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SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE MISSIONS OPERATING IN POST CONFLICT CONTEXT: CASES OF SOMALIA, SIERRA LEONE, KOSOVO AND IRAQ

Çatışma Sonrası Ortamlarda Yürütülen Polis Misyonlarının Başarıları ve Fiyaskoları: Somali, Siera Leone, Kosova ve Irak Örnekleri

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Abstract

We all share one world where there is possibility of conflict spilling into other territories, threatening the stability of a number of nations. The world has a responsibility to contribute to the resolution of these conflicts before they go out of control. In response to such conflicts, police forces have been deployed in foreign countries as peacekeepers for decades. Currently there are over thirty multinational police missions under different umbrellas such as United Nations (UN), Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and European Union (EU) with over 10,000 police peacekeepers from over 100 countries. Active presence of international police is needed and expected until a stable and sustainable police force has flourished.

This article is an attempt to examine police reform process in post conflict environment as a broad part of security sector reform. At the beginning of the essay the success and failure have been defined by using related peacekeeping literature. International police missions in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Iraq were examined in terms of initial conditions, inputs-outputs, and outcomes. Comparison among those cases revealed that Sierra Leone and Kosovo were success, while Iraq and Somalia were failure.

Keywords: Police Peacekeeping, CIVPOL, UNMIK, UNAMSIL, UNOSOM, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Post conflict, International Crisis, International Relations, UN, OSCE, EU, Police Reform

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Öz

Çatışmaların heran başka bölgelere yayılmasının mümkün olduğu ve diğer ülkelerin istikrarını bozabileceği bir dünyayı paylaşıyoruz. Tüm dünyanın bu tür çatışmalar kontrolden çıkmadan çözüme katkı sunma sorumluluğu vardır. Bu tür çatışmalara bir çözüm olarak polis güçleri on yıllardır yurtdışına barışı koruma personeli olarak görevlendiriliyor. Halihazırda Birleşmiş Milletler (BM), Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı (AGİT), ve Avrupa Birliği (AB) gibi farklı şemsiyeler altında, yüz farklı ülkeden, onbinin üzerinde polis barışıkoruma personeliyle toplamda otuzun üzerinde polis misyonu vardır. Uluslarası polisin aktif varlığı istikrarlı ve sürdürülebilir bir polis gücü gelişene kadar beklenilen bir ihtiyaçtır.

Bu makale çatışma sonrası ortamlardaki polis reform sürecini güvenlik sektörü reformunun geniş bir bölümü olarak incelemeye çalışma gayretidir. Makalenin başında başarı ve fiyasko kavramları barışı koruma meselelerini ele alan literatür kullanılarak tanımlanmıştır. Somali, Siera Leone, Kosova ve Irak'da konuşlu uluslararası polis misyonları ilk durum, girdiler-çıktılar ve akıbet başlıkları altında incelenmiştir. Bu örneklemlerin karşılaştırması şunu göstermiştir ki Siera Leone ve Kosova bir başarı hikâyesi olarak anılırken Somali ve Irak bir fiyasko olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Polis Barışı Koruma, CIVPOL, UNPOL, UNMIK, UNAMSIL, UNOSOM, Irak, Somali, Siera Leone, Kosova, Çatışma sonrası, Uluslararası kriz, Uluslarası ilişkiler, BM, AGİT, AB, Polis Reformu

Introduction

It is ordinary to see in daily news mentioning failing governments, conflicting states, nations, groups and people, violations of fundamental human rights and security, civil wars, and ethnic rivalries in today's world. Although lots of violent conflicts have been intervened by the international community, there is strong evidence in the literature that nearly half of all post conflict countries went back into conflict within five year of respective peace agreements such as Eritrea-Ethiopia, Angola, East Timor, Liberia, and Haiti (Centre, 2006; Tschirgi, 2004). It means that the international community does not learn adequately from bad experiences and good practices. In fact, the possible reason for this problem might be the lack of knowledge on the issue of what is good and bad practices. Evaluation of the implemented programs is the best way to learn what works and what does not work. However, there is no common framework that allows for a systematic examination of the different dimensions of peace building efforts in post conflict environment (Tschirgi, 2004).

This article is an attempt to examine police reform processes in the post conflict environment as a broad part of security sector reform. Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Iraq were selected as cases for this study. Selection was made based on their non-identical

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nature of their problems. It was thought that it would help policy makers to come up some applicable solutions for different environments. At the beginning of the essay the terms of "success" and "failure" will be defined from the literature in order to create a framework for further steps. Then each of four cases will be examined one by one, and the essay will conclude with a comparison of the cases. Some of missing comparative data from cases due to its availability to the public could be considered as a limitation to this study.

