

## The EU-NATO Relations in the Post-Cold War Security Context\*

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### Abstract

This article aims to analyze the EU-NATO relations in the post-Cold War security context in order to find out whether the two interlocking organizations cohabit or separate. The first part of the article discusses the evolution of EU-NATO relations in the post-Cold War era. The second part analyzes the resolution of the main obstacle for the finalization of the security arrangement between EU and NATO, which would enable the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities through Berlin Plus arrangement. The third part examines the first EU-led military operation with recourse to NATO assets, Operation Concordia (2003). This article concludes that evolving and dynamic nature of the EU and NATO relations do not allow us to give a clear answer to whether the EU and NATO cohabit or separate. The answer to this question is closely dependent on the political will of major powers to overcome obstacles for effective EU-NATO relationship. However, given the insecure environment of the post-Cold War era and new security challenges like global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it can be argued that EU and NATO should strive for cohabiting and working together in a complementary and harmonious way to tackle with these challenges.

**Keywords:** European Union, NATO, Berlin Plus, Operation Concordia, Post-Cold War Era

## Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Güvenlik Ortamında AB-NATO İlişkileri

### Öz

Bu makale, Soğuk Savaş sonrası güvenlik ortamında aralarında sıkı bir bağ bulunan AB ile NATO arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede makale iki örgütün gelecekte bir arada varılmaya devam mı edeceği yoksa ayrı yollara mı gideceği sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Makalenin ilk bölümü Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde AB-NATO ilişkilerinin gelişimini incelenmektedir. İkinci bölümde AB'nin kendi yürüttüğü operasyonlarda NATO imkan ve kabiliyetlerini kullanmasına olanak sağlayacak olan AB-NATO arasındaki düzenlemenin Berlin Artı güvenlik düzenlemesi ile nasıl çözüldüğü incelenmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde ise Berlin Artı düzenlemesinin ilk uygulaması olan AB'nin Makedonya'da yürüttüğü Concordia Operasyonu (2003) incelenmektedir. Sonuç olarak, AB ile NATO arasındaki ilişkinin sürekli gelişen dinamik doğası, AB ile NATO'nun gelecekte bir arada varılmaya devam mı edeceği yoksa ayrı yollara mı gideceği sorusuna net bir cevap vermemizi zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu, daha çok etkin bir AB-NATO ilişkisi kurulmasının önündeki engellerin ortadan kaldırılmasına yönelik başat güçlerin siyasi iradesine bağlı görünmektedir. Ancak, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin güvensiz ve belirsiz ortamı ve küresel terörizm ve kitle imha silahlarının yayılması gibi yeni tehditler gözönüne alındığında iki örgütün bu tehditlerle başa çıkmak için birbirlerini tamamlayan şekilde ve uyum içinde çalışarak bir arada var olmaya devam etme mecburiyetinde olduklarını iddia edebiliriz.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliği, NATO, Berlin Artı, Concordia Operasyonu, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem

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## INTRODUCTION

The development of a European security arrangement has been on the agenda of both Europeans and Americans since the beginning of the Cold War. Although the Western European Union (WEU) was formed as the only European security and defence institution with the Brussels Treaty in 1954, it transferred most of its functions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the Cold War years, NATO was at the centre of European security and protected Western Europe from immediate Soviet military domination. Furthermore, it represented an alliance of collective self defence and security regime that reflected shared norms, values and the convergence of interests. On the other hand, although Western European states attempted to add a defence dimension to an ongoing European integration process through European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s and the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, these attempts failed. As a result, the primacy of NATO in European Security could not be challenged. Moreover, the bipolar international system of the Cold War affected the European Community's (EC) pursuit of defence ambitions. As a result, the EC had excluded security and defence issues from the European integration process and employed mainly economic means for the pursuit of its goals and constrained its development to economic and trade areas. In this respect, the EC was regarded as a civilian power for a long time.

