SPREAD OF RADICALISM:
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROCESS BY WHICH IDEAS FLOOD THE WORLD

Radikalizmin Yayılması:
Düşüncelerin Dünyaya Yayılış Süreçlerine Teorik bir Bakış

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Abstract

Radical ideas, calling young men and women to join violent rebellion have periodically inundated the world for the past 130 years. While mega waves of internal terrorism and political violence have been noticed in the scholarly literature, relatively little effort has gone into the explanation of their origin or the path of their proliferation. By borrowing from various disciplines, this article aims at proving an explanation for the global spread of radicalism. Our understanding of these broad trends leads us to the policy parameters to deal with the destructive effects of the spread of extremist ideologies. In this article I argue that a proper policy analysis to deal with the problem of radicalization is not only to look at the causes of inspiration, but also to carefully examine the portals of "opportunity" through which the inspired join actual terrorist organizations.

Key Words: Radicalism, international terrorism, future terrorism, inspiration, opportunity.

Özet

Gençlerimizi kanlı ayaklanmalara katılmaya iten radikal düşünceler dünyamızın son 130 yıllık siyasi gündemini meşgul etmiştir. Akademik literatürde iç terörizm ve politik şiddet konularında yazılmış eser zenginliği dikkatleri çekerken, bunların gerçek nedenlerinin veya bunlardaki şiddet unsurunun devamını sağlayan sebeplerin çok az çalışıldığı görülmüştür. Bu makalede, değişik sosyal bilimlerden de faydala-

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nılarak, radikalizmin küresel ölçekte yayılma nedenleri irdelenecektir. Bu küresel radikalleşme eğilimlerini anlamamız, aşırıcı ideolojilerin sebep olacakları yıkımla mücadelede geliştireceğimiz uygulamaların etkinliklerini artıracaktır. Bu çalışmada, radikalizmle mücadelede uygulanan mevcut yöntemlerin etkinlikleri, yalnızca bu radikalizmi tetikleyen motivasyon unsurlarına bakılarak ölçülmemiştir. Aynı zamanda, örgüt üyeliklerine yatkın olan kişilerin, örgütlere katılımda kullandıkları "fırsat pencereleri" de bu çalışmaya dâhil edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Radikalizm, uluslararası terörizm, geleceğin terörizmi, ilham ve fırsat pencereleri.

Introduction

The history of human civilization is about the spreading of ideas. Ideas of religion, politics, and fashion have periodically inundated the world. Judaism, a regional religion, gave birth to Christianity and, over time spread, initially along the contour of the Roman Empire and beyond, but mostly to the west. Buddhism, an offshoot of Hinduism saw its spread primarily to the far eastern countries. Occupying the geographical middle, Islam, rising in the seventh century rapidly spread through the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa and Spain to the west and to India and Indonesia to the east. The spread of ideas in the past was often slow and was heavily constrained by geography; today they flow freely across the world. Originated initially in the rough inner-city neighborhoods of urban America, rap music is heard in practically every language, just like hula-hoop and bellbottom pants became the craze among the previous generations. However, the path of the flow is not random. A careful investigation reveals the patterns that shed important lights on policies to deal with those ideas that spread death and destruction in the world. The process diffusion of ideas has been the focus of intense research for the past half a century (Rogers, 1962; Brown 1982). Unfortunately, their application to terrorism, till now has been limited. The purpose of this article is to understand the process by which religious radicalism, particularly that inspired by the al-Qaeda has influenced a significant number of Muslim youth around the world, by bringing to the fore some of the past research. Having analyzed the process of spread of radical ideas, the article will develop some policy measures to deal with the threat.

1. Waves of International Terrorism

When we look at the history of modern terrorism from a very broad perspective, we realize that the world has seen four waves of radical ideas. Rapoport (2006:10) defines waves with three characteristics: a) a cycle of activities characterized by expansion and contraction phases, b) covering multiple nations, and c) "driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups' characteristics and mutual relationships". By studying the history of terrorism since 1880s, he identifies four distinct waves of terrorism and political

violence fueled by the common ideological fervor emanating from anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism, with the first three waves lasting roughly 40 years each.