1. What is Success and Failure?

Comparing "success" and "failure" is not easy task to handle for every segment of life. Defining "success" may vary for different topics. To be able to compare successful and failed police missions we should first define "success". Since police institution is a part of the internal security system we can use Jones et al. (2005)'s definition of success for reconstruction of internal security (Jones, Wilson, Rathmell, & Riley, 2005). They defined "success" as "the establishment of stability and a rule of law". In this definition, we encounter two important concepts: the rule of law and stability that refers to the political stability. Political stability is not an easy task, particularly in post conflict societies within which regime is usually not consolidated (Linz & S, 2001). Political stability and rule of law, according to the perspectives of Lipset (1959) and Huntington (2006), are among the essential requisites of healthy regimes. According to Huntington (2006), stability is obtained through integration of social forces that includes any groups opposing to the legitimate political authority. The rule of law is briefly a principle that entails no one is above the law. In addition to the stability and rule of law, Marenin (2005) points out the third concept: human security. Being endogenously related to the stability and rule of law, human security is another concept in order to be used to judge success or failure in post conflict environments.

It is normal to expect an increase in violence and crime in the initial period of post conflict. It could be said that most of the post-conflict environments experience such increase in crime rates and violence, since security organizations are dismantled. However, if increase in crime and violence persists after several years of international intervention, it demonstrates that mission is not in a good track and it might fail in the end (Jones et al., 2005).

In order to evaluate failure and success of any police mission, we should first examine initial conditions of a mission; second, reform activities as a set of inputs to indigenous police force; third, outcomes of the mission as metrics of evaluation. Initial factors encompass existence of a functioning central government, status and viability of security bodies, effectiveness of justice system, and peace agreement and formal surrender. Input and output refers to amount of resources used in rebuilding internal security such as financial assistance, duration of assistance, personnel, equipment, among others. Outputs can be seen as reform activities such as training, infrastructure, and institutional development. Overall expectation after all is positive changes in the stability, rule of law, and human security. The changes in these areas (i.e. stability, rule of law, and human security) manifest itself in declines in crime rates, level of political violence, perception of security, corruption, and civilian and military casualties (Jones et al., 2005).

Based on the criteria on the stability, rule of law, and human security, literature on

peacekeeping studies suggest that the missions in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone can be considered as a successful mission whereas the missions in Somalia, El Salvador, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq are failed missions(Azimi, 1996; Hansen, 2002; Jones et al., 2005; Law, 2006; Mettle, 1996; Moss, Rohde, & Semple, 2006; Olonisakin, 2008; Pfaff, 2008). In the light of literature on peacekeeping studies and selected criterion cases were examined below.

2. Cases

This section will examine four different international police missions in post conflict environment: Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Somalia. Among them, Kosovo and Iraq are still ongoing missions, while Somalia and Sierra Leone are completed missions.

2.1 Sierra Leone

The police reform initiative in Sierra Leone is regarded a success story which resulted the mission to be replaced with a smaller one in a short period of time. Security situation in Sierra Leone was sufficient enough, as Olonisakin (2008) asserted, to allow UN to replace United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with a smaller one which is United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in 2005.

Initial Condition

Before move forward on the case of Sierra Leone, an historical summary of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) would help us to understand the initial condition in this mission. In 19th century, Sierra Leone was regional headquarters of West African British colonies and its police force was established by colonial authorities with the mandate of protecting British interests. In 1961, the country became an independent state: however, as it was difficult to break with colonial past, the head of SLP was a British till 1963. The Sierra Leone Police (SLP) was relatively a good police institution during the early sixties in West African region(Gbla, 2006). It may sound strange in today's Sierra Leone, but the 1950s and 1960s were good times for the country. For instance, SLP did not carry firearms and the issues of security went well beyond the expectations(Gberie, 2002). In 90s, Sierra Leone suffered from series of military coups that ended in cruel civil war for eleven years. The human costs associated with the civil war were enormous. There were 4.5 million internally displaced people as well as 50,000 casualties in Sierra Leone when the civil war officially declared as over in 2002, while there were 900 members of the Sierra Leone Police among the casualties(Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006; Stone, Miller, Thornton, & Trone, 2005). During the civil war era, the police went through periods of severe politicization and neglect. Its senior officers had deserted the institution. Subsequently, it disintegrated from the society. At the time, the SLP had little equipment, beside the fact that almost its entire building infrastructure had been destroyed during the ten years or more of conflict. Among other things, police corruption became a way of life. The result was that the police could not (and sometimes through fear and incompetence would not) respond to emergencies(Gberie, 2002).

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established in July 1998 with authorization of the United Nations Security Council in order to monitor the military and security situation as well as disarmament and demobilization of former

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combatants till termination of the mission on October 22, 1999, when the Security Council authorized deployment of another significantly larger new peacekeeping operation the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)[1]. UNAMSIL was mandated to cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan. On February 7, 2000, the Council revised UNAMSIL's mandate. In May 2000, the United Kingdom (UK) made a military intervention to its former colony of Sierra Leone in order to prevent further and deepening instability in an already fragile West Africa(Horn, Olonisakin, & Peake, 2006; Law, 2006). The UK's sponsorship to Sierra Leone was strongly partisan nature in relation to the government of Kabbah and its war with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)(Fluri & Hadžić, 2005).