The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and following dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of Cold War and heralded a new security environment where threats and principles of the previous era became irrelevant. Moreover, the perceptions about the nature of threat and risks altered dramatically. The meaning of security widened and went beyond violence and military instruments. Security began to cover social, economic and environmental issues and thus became a multidimensional concept. The East –West conflict and the Soviet military threat were replaced by multifaceted security challenges such as political and economic instability in Southern Europe, ethnic and nationalistic conflicts, refugee movements and illegal immigration, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. These new challenges necessitated restructuring of NATO and the EU. They introduced new instruments and policies in order to adjust themselves to the post-Cold War context. In this respect, NATO assumed new missions like crisis management, peacemaking and peacekeeping in addition to its collective defence mission. Parallel to this process, the EU transformed itself and decided to take over greater responsibility for its security and defence. The Gulf War and the Yugoslavian Crisis became influential on the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) beginning from the Maastricht Treaty. Afterwards, ethnic and nationalist conflict in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia revealed the fact that the EU was incapable of acting decisively in international crisis without having an effective and credible military capability. Besides, it became apparent that the EU could not use its economic leverage for political purposes. The EU relied on NATO, therefore the United States (US), in terms of providing security and stability to Europe. Nevertheless, this gave rise to problems when the American and European interests did not coincide in the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era. Since EU member states were not able to assert their preferences against the US dominance, they embarked a new and ambitious course towards developing an autonomous European defence capability.

NATO welcomed the above mentioned attempts of the EU member states and advocat-

ed the development of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) for strengthening the European defence pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. However, the EU member states wanted to design a new institutional set up and capabilities that do not necessarily depend upon NATO assets. Kosovo crisis became main driving force for propelling the EU into launching European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU Member States agreed to launch ESDP at Cologne European Council in June 1999 and gave substance to it through European Rapid Reaction Force at Helsinki European Council in December 1999. Consequently, the EU searched for a greater autonomy in its security and defence through ESDP. This gave rise to overlapping of the defence and security dimension of the EU with certain roles and functions of the NATO. Against this background, this article aims to investigate the EU-NATO Relations in the post-Cold War security context on the basis of these questions: do NATO and the EU cohabitate or separate from each other in the new European security environment?; what will be the implications of ESDP for the future of NATO?; and to what extent does the EU's quest for an autonomous defence through ESDP pose a serious challenge to NATO's predominant position in European security?

## **1. THE EU AND NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

The Cold War ended with the collapse of Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991. The end of Cold War gave way to the birth of a new European order marked by the unification of Germany and emergence of the new pluralistic democracies in Eastern Europe (Carr and Ifantis, 1996: 15). On the other side, the accommodation of reunified Germany became another issue in immediate post-Cold War context. Throughout the Cold War, Germany's linkage to West on security matters was provided by the US leadership within NATO, while that linkage on political issues was ensured through French leadership in the EU. However, after reunification, Germany shifted from middle power having a number of constraining structures and institution to a major player with its new size, economy and geostrategic location in new Europe. In the words of Hoffman, the relative equilibrium among the big three, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the UK within the EC broke in Germany's favour (Carr and Ifantis, 1996: 38). The impact of the end of the Cold War on European integration process took place with the processes of deepening and widening. The former paved the way to development of an effective CFSP and European Monetary Union (EMU), the latter brought about the enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (Bluth, 2000: 131).

On the side of NATO, the end of the Cold War posed a serious challenge to *raison d'être* of NATO. The sequence of events that marked the end of Cold War such as the collapse of Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989; reunification of Germany in 1991, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union caused both relief and confusion for NATO (McCalla, 1996: 448). Hence, the reunification of Germany and the demise of NATO's main threat, the Soviet Union removed NATO's existence ground and led to discussions about necessity or validity of NATO in the changing strategic circumstances.