Although the "wave" theory has gained a firm footing in the extant literature (Sageman, 2008a), not much effort has gone into the examination of the causes of the mega trends of violence. By drawing upon some of the current research in the areas of business, advertisement, and marketing, we can discern some patterns that can shed important light onto why certain ideas seem to "infect" a large number of people across history, culture, and geography. However, before we delve into the question of *how*, let me address the question, *why* do people follow these mega-trends of ideas.

2. The "Why" of the Mega-trends and Human Nature

In the Western cultural ethos, the idea of individualism is pervasive. In our daily affairs the assumption of self-utility maximizing individuals as islands of rational calculation, independent of community, culture, or creed, becomes self-evident truth. In our unquestioned assumption of fundamental human nature, the picture of the me-centric individual, in the words of the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1970: xi), becomes a "positive consciousness of knowledge," which he defines as "a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientists and yet is a part of scientific discourse". Despite this conscious and unconscious acceptance of basic human nature, current advancements in the fields of experimental psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Haidt, 2006) evolutionary biology (de Waal, 2006), and cognitive sciences (Damasio, 1994; Pinker, 2002) clearly demonstrate the importance of group behavior in our decision-making processes. Even economists, the primary proponents of the assumption of self-utility maximization, who typically are disdainful of those who might contaminate the concept of human rationality with history, culture or psychology (Becker, 1996; Lerner, 2007), are becoming cognizant of the importance of group psychology and interdependent utility functions (Frank, 1998). This diverse body of research clearly demonstrates that as social beings, we all crave to belong to groups and, when we do, we derive great satisfaction by adhering to their explicit rules and implicit norms. We are happy, being altruistic toward members of our chosen groups and opposing, sometime violently, the rival groups. In fact, in the Maslovian (Maslow, 1968) hierarchy of needs, the need to belong is second only to the physical needs of keeping our bodies and soul together.

Furthermore, people follow cultural dictates not only because they generate personal utility, but also because through their "doing", they "become" somebody (Schuessler, 2000). So when we choose to wear a certain fashion, buy a certain toy, or drive a certain car, we not only derive pleasure the consumed goods generate for us (the instrumental part of our demand), they also help us establish our identity as members of our chosen groups. Similar to these consumers, the participants in a global terrorist movement, beyond satisfying their own personal needs - varying from power, prestige, monetary gains, salvation, or even the

72 virgins in heaven - *become* the person they want to be as members of the group, in which they claim their membership. As a result, when an idea gains momentum, the number of people seeking its affiliation by being part of the community increases.

Therefore, Hoffman (1998) is correct in asserting that when people join dissident organizations and take part in violence, which we now commonly attribute as "terrorism", they act not so much upon their private motivations, but out of a broad community concern. In other words, in their own minds all political terrorists are altruists. This fundamental difference in motivation distinguishes terrorists from common criminals, who are motivated only by their personal gratification (Gupta, 2008). Our natural proclivity to form groups and work for their collective welfare is biologically imprinted in us, which accounts for the human need to join global trends of all sorts, including waves of international terrorism.

Let us now turn our attention to the process by which the ideas spread.

3. How Do Ideas Spread?

Journalist Malcolm Gladwell, in his bestselling book (2002) asks an important question: How do we arrive at the tipping point, after which, a new idea, a fad, a fashion, a business, an innovation, or an ideology floods the world? Gladwell, studied the success of businesses like the popular footwear, hush puppies and children's shows like the *Sesame Street*. When we examine the process by which a wave of international terrorism spreads throughout the globe, we find that this is the same process by which ideas spread, some ending up being global others remaining localized, some making great impacts, most others disappearing within a very short time. Based on Gladwell, the process by which little things can make a big difference, we find the workings of three broad forces: i) the messenger(s), ii) the message and iii) the context.

3.1. The Messenger(s)

The social theories of terrorism and political violence argue that gross imbalances within the social structure, such as poverty, income inequality, and asymmetry in power lead to violence. However, when these factors are put to empirical tests they, despite age-old assertion of their salience, produce only ambiguous results or weak correlations. The reason for these puzzling dissonance rests with the fact that the factors of deprivation – absolute or relative – only serve as the necessary conditions for social unrest. For the sufficient reason, we must look into the role that "political entrepreneurs" play to translate the grievances into concrete actions by framing the issues in a way that clearly identifies the boundaries of the aggrieved community and its offending group (Gupta, 2008). The clear identification of the "us" and "them" creates conditions to overcome the natural bias toward free-riding and overcome the collective action problem (Olson, 1968).