Input-Output

There was a two-track police reform initiative: on the one side, the UN was providing technical advisers, while the British Government was providing the funding and other leading assistance in the police reform process on the other side. The Government of Sierra Leone requested Commonwealth Secretary General to coordinate the police reform activities in Sierra Leone. Upon this request, small number of experienced senior officers from Canada, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, and UK were sent as an initial assessment team in mid-1998. Police Reform process can be divided into three phases in Sierra Leone. The first phase included efforts to establish a conceptual framework of the reform, but it was undone by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attack in 1999. The second phase started from the scratch, and in this phase, a new philosophy of policing introduced. A lot of initiatives started under the leadership of the international community to build up SLP's capacity and skill in a proper way. During the second phase an expatriate inspector general of police (IGP) was appointed to drive through the police reactivation and restructuring program, because of the fact that there was not a suitable candidate within the SLP. Infightings in the force for IGP position were also tearing the SLP apart. Since local ownership is considered as a key factor for the success in any international police reform activity, third phase of the police reform program in Sierra Leone addressed the increase of Sierra Leonean ownership in the SLP(Horn et al., 2006).

Once police stations reopened and day-to-day policing was reintroduced across the country, it was seen that conceptual framework was not enough. Therefore, practical steps to improve police capacity were required at that point. First action was taken to bring the SLP up to a reasonable level of operational efficiency and plans were put in place to retrain all existing police personnel. Although some training courses were delivered in a refurbished training school, the bulk of training activity was in the field. In parallel to this, a three-year strategic development plan (SDP) was drafted and this document informed the change in management process.

As Bayley (2006) asserts, police force can be considered as democratic when it is responsive both to government and individual requests, and accountable to multiple external audience. Commonwealth and UNCIVPOL officers worked hand in hand for the reform of SLP within the framework of democratic policing standards. They have introduced a new policing

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[1]	UN Security Council Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270(1999), 22 October 1999. http://www.un.org/Depts/ DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm

approach called "local need policing (LNP)" which was aimed to   meet the needs and expectations of the community. The LNP style has played an important role in terms of the process of internal restructuring, and organizational change, in order to the better serve to the public. This approach allowed SLP to become more responsive to both the government and the public needs. As part of the community policing program, family support unit was established to provide better service to the victims of sexual and domestic violence. Another important step was the establishment of new SLP magazine, in order to suppress inaccurate news about SLP. This allowed SLP to solve internal and external communication problems. Reformers, devoted to deal with complaints and misconduct, also established a new structure with the new disciplinary regulations so as to maintain internal accountability. As a result of this structural change, corruption was reduced in the SLP (Horn et al., 2006). These structural changes contributed to the establishment of accountability and responsiveness as two important pillars of democratic policing.

Outcome

Dobbins (2003) provides adequate information on the outcome of the police sector reform in Sierra Leone. As seen on Table 1 the peak number of international police presence in the mission was 130 in Sierra Leone. Table 2 shows us that there were only 8 combat deaths after intervention. In addition, 72 percent of refugees returned to their homeland (see Table 3). According to PolityIV (2011) fragility and democracy index, today's Sierra Leone is lees fragile than 1995 and democratic development drastically increased from -6.5 in 1995 to 6.4 in 2010. According to Table 4, the goal to achieve sustained peace as the most essential product of any international intervention in the country looks to have been accomplished. Beside these assessments, the US State Department[2] and the Amnesty International[3] have assessed the Sierra Leone's overall security situations as "generally stable" despite some security concerns related to ordinary crime. It is also added that the SLP is working to improve their professionalism and capabilities with some shortcomings in response time, communications, and specialty skills in comparison to the police forces of the industrialized countries.

Table 1. Peak Number of Civilian Police Presence by 2004 (Dobbins, 2003)

Country	Number of Civilian Police
Somalia	42
Iraq	433
Sierra Leone	130
Kosovo	4468

Thus, the success of Sierra Leone police reform can be attributed to strong national commitment, successful local ownership of the process, and coordinated and sustained international supports, all of which led to the overarching unified political consensus for achieving peace.

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2   Information can be accessed via http://www.travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1016.html
3   Information can be accessed via http://thereport.amnesty.org/document/15l

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Table 2. Number of Post Conflict Combat Casualties by 2004 (Dobbins, 2003)

Country	Number of Combat Casualties
Somalia	43
Iraq	1106
Sierra Leone	8
Kosovo	0

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) made an early decision to promote policing as a way by which internal security was ensured and this helped to keep the military away from politics. President Kabbah, upon resuming power in February 1998, quickly sought for help of the international community. A procedure was followed so that a clear high level policing policy was in place, a security framework was designed, a national security council was put in place (NSC), and a military reform strategy was designed (Horn et al., 2006).

Table 3. Percentage of Refugee Returns After Five Years of Conflict by 2004 (Dobbins, 2003)

Country	Percentage of Returnee
Somalia	22
Iraq	12
Sierra Leone	72
Kosovo	90

The political insulation is paramount for the success of the reform process, and in the case of Sierra Leone, the government showed unflinching support in maintaining the needs and provided full political commitment for ensuring the police reform in the prior agenda. Police Reform in Sierra Leone has been considered as the best example of a timely transfer to the local ownership in 2002, after three years of the initiation of international involvement. During the reform process, the government was controlling the security sector, but foreign advisers inside national structures were the drivers of the reform efforts (Law, 2006).

