 1974: 402 and 1984c: 30-31). In this sense states may promote the interests of different types of groups, and for this reason those different groups fight to influence state policies.

One of the interesting characteristics of world-system analysis is that a category of states exists known as the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery is a structural position in the world-economy between core and periphery.¹ Earlier, I defined the core as characterised by high profit, high technology and high wage production, and the periphery as characterised by low profit, low technology, and low wage production. In fact, these are categories defined in terms of economic activities. There is no *sui generis* semiperipheral economic activity as such, but there are semiperipheral states where economic activities reveal an even mix of core and peripheral types of production (Chase-Dunn, 1980: 191). In other words, there is a rough balance between core and peripheral production processes in semiperipheral states. According to Wallerstein, semiperiphery is a fruitless concept unless it refers to certain political processes. The relationship between economics and politics here is directly attributed to the relation between state policies and the accumulation of capital. The state is more important and the struggle to control it is more intense in the semiperiphery than in the core or periphery because of the roughly equal distribution and the contradictory interests of core and periphery-like producers. Hence, within the semiperiphery to effect and transform state policies becomes the vital concern of various groups whose interests lie in the semiperiphery. On the other hand, since different kinds of economic elites tend to have opposing interests in the semiperiphery, it is often the case that the state becomes the dominant element in forming power blocks and shaping political coalitions among economic groups (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 241). Moreover, another important characteristics of semiperipheral states is that in those which have potential for upward mobility, state mobilisation of economic development is an important feature (Chase-Dunn, 1989: 241).

Wallerstein also argues that the semiperiphery ensures the smooth functioning of the capitalist world-economy. As I indicated earlier, there has always been unequal distribution of rewards among regions in the world-economy. If this is the case, how does the world-system manage to survive politically? In other words, why does the exploited majority not revolt against the exploiting minority? According to Wallerstein there are

¹ The term semiperiphery is used by other scholars in different contexts. For example, Nicos Mouzelis, who does not identify himself with the world-system school, uses the concept 'semi-periphery' (1986, pp.xiv-xv) "as a kind of *shorthand* for referring to a number of societies all of which, unlike most other third-world countries, have experienced both advanced industrialisation and a long history of parliamentary rule".

mechanisms in the system which prevent the likelihood of such a possibility (Wallerstein, 1974: 403-5). First, the military strength concentrated in core zones plays an important role in maintaining political stability. Second, the cadres of the system feeling that their well-being is closely related with the smooth functioning of the system, attach a pervasive ideological commitment to its survival. However, these mechanisms are not enough. For the political stability of the system we need a third key mechanism that is the semiperiphery. The world-system could function economically without having a semiperipheral zone, but it would not be politically stable, since it would be a polarised system. The existence of the semiperiphery, being both exploited and exploiter, decreases the possibility of unified non-core opposition against the core. In other words, the semiperiphery tends to depolarise and stabilise core/periphery relations. Consequently it is a zone of political analysis rather than economic.

The game of musical chairs is also played by the semiperiphery. In the semiperiphery some groups try to strengthen the state mechanism in order to change the composition of production, and accordingly to change the relative position of the country in the world-system hierarchy (Wallerstein, 1984e: 50). But, this is not an easy task and there are counter pressures from both internal and external groups. In times of expansion semiperipheral states find themselves as satellites of core powers, and they play the role of economic transmission belts and political agents of the hegemonic power (Wallerstein, 1984a: 7). However, periods of stagnation in the world-economy give the semiperiphery the opportunity to move upwards since the competition between core powers intensifies in these periods while their grip on satellites decreases. However, one should not ignore the other side of the coin; during these periods of difficulty the flow of income, capital and technology from the core to the semiperiphery is cut off. That means that while a few semiperipheral states (those which are relatively strong) may manage to push themselves towards the core,² relatively weak semiperipheral states do not manage to do so. In the upwardly mobile semiperipheral states the core producers are in ascendance. But there is also the danger of downward mobility for semiperipheral states if they are dominated by peripheral producers or former core producers who are inefficient and are pushed out of the market (Chase-Dunn, 1980: 191).

One of the major criticisms directed against world-system analysis is that Wallerstein undervalues political structures and processes, and reduces state structures and politics to determination by economic conditions and

² Fred Halliday (1994: 120-21) calls this upward move in the hierarchy of states "semi-peripheral escape".

dominant class interests. Consequently in world-system analysis states are treated as economic rather than political actors (Skocpol, 1977 and Zolberg, 1981). In this context what sort of external environment does world-system analysis present us for the study of foreign policy? In general, Wallerstein's framework focuses on the impact of the external environment (modern world-system) on individual states as the determinant of their behaviour and accordingly, as a system-oriented model, it postulates a high degree of uniformity in the behaviour of the states. In particular, Wallerstein offers an economics dominated external structure. This means that in conventional terms we can hardly study foreign policy using his model because his external environment for the study of foreign policy is the capitalist world-economy.