Gladwell, for instance, makes a finer distinction within the category of "political entrepreneurs", whom he calls, the *connectors*, the *mavens*, and the *salesmen*. The connectors

are the primary nodes of a communication network. These are the people who know a lot of people and are known by a lot of people by dint of who they are (position, power, money, etc.). The *maven* is a Yiddish word, meaning the "accumulator of knowledge". The mavens are the so-called "theoreticians" of a movement, the pundits and gurus, who can provide a cogent explanation of the current crisis based on their knowledge and observations. The *salesmen* are those, who through their power of persuasion can attract groups of followers. Although there are no specific boundaries separating these three groups of key individuals, any analysis of a global movement will clearly identify people with characteristics of all three.

In this article, I am going to concentrate on only one movement within the fourth wave, the al-Qaeda. However, a careful look at all the other previous waves will clearly indicate the same pattern.

The grievances of the Muslim community (*ummah*) have been acute for at least a century, since the days when the last Islamic Empire in Istanbul slipped into the pages of history books. After an impressive run that lasted over a thousand years and saw the conquer of almost the two thirds of the "known world", beginning with the expulsion of the Mores in 1492 by the Spanish monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Islamic Empires started to experience defeat for the first time. The following half a millennium saw a steady decline of the Islamic Empire, which was completed after the WWI, when the Ottoman Empire broke apart. Yet, this widespread realization did not immediately create violent rebellion along the lines religious fundamentalism. The collective frustration and anger felt in the Muslim world found its expression mostly through nationalistic yearnings, primarily as a result of the second wave of international terrorism. The so-called "jihadi" movement took shape slowly through the writings of the *mavens*, such as Hasan al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb[1]. Although they failed to make much political impact during their lifetime outside of Egypt, their writings inspired the son of one of the wealthiest Arab families, Osama bin Laden. If we examine bin Laden's life, we can clearly see why he would be the Great Connector. As a student in the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah young bin Laden was greatly influenced by his teachers, Abdallah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of the fiery Islamist. His vast wealth and his connections to the Saudi royal family, gave bin Laden a ready platform, which an ordinary person would not have had. As a result, when the Afghan war started, with his influence and familiarity with the rich and the powerful, he could establish *al-Qaeda*, "the base", which served as the bridge between the mujahideens fighting the Soviet army

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[1] *The word jihad has a specific religious connotation. Not all Muslims accept the way the radicals have used the term. By accepting the term to label radicals, we may actually give it more legitimacy than it deserves. However, since all other alternatives to the expression, such as "Salafis", "fundamentalists," "extremists," or "literalists" carry their own limitations, I will use the term "jihadi" in this article being mindful of its political and religious limitations.*

in Afghanistan and their families in the Arab countries. Furthermore, he quickly established linkages with the Pakistani military intelligence service, the Inter service Intelligence Agency (ISA), which served as the conduit for the CIA to deliver money and weapons to the Afghan fighters. Apart from his personal wealth from his inheritance and his investments, bin Laden was also able to tap into the vast amount of charity money (*zakat*), generated within the Arab world, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations. Through his immense connections and seemingly inexhaustible funds, bin Laden was able to attract a large number of lieutenants, who served as the *salesmen* of his jihadi ideology.

The role of wealthy benefactors in the spread of ideas cannot be overstated. The spread of Christianity could not take place without the active support of Emperor Constantine (Montgomery, 2002) or Buddhism without the Ashoka the Great and other Indian kings. In today's world, this support can come from various governments, wealthy donors, and from taking part in illicit drug trade. In any case, for a group to survive for a long time, it is essential to have a sustained source of funding.

3.2. The Message

The information age literally bombards us with innumerable pieces of information every single day of our lives. As we see, listen and/or read them, very few get through our conscious understanding. We may, for example, see a billboard while driving, a commercial while watching television or listen to a lecture, yet may recall absolutely nothing about the specific message they contain only a minute later. On the other hand, we may recall something we heard, seen, or read many years ago. The question is, what causes some messages to stick? The secrets of stickiness have been the focus of research of psychologists, communications specialists, and scholars from diverse disciplines. Heath and Heath (2002), for instance, identify six factors that cause messages to stick. They argue that a memorable message must be *simple*, *concrete*, *credible*, and have contents that are *unexpected*, they must appeal to our *emotions*, and should contain a compelling *storyline*.