Table 4. Sustained Peace by 2004 (Dobbins, 2003)

Country	At Peace 2004
Somalia	No
Iraq	No
Sierra Leone	Yes
Kosovo	Yes

Another reason for the success of the reform process was due to the fact that the entire process was locally driven and based on the wish and demand of the Sierra Leone community. Unlike in the other missions, United Nations engagement was not overwhelming, and there were limited advisers as well as trainers from limited number of nations. This

situation helped reduce usual problem of exposure to too many policing approaches from different contributor countries. The steering committee at the political and working levels ensured proper coordination and cooperation in terms of identifying priorities as well as channeling the efforts into the real needs and the real focus amongst various police reform partners and the stakeholders (Horn et al., 2006). International community realized that unsystematic and disjointed approaches to the police sector reform had been a recipe for failure. Equipped with this experience, the Sierra Leone Mission resulted in the most comprehensive programme so far on the post-conflict security sector reform efforts (Law, 2006).

2.2. Kosovo

Kosovo can be considered another success mission in terms of police reform.

Initial Condition

Serbs and Albanians had fought for controlling Kosovo for hundreds of years. Kosovo, in the last decades, became the starting point for the recent problems in the Balkans, because of Milosevic's provocative speech as well as his provocative alteration of government officials in favors of minority Serbs in Kosovo. Initially, nonviolent Albanian nationalist movements became more violent under the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) umbrella. Destroying Albanian insurgency resulted in significant civilian casualties and refugee movement (Malcolm, 1998). As a result of conference in Ramboulliet, France, NATO started bombing campaign on March 24 of 1998 to force the removal of the Serbian military and the police forces and establish interim settlement under the international umbrella in Kosovo (Dobbins, 2003). After the bombing campaign, law enforcement bodies disappeared in Kosovo. As Serbian forces moved out, KLA elements tried to deploy themselves as an authority before the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) assumed its new responsibilities. After withdrawal of the Serbian forces in 1999, no domestic police force left in Kosovo; therefore, there was an urgent necessity to establish a police force to stabilize Kosovo territories (Decker, 2006).

In June 1999, the United Nations was tasked to govern Kosovo through its Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK established an international presence in Kosovo[4]. In his report about Kosovo, UN Secretary-General[5] proposed a three-phase process for UNMIK in the field of police and security. The first phase was to establish The Kosovo Force (KFOR) primacy in maintaining law and order. The second phase was to turn policing task to UNMIK CIVPOL officers with executive policing powers, as well as the establishment of an indigenous police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The third phase was to transfer full ownership to the KPS (Dobbins, 2003).

Input-Output

The UNMIK international police effort consisted of three components: the UN CIVPOL unit, the UN Border Police Unit, and the UN Special Police Units (SPUs). The traditional CIVPOL were in charge of regular daily police job. The Border Police Unit worked with KFOR at Kosovo's

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4   http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/Fact_Sheet_February_2008.pdf

5   'Report of the Secretary-General on the Interim Administration in Kosovo', S/1999/779, paras.61–5, 12 July 1999

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international borders. The SPUs were responsible for crowd control and other tasks requiring more heavily armed police(Dobbins, 2003). After UNMIK came into power, it began to recruit KPS officers. OSCE established the Kosovo Police Service School in Vushtrii in cooperation with International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), sponsored by the US Justice Department (Robert Perito, 2004). The purpose of the school is to train professional KPS officers according to the democratic policing principles. At the beginning, training term was just eight week. As the time went on, it was increased to twenty weeks by mid-2004. As of February 2008, OSCE Kosovo Police Service School had recruited, trained and deployed 8,270 KPS officers through the chain of command from the police stations up to the Main Headquarters level and into various specialized police departments[6]. Kosovo's police strength increased from about 95 to 537 per 100,000 population till 2004. Since organized crime, human and drug trafficking, and weapon smuggling were primary security threats in Kosovo, several special units were successfully established during the mission among which are the central intelligence unit, the organized crime bureau, the sensitive information and operation unit, the victim advocacy and assistance unit, and the interim security facility. In order to tackle corruption problem among public officials, UNMIK also established a financial inspection unit(Jones et al., 2005).

Outcome

As of February 2008, UNMIK Police, together with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) successfully investigated 182,983 cases, established 33 police stations, and 13 border control points. After eight years, because Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) were established and gained capacity to assume controlling power, UNMIK has moved back from an executive role to monitoring and support function[7]. As a result of all these police building efforts, crime rates from all sectors decreased. In 2002, the number of murder cases was 245. This number was reduced to 68 by 2005. Over the same period of time, kidnapping dropped 44%, robbery 25%, and arson 9%. It is clear that positive progress has been made on traditional crimes. This may be attributed to increase in police levels to detect crime as well as enforce the law and professional work of other criminal justice system's apparatus (Dobbins, 2003). Before the intervention, approximately 800,000 people were in refuge (Wilson, 2006). Refugee return is another good indicator of the success of the mission of Kosovo. By 2004, ninety percent of Kosovar Albanians returned to their home (see Table 3). As seen on Table 7 Recent democratic development index of freedom house shows that democracy index is pretty satisfactory with 7 out of 10 in Kosovo.