In the post-Cold War era, NATO not only survived but also took new roles and functions. Namely, NATO updated its strategic concept, preserved its integrated military structure, involved in joint military planning, training and exercises. Moreover, NATO developed

policies for fostering dialogue and security cooperation with CEECs. Most strikingly, it played a crucial role in enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions in ex-Yugoslavia. Besides, NATO continued to gain support from its members, to illustrate, German political leaders were willing to maintain and strengthen NATO after reunification of Germany. Correspondingly, French officers often appreciated enduring value of NATO. Among the western security institutions, NATO was the first institution to transform itself. This affected the reconstruction process of other institutions. In this sense, NATO tried to reconstruct itself and influenced the reconstruction of other institutions. In this connection, the London Summit of NATO in 1990, which was held just eight months after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, indicated the first stage of NATO adjustment to the new world order (Aybet, 2000: 50).

At the NATO's Rome Summit, two important documents were presented: the "new Alliance Strategic Concept" on 7 November 1991 and the Declaration of Rome on Peace and Cooperation" on 8 November 1991. The new strategic concept meant a response of NATO to the new security environment and the prospect of a decline in NATO forces. It mainly involved two significant changes: shift from 'forward defence' to a 'reduced forward presence' and the modification of the "flexible response principle" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Forward defence was made up of army corps consisting of troops of one nation aiming at defending the territorial integrity of NATO at the point of penetration, which precluded other defensive notions, such as defence-in-depth. As a result of the shift from forward defence, NATO's forces arranged into six multinational corps, which would pursue the same operational doctrines, command procedures, logistical coordination etc (Duke, 1994: 289-290). Moreover, the new strategic concept asserted that the notion of a "predominant threat" had lost its validity with the end of the East-West confrontation and gave way to the risks. The Rome Summit moved NATO from a military alliance to a means of wide range of political cooperation. Besides, Michael Brenner regarded the Rome Summit 'a triumph for the US diplomacy' (Brenner, 1998: 28-29). The NATO's new strategic concept involved everything within the 'wishlist' of the Bush Administration. According to Brenner, from the US perspective, the Rome Summit marked the rebirth of NATO and 'US leadership in Europe has given an expanded lease' (Brenner, 1998: 29). Another point to mention is that the Rome Summit Declaration on Peace and Cooperation identified NATO as 'the essential forum for consultations of the Allies on defence matters under the Washington Treaty' (Cogan, 2001: 51). Therefore, the primacy of NATO in the immediate post-Cold War security environment was highlighted. Moreover, the role of WEU was identified as a bridge between NATO-EU relations (Carr and Ifantis, 1996: 77).

While NATO was assuming a new function, the EC was adopting itself to new world order. The security and defence dimension of the EC, which had been a taboo throughout the Cold War, came into the EC's agenda. Following the Gulf War, the Europeans concluded that a recognized the necessity of an international role closely linked with the ability of power projection, yet the Europeans were not capable of projecting power (Nuttall, 2000: 147). With the Maastricht Treaty the member states agreed on the establishment of the CFSP which "shall include all question related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time, lead to a common defence."

Although the Maastricht Treaty defined the objectives of the CFSP as “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union” and “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”, it failed mention about the ways for the achievement of these objectives except for the establishment of cooperation and joint action among the Union Members (Taylor, 1994: 8). Nevertheless, the CFSP is not a common policy like the Common Agricultural Policy or Common Commercial Policy. It has an intergovernmental character rather than a supranational one, in which the member States have not delegated their sovereignty on foreign and security policy matters to the Union. It remains within the responsibility of the member states (Dinan, 1999: 508).