Simplicity is one of the foremost requirements of a "sticky" message. In the area of political communication, where a leader attempts to inspire a large number of people, sticky messages depend on the simplicity of thought. When we look at the messages of bin Laden, we can clearly understand that in his vision: Islam is under threat from the infidel West, the Jews, and their collaborators in the Muslim world. All his communications, long and short, contain this message (Lawrence, 2005).

These messages are not simply a litany of grievances, but are concrete in their action plan: It is the religious duty of every Muslim to join the jihad against those who are putting the followers of the Prophet in peril.

The "unexpected" part of a memorable message comes when to the listeners the leader "connects the dots" and explains clearly the confusing world in which they live. To many in the Arab/Muslim world the message must come a revelation, where they begin to see how the unbelievers have been undermining their rightful place in history. Through

extreme cunning, the infidels not only sapped the energy of the Islamic Empire, but also are plotting to destroy it militarily, politically, financially, and even spiritually. This sudden realization often lies at the core of recruiting of new believers to the cause.

Coming from the son of one of the wealthiest families, living an ascetic life, waging war against injustice, bin Laden cuts a God-like image in the minds of many in the Arab/Muslim world. These images, often carefully chosen by al-Qaeda give his messages an immense and immediate credibility.

As human beings we remember messages that evoke emotions, particularly one that paint the portrait of an impending threat. Fear is most often the primary motivator for collective action. Evolutionary biologists bolster the findings of experimental designs of Prospect Theory offered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The Prospect theory simply states that in the process of evaluating benefits and costs of an action, human beings often place a far greater weight on the fear of a loss than the prospect of a gain. Thus Heidt (2007: 29) points out: "If you were designing a fish, would you have it respond as strongly to opportunities as to threats? No way. The cost of missing the sign of a nearby predator, however, can be catastrophic. Game over, end of the line of those genes". Therefore, fear moves us in a profound way. Hence, it should come as little surprise that the messages of bin Laden would be strewn with dire predictions of a destroyed Islamic world, which are sure to pass when the believers fail to act (Olsson, 2008).

Finally, memorable messages come with stories. Experimental studies (Pennington and Hastie, 1988) show that when two similar messages are presented to an audience, one with supporting statistics and the other with a suitable story, the latter inevitably sticks more than the former. Any good public speaker knows the power of a storyline. Thus when someone evokes the name of the former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the negotiating process, we immediately understand the follies of trying to appease an impeccable enemy. Similarly, the mere reference of Vietnam, Watergate, or the Edsel tells a storyline to the listener regarding a complex, yet perhaps a totally unrelated situation. Like all other political communicators, bin Laden's speeches are chalk full of analogies of stories from Islamic history. Thus, when he calls the Westerners, "the Crusaders", or George W. Bush, "Hulagu Khan", their implications leave little doubt in the minds of his intended audience.

Thus, throughout history, the *mavens* have concocted coherent stories, by borrowing from religion, history, and mythology, with completes set of heroes and villains, good and evil, allies and enemies that have resonated with the masses. The *connectors* have spread it far and wide, and the *salesmen* have recruited eager volunteers.

3.3. The Context
There may be great messengers, but the sticky-ness of their message depends on the socio-political, historical, and cultural context. Rapoport (2006) himself points out three historical and cultural factors for the spread of at least one form of religious wave: religious fundamentalism. He argues that the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the beginning of a new Islamic century,

and the Afghan War paved the way for it. The success of the Ayatollah Khomeini is bringing about a fundamental change in Iran by driving out the Shah, the closest US ally in the Islamic World, gave a tremendous impetus to many religious radicals to choose the path of violent revolution to drive out the infidels and the apostates. Second, a millenarian vision of the arrival of redeemer coincided with the Iranian Revolution, giving the fundamentalists one more sign of a propitious time to rise up in the name of Allah. Finally, the Afghan War saw a victory for the Mujahideen against the mighty Soviet military. In their victory the religiously inspired totally disregarded the role that the covert US and Pakistani operation played. They simply took it as yet another sign of their inevitable victory.