By considering these positive numbers for Kosovo it could be said that a sustainable peace is achieved in Kosovo as a most essential product of any international intervention. The success of Kosovo police reform can be attributed to initial conditions such as strong national commitment, demographic characteristics of Kosovo, and coordinated, comprehensive as well as sustained international support. In addition, as Kosovo is a small country with a small population, it was relatively easy to handle. There were not large minority groups to increase ethnic tension with compared to the other post conflict territories. Because UN

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6   http://www.unmikonline.org
7   http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/Fact_Sheet_February_2008.pdf

and NATO was perceived as a savior among the public, most of their reform policies were well received and supported both at the government and public levels. Another important parameter of the success was the initial condition of the Kosovo. There was no active police force at the beginning, so everything started from scratch. This situation gave big advantage to the international community to create proper police subculture among the new recruits. Majority of international police officers were from democratic countries therefore they were more experienced in implementing and building democratic policing principles. This was a key and advantageous condition for the Kosovo

2.3. Somalia

The example of total failure in establishing a proper policing structure comes from the experience in Somalia.

Initial Condition

To understand why it has been considered as a failure necessitated to know what the initial condition in the mission was in, what the inputs and outputs were, and what the result was as an outcome. In order to better understand the initial condition of the mission it is essential to look at the history of the police in Somalia.

As Somalia was a colony of the Italians and the British in sequence, the Somali Police Force (SPF) were influenced from both of them in the history. In SPF, Europeans served as officers, while Somalian citizens were bulk of the lower ranks. Whenever colonial powers disbanded current police force, they re-established another one with their own policing style under a different name. For instance, in 1958, the authorities made the corps entirely a Somali force and changed its name to the Police Force of Somalia (Forze di Polizia della Somalia). In 1960, the British Somaliland Scouts joined with the Police Corps of Somalia to form a new Somali Police Force, which consisted of about 3,700 men. Under the parliamentary regime (1960-1969), police received foreign assistance in the form of training and material aid from West Germany, Italy, and the United States. During that period, Somalia government used the police to counterbalance the Soviet-supported army. Under the military regime of Siad Barre (1969-1991), the police received foreign assistance from the Soviet bloc nations. In the late 1970s again, the western assistance teams appeared in Somalia because of the improved relations with the West instead of the Soviet bloc. During that time period, the SPF was an effective and efficient police force with specialized units of traffic, criminal investigation, intelligence and counterinsurgency. There were two separate elite police units: the Darawishta and the Birmadka Poliska (Riot Unit). The Darawishta operated in remote areas while the Birmadka acted as a crack unit for specialized tactical and public order maintenance.[8] In a nutshell, the pre-civil war police was an organized element of the society and therefore, provided one of Somalia's most stabilizing elements. The police had an undisputed reputation for professionalism. In 1991, there were approximately 15,000 police officers working in around 200 police stations located throughout the 18 regions in Somalia. After Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, both the Darawishta and Birmadka forces ceased to operate(Ganzglass, 1996).

Input-Output

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[8]   http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/economy/somalia_economy_somali_police_force_~1639.html

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In year 1992, the Somalia government was called "government with no ability of self-governance" therefore international community's intervention started in April 1992 ended up in March 1995 with three different UN operations in Somalia. First of all United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu in April 1992. After that The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established in accordance with Security Council Resolution in March 1993, in order to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)[9]. Its mandate later expanded to include assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system (Thomas & Spataro, 1998).

Most of the former members of the National Police were ready to serve for their country. They were competent, honest, respected, and largely free from the taint of former leader Siad Barre's rule. The international community and clan leaders decided that a security force was needed to settle refugees' crisis, therefore as a first step to establish a reliable security force, a police committee was established. The committee included former members of the National Police as well. As a first step, the police committee identified personnel needs, necessary training standards and logistic requirements. The establishment of new police force process hit a temporary obstacle in discussion of establishing a national or a decentralized police force. However, the local police forces were created after pressure of the political leaders over religious and community leaders (Sismanidis, 1997).

The new Somali police were partially effective in areas where UNITAF provided support. UNITAF Provost Marshal Lieutenant Colonel Steve Spataro expressed that the Somali police were initially successful because of the fact that the police officers believed that they had a responsibility to their fellow citizens. In addition to this, the clan and military leaders realized that reestablishing the police was important, and providing support to police was the quickest way to establish a secure environment. UNITAF also never had more expectation from police than their ability to handle(Thomas & Spataro, 1998).

During the period of UNSOM I, although there was a concern raised about the magnitude of humanitarian suffering that posed threat to the international peace and stability, yet the actions called in was not sufficient for the dire nature of the situation. There was a complete vacuum to address the public security in general. Although the Security Council resolution 794 called in for security, there was no legal basis to recreate the police force in the mandate. It was decided by the Police Commission to establish an interim Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) that would enforce locally agreed laws and be controlled by the community. The reestablishment of local security in the form of Somali Police was included as a target sector of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Program and funds were made available to get new uniforms, communications and office equipments as well as rehabilitate office buildings. Despite the fact that the ASF showed its promising start, the lack of parallel judiciary and penal system limited its effectiveness.