Does that mean that one cannot employ this approach for the study of foreign policy? According to Ray (1983) although the foreign policies of states are not central to Wallerstein's approach, one can pick out the relevant points on foreign policy in his work and apply them to the study of foreign policy. As Ray argues economic, rather than political interaction is the driving force among states. However, foreign policy also comes to the surface when Wallerstein discusses the advantages enjoyed by the core states. Here what is relevant for foreign policy is the concept of power and, more specifically, the use of power by core states in order to distort the normal operation of world market forces. According to Ray, this is the principal foreign policy goal of the core states (Ray, 1983: 16). It follows that world-system analysis becomes relevant in this way for the foreign policy study of core states or great powers.

However, I have doubts on whether it is proper to employ Wallerstein's framework for the study of foreign policy by simply picking out what is relevant for it. As Ray is aware, world-system analysis is an integrated whole and it cannot be studied by dividing it into the various disciplines of the social sciences and extracting the relevant points. If it is studied in this way, world-system analysis will most likely lose its paradigm and researches will probably end up with misleading conclusions. An alternative way to employ world-system analysis in foreign policy studies might be to perceive the foreign policies of individual states as an integral part of that system, and to investigate to what extent in practice they are in conformity with, or diverge from the premises of the framework proposed by Wallerstein. In other words, it seems sound to me to study the foreign policies of individual states in a totality composed of economic and political history, political science, sociology, geography, etc. (in other words, those disciplines incorporated by world-system analysis) and to investigate the impact of this whole on the phenomenon of foreign policy.

World-system analysis provides a very good starting point for this task. First, it divides states into three main categories of core (plus hegemonic power), semiperiphery, and periphery. States in each category have more or less the same characteristics, and consequently behave in a similar way in the system. Second, world-system analysis provides us with cyclical rhythms of 'the rise and decline of the hegemonic powers' and 'expansion and contraction' periods in the world-economy. These processes reveal similar characteristics in each cycle. Furthermore, each category of state behaves in a similar manner during the different phases of these cycles of the modern world-system. Accordingly, it would not be unrealistic to employ world-system analysis in a study of foreign policy. The first task would be to determine the structural category of those states whose foreign policies are to be analysed. Then, the second task would be to determine the time in the cyclical rhythm, for instance, is it an expansion or contraction period? Or is it an ascending or declining phase of the hegemonic power? These basic questions need to be clarified before examining the foreign policies of individual states in the framework of world-system analysis.

However, it might not be easy to give clear answers to some of those questions, since Wallerstein is also criticised for not giving clear-cut definitions and accounts of those three structural categories (Snyder and Kick, 1979). Hence the main task for the researcher must include further clarification of those concepts and their applicability to the states in question.

In conclusion, if we compare the frameworks of Waltz, Modelski, and Wallerstein we see that;

(1) All three focus on the global level and investigate the characteristics of this level which are supposed to be different from the characteristics of its constituent units, namely states.

(2) All three argue that behaviour in the international system is explained through global level structures. However, while Waltz and Modelski see these global level structures as political structures, Wallerstein presents an economic structure. In fact, both kinds of global structure are the main determinants of the behaviour of nation states.

(3) In contrast to Waltz's ahistorical model Modelski and Wallerstein provide frameworks which contain historical analysis.

(4) In contrast to the horizontal (non-hierarchical) organisation of the international system in Waltz's account, Modelski and Wallerstein consider the international system as hierarchic.

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Özet

Sistemsel-yapısal yaklaşımlar, dünya-sistemi analizi ve dış politika çalışmaları

Bu makale temel olarak uluslar arası ilişkiler alanındaki 'sistemci-yapısalcı' yaklaşımları ve bunların dış politika çalışmaları üzerindeki etkisini gözden geçirip karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ancak, bu çalışmanın özel amacı, uluslar arası ilişkiler ve dış politika analizi çalışmalarında çoğunlukla az anlaşılan ya da yanlış yorumlanan 'modern dünya-sistemi kuramını' tartışmaktır. Ayrıca, 'globalleşme çağında', sistemci-yapısalcı yaklaşımlara ve özellikle de 'modern dünya-sistemi' kuramına yeniden bakmak 'globalleşme sürecinin' dinamiklerini daha iyi anlayabilmek için gerekli araçları ve sezgi gücünü verebilecektir.