In contrast to Rapoport's emphasis on historical and cultural factors, social science analyses of social movements in general, and terrorism, in particular, concentrate on the macro level social, economic, and political variables (Keefer and Loayza, 2008). The presence of a large number of factors of structural imbalances, such as poverty, unemployment, income inequality, and lack of opportunities for political expression provided the youth in the Islamic world and those living in the Western nations the context within which the messages of bin Laden could be retained.

Finally, terrorism does not happen in a vacuum. The evolution of a violent movement is the outcome of a dynamic interaction between the target government and the dissident group. Being guided by the same process of over emphasizing the actual threat (Mueller, 2006) time and again governments fall into the trap of overreaction, which only reinforces the movement.

4. Inspiration and Opportunity

In my explanation of waves I have included the charismatic connectors, the knowledgeable mavens, and the energetic salesmen. Although they explain the spread of ideas, fashions, or ideologies, there is one significant gap in the puzzle with regard to the spread of radicalism. While ideas spread and many get inspired only a few actually join radical groups. Literature (Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2008b) shows that regardless how inspired they are few people join violent dissident groups as a result of epiphany; most join slowly over time through friendship and kinship. When people get deeply affected by the sights of suffering of their own people and/or listening to inspiring speeches etc., they seek common friends or relatives through whom they get involved in political activism. O'Duffy (2008), for instance narrates the process of radicalization of Muslim youths in the UK. Yet, one curious phenomenon has generally escaped notice of most researchers: there is a significant difference in the rates of actual activism among the various national groups. Thus, while many young men and women from Pakistani background join these movements, few from Bangladeshi or Indian community do so. On the other hand, young men and women from the Magreb community, similar to the Pakistanis find ways to become active in the movement. This differential rate may be the outcome of opportunity. Let me explain.

Pakistan was created with a deep scar in its collective mind. Apart from the trauma of horrific mass killings that preceded the partition, it also inherited the persistent problem of Kashmir. Since the inherent logic of the partition based on religion might have dictated that the former Princely state would join Pakistan, history did not go that way. As a result, the Pakistani leaders from the beginning framed the Kashmir issue as an integral part of its national identity. Facing a much stronger enemy, Pakistan turned to the jihadis and, in effect, out source its war of attrition (Swami, 2007). Since these terrorist training camps were established and administered with full support of the Pakistani government and its intelligence service, the ISA (Stern 2003) they operated in the open; those who wanted to join them had full knowledge of their location. Similar training camps, built around extreme interpretation of Islam further flourished in the North West Frontier provinces, with blessings and resources from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States during the Afghan War against the Soviet military became the ready destination of all the "wannabe" jihadis. These camps provided unprecedented opportunity to the inspired all over the world. Apart from the jihadi training camps, radicalism blossomed in the Islamic schools, the madrassahs, which were financially supported by Saudi Arabia as a part of their war of religious hegemony (Fair, 2008). By providing opportunity to the inspired Pakistan quickly became known as the "most dangerous place on earth".

Sageman (2008b: 85) finds from his dataset of terrorist profiles that most of the violent activists not only are of Pakistani background, a disproportionate percentage comes from Mirpur district, a small area in the Pakistani controlled Kashmir. These findings attest to his earlier (2004) "bunch of guys" hypothesis, where a group of (mostly) men join to create a cell and they stick to their own group norms. These men may come together at a mosque, initially for no reason other than finding halal food or looking for people of their own language and culture. As they get to know one another many of them find a strong bond in a common enemy. Slowly they may form an informal group of like-minded individuals. Soon, in their vociferous vilification of the enemy they would establish a bond among themselves. In their grouping they, in effect, create their own "echo chamber", where only acceptable voices are heard and opinions reinforced. Those who disagree or have contrary opinion, quickly peel off leaving behind a hard core group, which increasingly gets more and more radicalized. They read, listen, or view materials that only buttress their own worldview.

These sorts of groupings are common in all social settings. However, if these radicalized members find a way to act upon their conviction, a terror cell is born. As groups are formed, leaders emerge. In the network process, they act as the nodes by making contact with other groups or the central core of a movement. As ideas spread, inspiration meets opportunity to produce terrorist attacks. This is why the establishment of a strong Taliban dominated region in Pakistan poses a great security threat to the rest of the world (Hoffman, 2008; McConnel, 2008).