During the UNOSOM II, the mandate included direct reference to the role of the Somali Police. In this period it was concluded that ASF was an effective force and, with further training and equipment, could form the basis for the National Police Force. A detailed plan under the Justice Department of UNOSOM II was developed to re-establish criminal justice

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[9]   UN Security Council Resolution 814, S/RES/814(1993), 26 March 1993

system which includes police, judiciary and correction components. Although the plan included the provision for the 54 member international police, the lack of police contributions and comprehensive concept of operation limited any further progress on the police reform issues. There was unambiguous understanding among international community that the reestablishment of the police, justice and the penal system was the key for establishment of security as well as law and order in the country. With this understanding, the US came with the bilateral plan of assisting the Somali police through International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the funding was made from their ICITAP Haiti Program. The entire program focused heavily on tactical and military patterns of training without any Somalian perspectives and ownership. It was rather an imposition of external policing practices into Somalia context. A lack of coordination between the efforts of the Justice division within the UNOSOM and the bilateral efforts further complicated the police development efforts and therefore, nothing tangible could be achieved during this period. The lack of political will, mission-wide planning, and failure to meet the obligations of the voluntary funding by the member states for the police and justice trust fund, as well as uneven application of the mission mandate seriously undermined the achievement of the police plan(Thomas & Spataro, 1998).

CIVPOL's task was to re-organize the Somali Police for maintaining the rule of law, stability, and peace. In order to do this, CIVPOL implemented four strategies: re-engaging former members of Somalian Police, training officers of the Somalian Police, equipping the force with required support materials, and repairing police infrastructure (Dobbins, 2003). In 1995, there were 8,000 officers in the force and about a third of this had undergone two types of training. First type of training was military oriented so as to discipline the force. The courses were given by the military apparatus of UNOSOM. The other types of courses were police oriented and it was given by CIVPOL in collaboration with ICITAP. They were aimed to rebuild police capacity and skill of the Somalian police. It was impossible to carry out the police job effectively without necessary equipment. There was logistic gap to carry out daily police job effectively. UNSCOM tried to fill this gap by donating large quantity of equipments to the Somalian Police (Mettle, 1996).

Outcome

Dobbins (2003)'s information on the outcome of the police sector reform in Somalia clearly proves that the police reform mission in Somalia could be considered as a failed mission. As seen on Table 1, the peak number of international police presence was 42 in the mission of Somalia. Table 2 shows us that there were 43 combat deaths after the intervention which is very high comparing other cases. Just 22 percent of refugees were able to return to their home back (Table 3). According to Polity IV fragility and democratic development of state index, Somalia's state fragility has not been changed since the international intervention. Somalia is the number one country in the fragility index for 2010 and there is no observed democratic development in Somalia (Marshall & Cole, 2011). As seen on Table 7 Democratic Development score for Somalia was -6.2 in 1990 and it has never been changed by 2007. Afterwards it became worst in year 2010 with -7 despite international intervention to the country. Although sustained peace is the most essential product of any international intervention, the goal of sustained peace in the country has never been succeeded (see Table 4).

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The failure of the police reform in Somalia can be attributed to the political ambiguity of the overall mission. The overwhelming military focus of the mission pushed the political pillar into total disarray and the total lack of understanding on the importance of the rule of law initiatives.

2.4. Iraq

Although it is still an on-going mission, police reform process in Iraq could be considered as a failing story. As Pfaff (2008) who is one of the US Army division commander pointed out, "the failure of the local police forces to provide a permanent security presence was the biggest obstacle to stability in Iraq". In spite of the fact that so far the US government and other countries have spent millions of dollars to provide aid, equipment, and education, international community has achieved little progress in the police reform.

Initial Condition

What was the initial situation in Iraq when the reform process of police started? Brief history about the case would be helpful to better understand initial conditions in Iraqi Police.. After World War I, although the British installed the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, they were overthrown in 1958 and subsequently replaced by the Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime (Wilcke, 2006). During Saddam rule, Iraq had two major wars, several internal violence cases, and decade-long economic sanctions imposed by international community. These left poor people with mostly destroyed societal institutions in Iraq (Dobbins, 2003). Saddam was ruling the country in a strong centralized fashion with divide and rule tactics. Therefore, the security sector was composed of a lot of agencies controlling each other. Iraq was a security state with a dense web of the police, the military and the intelligence agencies under Saddam's direct control . As it is expected in any undemocratically governed police force, those agencies were in charge of upholding the Saddam regime rather than upholding rule of law. Since the regular police was not the key element in enforcing regime policies, they were underpaid and under resourced; hence, corruption was a way to compensate this gap (R. Perito, 2003; Pfaff, 2008).

Input-Output

Coalition efforts to reform Iraq's police force were a three-phase process: transformation, philosophies and models, and program delivery. For the transformation phase, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) developed a twin-track approach: rehiring Saddam's era policemen providing a minimal level of training as well as new recruitment with full scale training programs. For the policing philosophies and models, the CPA addressed two vital aspects of policing: governance and also institutional development and structure of the police (Jones et al., 2005). As Bayley (2001) points out, Americans often assume that American police structure must be model to the others since police structure in the US is democratic. For example, American authorities in Germany and Japan after World War II imposed decentralized structure in the police, and authorized local authorities to create their own police forces. As soon as the American forces left the country, everything was reversed in terms of the decentralization. Americans made the same mistake in Iraq as well (Bayley, 2006). They tried to reorganize the police in a decentralized structure. The decentralized reorganization of the Iraqi police forces created new problems, in terms of relations between

the provincial police forces and the Ministry of Interior. Which leadership the police should follow was the major problem of confusion. Arab culture is in favor of centralized authority; therefore, it was not likely for Iraqi's to easily adopt the new decentralized structure. The CPA had some sort of difficulties in implementing this structure, so they chose a hybrid model. The local police would have a certain level of authority in the local level and at the same time it would be accountable to the central government to some extend (Dobbins, 2003; Pfaff, 2008).