In conjunction with the defence matters, the WEU was accepted as integral part of the development of the Union or as the defence arm of the Union and tasked to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. According to the Declaration concerned with the role of the WEU attached to the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU was tasked to be the integral part of the process of the development of the Union and in order to enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of the WEU in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy, compatible with that of Atlantic Alliance (Nuttall, 2000: 179). Even though, the WEU was given the responsibility to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, the wording of the article left ambiguous concerned to who exactly made decisions (Duke, 1994: 234). Despite this provision, in practice WEU didn't implement any decision of the EU with defence implication (Andréani et.al., 2001: 8). As an outcome of the Maastricht, the WEU granted a pivotal role in the new European Security architecture. Although the CFSP envisaged the development of a defence policy, the wording of the Treaty remained unclear as “might in time lead to a common defence”. Thus, the contending visions of the major European powers were reconciled. The WEU was arranged as both the defence component and the European pillar of NATO and thus it was placed equidistant between the two organizations (Carr and Ifantis, 1996: 49).

Concerning the activities of the WEU, the member states of the WEU agreed on the Petersberg Tasks. In addition to the fulfilment of defence obligation in compliance with Article 5, the military units of WEU member states could be engaged with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (Nuttall, 2000: 243). In contrast to desires of France and Germany, the WEU was determined as an organisation that could be called upon by the EU Member States to act on their behalf. In line with the inclusive membership of the WEU, Spain and Portugal joined the WEU in 1990 and subsequently Greece joined the WEU in 1995. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden became observers in 1992 and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway and Turkey became associate members.

The WEU was responsible for strengthening links and the roles of its member states in NATO. The WEU pledged to act in line with the Atlantic Alliance's stances and accepted a number of commitments to increase its operational identity. The NATO Brussels Summit in January 1994 endorsed the Maastricht Treaty and the commencement of the European Union. In line with the wording of the WEU Declaration, the NATO declaration pointed out the emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity for strengthen-

ing the European pillar of the Alliance, reinforcing the transatlantic link and enabling European allies to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defence. Furthermore, the NATO Declaration expressed the common strategic interests between NATO and the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty made reference to making closer relations between the WEU and the EU and integrated WEU's Petersberg tasks to the EU's second pillar. Besides, the WEU was involved in the stepping up of an EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Rees, 2001: 99).

On 3-4 December 1998, at Saint Malo Summit, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met. The two leaders issued a Joint Declaration on European Defence at Franco-British Saint Malo Summit which was accepted as the starting point for the defence dimension of the CFSP, which was named as ESDP. With this declaration the two leaders agreed that in order to respond to international crises, the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so. St. Malo Declaration was a watershed in the European defence in various respects. First of all, it symbolized a major shift in British security policy. With this shift, Britain convicted that the US would not automatically engaged with European security like in the Cold War. Britain began to see the ESDP as a means of strengthening Atlantic Alliance, rather than a threat (Howorth, 2000: 43). Secondly, it paved the way for the EU's emergence as a security actor in its own right (Howorth, 2001: 769). St. Malo Declaration argued for providing the EU with appropriate structures and capacity for the achievement of making decisions and approving military action where the Alliance was not engaged. St. Malo declaration marked the initial tangible steps toward the abandonment of the WEU and its absorption into the EU. Moreover, St. Malo Declaration stated that "the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means. "Therefore, the emphasis was shifted from ESDI to autonomy and 'bicephalic role' of European defence capability which could be inside or outside NATO was heralded (Cogan, 2001: 99-100).

After Franco-British Joint Declaration on Defence at Saint Malo, in Cologne European Council in June 1999, Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States welcomed Saint Malo Declaration and decided to launch the ESDP. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, EU Member States made important progress in order to boost EU's military capabilities. The EU member states agreed on headline goals for the achievement of Petersberg tasks set out in the Amsterdam Treaty.

With respect to the EU-NATO relations, the Helsinki Summit Declaration acknowledged the centrality of NATO. By referring to NATO's important role in crisis management, crisis response was not excluded from NATO preview. More important than these, the EU's action role was constrained circumstances where NATO would not be involved (Cogan, 2001: 117). After the establishment of Headline Goal, a number of political institutions which had been the part of the WEU have been transferred to the EU to implement Headline Goals. The WEU was charged with the implementation of defence aspect of EU's CFSP in cooperation with NATO.