The conclusion that we can draw from this discussion is that the intelligence community needs to pay particular attention where groups can form, such as mosques, discus-

sion groups, student unions, etc. Unfortunately, in a rapidly changing world, this task is likely to get harder, which will make the future waves far quicker to develop and spread, and more difficult to manage. This is because of the pervasive nature of electronic communication. Today ideas can spread instantly and networks are rapidly developed around the world with like-minded people. As Robb (2007) points out, the nodes of the communications network not only become sources of information exchange, they, in effect, become "small worlds" of virtual communities on the web. Through their interactions, they develop social capital, provide ideological and emotional support to their members, raise money, disseminate dangerous information regarding explosives, and keep the fire of hatred burning. Nearly three decades ago, when bin Laden began his jihad, his power to connect was limited by his physical ability to meet with influential people in the disaffected parts of the Arab/Muslim world. The next generation of connectors will increase this capacity infinitely through the rapidly advancing communications technology. More importantly, these new connectors may not even need the large sums of money and family connections that helped bin Laden to establish al-Qaeda. Currently, there is a debate among terrorism experts on how significant is al-Qaeda as an organization (Sageman, 2008; McConnel, 2008; Hoffman, 2008). However, regardless where the truth lies, experts of all stripes clearly warn us that when the next wave comes or this wave continues, the "jihadis" or not, completely leaderless or part of a hierarchical organization, will continue to pose an unprecedented threat to the global security.

5. Looking at the Future Waves

The problem of violent political dissent is as old as the organized society. Yet, the identification of a distinct pattern in the midst of a seemingly chaotic order provides an important step toward understanding and eventual management of the risks of terrorism.

The discussion of the waves inevitably raises two related questions. If we are in the middle of the fourth wave of religious extremism, when will it come to an end and, when it does what will be the nature of the fifth wave? When we examine the evidence, it appears that the past three waves have lasted approximately 40 years each. Almost the lifetime of a generation. However, that by itself should be no guide as to how long the present one, or for that matter, any single wave may last. The wave theory is only a tool of deeper understanding of the global spread of terrorism but is largely devoid of predictive capability. Societal events do not behave with the regular oscillation of a trigonometric function. There is nothing in Rapoport's definition of waves that precludes other ideas to percolate simultaneously. Thus, within the first wave, the seeds of the second were germane. In fact, if one looks at history of each group carefully, it is often difficult to separate the nationalists from the anarchists. Similarly, much of the anti-colonial movements were inspired by the Marxist/Leninist ideas. Even more surprising, that many atheist ideas of communism comfortably coexist with national and religious identities of the current religious radicalism. Thus, Juergensmeyer (2003: 141) points out:

In looking at the variety of cases, from the Palestinian Hamas movement to al-Qaeda and the Christian militia, it is clear to me that in most cases there were real grievances: economic and social tensions experienced by large number of people. These grievances were not religious. These were not aimed at religious differences or issues of doctrine and belief. They were issues of social identity and meaningful participation in public life that in other context were expressed through Marxist and nationalistic identities.

Thus, the three main vehicles of collective identity, nationalism, religious, and economic class are but jumbled up constructs of what Benedict Anderson (2003) may call "imagined communities", merely the building block of our intense desire to form groups and identify their shared enemies. Therefore, the fifth wave, if it comes as a distinct spread of common ideas, it should follow the three broad areas of collective consciousness based on ethno-nationalism, religious identity, or economic class identity. In all probability, it would contain elements of all three.

While nobody can predict the timing or the nature of the future waves, one thing is absolutely certain. As Rapoport has clearly shown, terrorism and violent group uprisings have been part and parcel of human civilization from its recorded birth. However, with advent in technology, what has significantly changed is our ability to inflict pain and suffering on an ever-larger number of those we choose to hate. The essence of human nature will continue to cause us to form groups and fight against others. In the open savanna, humanity survived only by forming groups. Ironically, our future survival will depend on how well we can manage the destructive power of groups. As a result, group formation has been integral to human nature as is the pursuit of self-utility. We will never know what the next wave is going to be or what will be its exact nature, but in an increasingly interconnected world, we can be rest assured that apart from all other problems - from global warming to the spread of pandemics - waves of shared identity will periodically test our resolve.