Under the direction of the CPA, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) was created and subordinated to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006; Jones et al., 2005). Training of new recruits and former officers were the first priority for CPA. There were three different police training activities conducted by the different coalition countries. With the financial assistance of the US State Department, CPA set up International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan in December 2003, in order to achieve the Iraqi police reform. The Center is operated by ICITAP. Within a year, the Center conducted 8 week-training sessions for 32,000 new recruits, ranging in age from 18 to 24 (R. Perito, 2009; USDOD, 2006). In the southeast Iraq, the ongoing UK-led training activities emphasized community policing and Human Rights as a more sustainable way to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people against terrorist groups. The Italian Carabineer conducted training activities on basic tactical skills with another way in the Italian controlled provinces. As a result, there was no consistency across the country as well as there was no consensus on which styles and syllabi proved to be ideal for the Iraq Police(Ashraf, 2007; Deflem & Sutphin, 2006).

It was soon understood by the CPA that the numbers of the trained police officers were not the primary indicators of the success of the police reform, because the security situation in Iraq worsened despite the increasing numbers. In 2004, with the help of Abu Ghraib scandal, violence drastically escalated, and then a debate started on appropriateness of the Western style of community-based police forces, in cases of extreme terrorism and rampant corruption. Some experts claimed that the formation of constabulary (French or Italian style) forces to deal with high levels of organized crime and political violence was appeared as a necessity in the police reform process in Iraq. Light armored Emergency Response Unit with 4,900 men was established to deal with high-end violence(Ashraf, 2007; Jones et al., 2005). In 2006, Emergency Response Unit merged with Mechanized Police Unit and created a new Iraqi National Police under the Ministry of the Interior. Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE), Directorate of Ports of Entry (DPE), Facilities Protection Services (FPS), and National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA) were another bodies of the Iraqi Police under the MOI. In addition to these efforts, although ombudsman mechanism was created as an oversight body over the police, it remained on the paper, since there was no such a tradition investigating the police misconduct(R. Perito, 2009; Wilcke, 2006).

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Table 5. MOI National Police Forces: Operational Readiness (USDOD, 2008)

	Ministry of Interior (MOI) Forces		
	Authorized	Assigned	Trained
Police	288001	275300	155248
National Border Police	33670	32389	41399
Enforcement	38205	39649	27959
Total MOI	359876	347338	224606

International input to the Iraqi police sector reform was money, equipment, expatriate civilian police advisors, and international advisors and mentors. In 2004, the US government allocated $ 3.2 billion to the security and law enforcement as a supplement. MOI, 18 provincial HQs, 425 police stations, and nine training facilities were scheduled to rebuilt or refurbished. A computerized immigration system was set up as a pilot implementation in two sites and it was planned to set up nationwide. In terms of individual equipment, 35 percent of the required vehicles, 24 percent of the required communication equipment, and 41 percent of the required body armor were donated by CPA to different the police forces in Iraq. At the initial stage, 6500 international police advisors were recommended, but it was revised to the number of 1500. There were less than 500 international police advisors by 2004, because of the high security risk(Jones et al., 2005).

Output of the Iraqi police reform program can be divided three categories: personnel, capacity, and institutional development. Despite the fact that projected number of the police forces in Iraq was around 172000 the number of police personnel in hand was roughly 60000 by 2005. When the time went on the number of police personnel increased to roughly 360000 (see Table 5). Local ownership is an important aspect of reform activities. The US Department of Defense report shows that there is progress in terms of operation readiness of the Iraqi police force(USDOD, 2008). As seen on Table 6 there were only 2 battalions fully independent by 2005. As of 2008 there were 9 battalions ready to operate without support of the coalition forces. CPA saw training of the police chiefs, establishment of the specialized units, and the establishment of oversight institutions as key elements of institutional development. Although steps were taken to do all of these reform activities, little progress have been made by 2008. International news headlines are good indicators of unstable environment in Iraq. The data on crime rates and political violence are not perfect as well as the attack to both the coalition forces and the local police is very high with the high number of casualties. In addition, poll results show that public perception on fear of crime is the main concern among the Iraqi citizens (USDOD, 2008, 2009).

Table 6. MOI National Police Forces: Operational Readiness (USDOD, 2008)

|	National Police Combat Battalion				National Police Brigades Headquarters				National Police Division Headquarters			
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2005	2006	2007	2008	2005	2006	2007	2008
Units in the Lead with Coalition Enablers or Fully Independent	2	5	10	9	-	-	3	5	-	-	1	2
Units Fighting Side by Side with Coalition Forces	13	22	17	18	7	7	5	4	1	2	1	-
Units Not Ready	1	-	12	5	1	1	3	1	-	-	-	-

Outcome

Available outcomes show that police reform mission in Iraq might be considered as a failing mission (Dobbins, 2003). Although the reports of the US Department of Defense denote some sort of improvement in the police reform process, the reports of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicate that it is difficult to determine overall impact of US efforts in Iraq due to unreliable and inadequate data of the local authorities(Christoff, 2007; USDOD, 2006). As seen on Table 1 peak number of international police presence in the mission was 433 in Iraq. There were 1,106 combat deaths after intervention by 2004 (see Table 2). Table 3 shows us that only 12 percent of refugees were able to return to their home back that means 88 percent of refugees still displaced and have no possibility to return their pre-war locations. According to Polity IV fragility and democracy index, Iraq's state fragility has not been increased since 2001. Iraq is the number third country in the fragility index for 2008. There is no observed democratic development in Iraq. It was (-9) in 1990 and scores changed slowly to 2.5 by 2010, despite the coalition intervention to the country. Although sustained peace is the most essential product of any international intervention, according to Table 4, the goal to sustained peace in the country has not been accomplished.

      Failure of the police reform initiative in Iraq can be attributed to non existence of pre planning, uncoordinated efforts, and inadequate understanding of local conditions and traditions. Iraq was relatively big and ethnically diverse country; hence, it was not easy to handle post conflict situation without understanding the local traditions and conditions.

Conclusion

Throughout these cases, international community implemented various policies in order to sustain peace in post conflict context. The goal of a sustainable peace was relatively achieved in Kosovo and Sierra Leone while, alas, Iraq and Somali are still suffering intense violence (see Table 2 and 4). Somali is still number one country in standing of the fragile countries index

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(Marshall & Cole, 2011). Somalia and Iraq have no improvement compared to Sierra Leone and Kosovo, which has improved their record since 2001(see Table 8). Democratization of the post conflict country is the main goal for the international interventions. As it is seen on Table 7, there is no progress for Iraq and Somali and they keep their negative grade steadily, while Sierra Leone and Kosovo have a positive grade in terms of democratic development. The number of combat casualty is another indicator of stability in a post conflict country. Iraq and Somali have high combat casualties in comparison to Sierra Leone and Kosovo. There are even no combat casualties in Kosovo after the conflict was over. After any conflict, the most attention is given to returnees by the international community, in order to bring life to normal level. Table 3 is a good indicator of success of Kosovo and Sierra Leone missions, since in Kosovo 90 percent and in Sierra Leone 72 percent of all refugees and internally displaced persons returned their home within five years after the conflict .

Table 7. Democratic Development (Source Freedom House[10] and Systemic Peace[11])

	1960	1990	1995	2000	2005	2007	2010
Somalia	6.2	-6.2	-6.2	-6.2	-6.2	-6.2	-7
Iraq	-5	-9	-9	-9	-9	-6	2.5
Sierra Leone	6	-6.5	-6.5	4	5	5	6.4
Kosovo	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.6	8

Another important aspect in post conflict context is democratic governance and rule of law in order to achieve designated goals. In both success stories, the police forces were very well structured and functioning in a proper way. The case of Somalia is a total failure because of the fact that there is no well structured and functioning police force there. In Iraq, it could be said that the police force was almost established but the volatile politics and security conditions prevented the police forces from exercising their power in a proper way. After the US withdrawal the situation is getting worse because of increased ethnic tensions.

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[10] www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=401&year=2006
[11] www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Table 8. State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008 (PolityIV, 2011)

	Somalia	Iraq	Sierra Leone	Kosovo
State Fragility Index 2010	25	17	19	7
State Fragility Index 2007	22	20	19	
State Fragility Index 2001	21	19	23	
State Fragility Index 1995	22	19	22	
Trajectory 1995-2010				
Armed Conflict Indicator 2010	war	war	*	*
Armed Conflict Indicator 2007	war	war	*	*
Effectiveness Score 2010	13	9	11	4
Effectiveness Score 2007	11	9	11	
Legitimacy Score 2007	11	11	8	
Security Effectiveness 2007	2	3	2	
Security Legitimacy 2007	3	3	1	
Political Effectiveness 2007	3	3	3	
Political Legitimacy 2007	2	3	1	
Economic Effectiveness 2007	3	1	3	
Economic Legitimacy 2007	3	2	3	
Social Effectiveness 2007	3	2	3	
Social Legitimacy 2007	3	3	3	

* The country has been directly involved in one or more major armed conflicts sometime during the previous twenty year period (1986-2005) but has not experienced a major armed conflict since, that is, for at least the past five years.

Kosovo and Sierra Leone are successful in their efforts to restructure a police force, whereas Iraq and Somalia are totally failure. At this point, it should be asked that whether the international community has learnt or developed its skills with respect to utilizing an international civilian force while establishing and maintaining peace in a war or ethnic conflict-stricken country. Because of most recent multinational involvement in Iraq resulted failure it would be inappropriate to give an answer "yes" to this question. Iraq could have also been a success story if the international community had studied their homework well. With this failure, the US and the other western countries have badly damaged their credibility in the field of peacekeeping operations and they may have no other chance to restore their credibility.

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