6. Broad Policy Guidelines

Although we cannot forecast the end of the current wave of international terrorism or the nature of the future ones, by tracing the patterns of diffusion of ideas, we can develop the outlines of policies that can mitigate the ravages of radicalization.

6.1. Know the Motivations and Design Policies Accordingly

It is important to understand the motivations of those who take part in violent political actions. We need to realize that for many, it is their desire to do good for their community is the primary motivating force. If a society cannot convince its members that their sub-national identity cannot thrive within a nation state, then it will be impossible for the state to stamp out the forces of violent resistance.

6.2. Abandonment of State Support for Terrorism

Similar to all other new business organizations, over 90 percent of the terrorist groups die out within a few years of their birth. Those, which survive, are most often supported by some state as a part of their foreign policy. Thus, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and many Gulf countries supported Sunni extremist groups. Even the United States either directly helped or gave tacit approval for support of al-Qaeda during the Afghan war and the Taliban during the Afghan civil war. Iran supported Hizballah and many other Shi'a groups. They even supported the Sunni Hamas against their common enemy, Israel. India lent a helping hand to the Sri Lankan LTTE. Soviet Union sent military and other logistical help to the communist insurgents and the United States supported their protagonists during the Cold War. Libya helped the IRA after the bombing of Tripoli by the NATO forces. In most cases, similar to Mary Shelly's monster, which turned against its own creator, Dr. Frankenstein, terrorist groups have targeted the government that helped create it. Organized governments, therefore, must resist the temptation of outsourcing their violent conflict with other states by supporting terrorist organizations.

6.3. Emphasis on International Cooperation

The biggest breakthrough in combating terrorism after the 9/11 attacks came in the shape of increased international cooperation in many areas of counter terrorism activities. In the past eight years, the governments have not only cooperated, they have often aggressively pursued suspected terrorists. The case of David Coleman Headley, the American man who worked with the Pakistani group Laskar-i-Taiba in planning and coordinating the Mumbai attacks is a case in point of this increased level of international cooperation. In recent years, nations have not only shared intelligence among their traditional allies, but also among those who are their political adversaries. Many nations are even going beyond this and are developing long-term strategies for combating radicalism (Schmid and Hindle, 2009).

6.4. Stopping the Money Spigot

Money is the lifeblood of any organization. Terrorist groups are no exception to the rule. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks international banking laws have been tightened to trace money transfers to the terrorist groups. Although many of them are using the informal hawala system and there are many loopholes (Napoleoni, 2008), the effects of these restrictive practices have had a chilling effect on the spread radicalism.

6.5. A Greater Police and Intelligence Coordination and Disruption of Terror Network

Terrorism is a social problem. Fight against terrorism cannot be won with military firepower alone. Since the heady days of Bush-Cheney administration, when unilateral military action was the accepted policy, the US and other western policymakers have learned the basic reality of counter-terrorism strategies. The establishment of the Homeland Security department

saw an increased cooperation between the intelligence agencies and police departments. Their efforts have tracked down the nodal points of terrorist network to identify not only the connectors but also the mavens (in this case, often the mullahs inciting violent actions), which have often disabled the terrorist organizations.

6.6. Close down the Narrow Portals for Joining Organized Groups

As we have seen, the portals for joining the established terrorist groups are often narrow. This is because the groups themselves are concerned about being infiltrated and hence, often refuse to deal with volunteers unless they approach them with impeccable credentials of family or strong ties of long-standing friendship. Such restrictions obviously reduce the spread of terror networks.

6.7. A Greater Integration of Academic and Intelligence/Police Community

Another important development in the post 9/11 era has been a closer working relationship between the academic and the intelligence/police communities. In the past, the two used to eye each other with suspicion. The necessity of the day has brought two closer together. The academics are learning to understand the needs of the practitioners and the intelligence and police communities are learning to ask questions that the academics can answer (Gupta, 2010).

6.8. Involvement of the Community and the Battle of Ideas

In the final analysis, the battle against violent radicalism is for the hearts and minds of the people. In combating the spread of destructive ideologies, we must be able to use the community as the bulwark against those who would want to kill for a higher cause.

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