Shortly after the EU's Summit at Santo Maria de Feira in Portugal in June 2000, the institutionalization of the EU-NATO relationship commenced despite French reluctance. In July 2000, four joint committees began to work on four main issues (Cogan, 2001: 112). The first group on security has prepared draft of an EU-NATO security agreement.

It dealt with exchanges of information, both EU's and member states' personnel access to NATO planning bodies. The second group studies on capability goals and ensure complementarity of both EU's headline capability goals and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative. The third group was on the issue of EU's access to NATO assets and capabilities. The final group is about defining the permanent arrangements to link the EU and NATO and examines the structures and consultation procedures that should connect the EU and NATO in times of crisis and non-crisis. The ambassadors of the EU and NATO member states met on 19 September 2000 for the first time. In the EU's Nice Summit, EU member states decided on the revision of EU treaties and approved 60 pages of documents on the implementation of the defence initiative. Among them, 'French Presidency report' and 'Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration' and 'Annexes on the Strengthening of EU Capabilities for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and Standing Arrangements for Consultation Between the EU and NATO' were approved. The annex On Standing Arrangements for Consultation between the EU and NATO elaborated the need for the attendance of NATO secretary-general to EU General Affairs Council, and outlined procedures for regular contacts between both NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative for the CFSP. The annex had also an appendix on issues concerned to terms of EU's use of NATO's assets, command structures and planning capabilities. Despite EU's approval, NATO as a whole were not able to approve this document due to Turkey's veto on EU's assured access to NATO planning in normal circumstances (Andréani et.al., 2001: 28-29).

## **2. THE RESOLUTION OF BERLIN PLUS DISPUTE AND THE EU-NATO DECLARATION ON THE ESDP**

EU-NATO relations were characterised as informal and lacking much substance until the end of 1999. Although these two organizations formed the basis of intra-European and Euro-Atlantic relations, they were separate and disconnected from each other. Owing to the dominance of the US in NATO, the EU tried to keep a distance to NATO. Thus, EU officials wanted to prevent too much US influence into the European Councils (Sloan, 2003: 179).

In the NATO's Washington Summit of 1999, the NATO allies put forward on the 'Berlin-Plus' compromise and pointed out the importance of stronger Europe for the vitality of NATO. In this regard, in the Washington Summit Communiqué NATO leaders emphasized their readiness to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged military as an Alliance. It was also stated that the Council in Permanent Session would approve these arrangements, which would respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

- Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, fur-

ther developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;

- The further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

Berlin Plus consolidated the primacy of NATO concerned to military action and restated that the EU would operate only where NATO forces were not involved militarily. Despite the fact that NATO endorsed the EU's autonomous action, the meaning of this autonomous action was not clear (Hunter, 2002: 54-55).

After NATO's Washington Summit, the evolution of a more formal EU-NATO relationship was slow, partly due to the concerns of certain EU member states, especially France. Having concerned about the prospect of excessive influence of the US on the construction of the ESDP institutions, France articulated the development of the ESDP institutions prior to discussion of the linkage of the EU-NATO decision-making process for the first half of 2000. However, the concerns of France were not shared by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. He pointed out that NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU's Interim Political and Security Committee (COPSI) started to work together to determine the details of EU-NATO Relations in September 2000. Additionally, four EU-NATO working groups were established to work on the issues such as security sensitive information, Berlin Plus, military capabilities and permanent EU-NATO institutional arrangements (Sloan, 2003: 177).

With the arrangements of NATO's Brussels Summit of 1994 and Berlin Summit in 1996, the foundation of WEU-NATO cooperation was formed and the development of ESDP beginning from St. Malo brought a new dimension to this arrangement. Having observed these European attempts, in order to guarantee the primacy of NATO, the US put forward three conditions, which was known as three D's: not to "Duplicate" NATO assets, not to "Discriminate" against non-EU NATO members, and not to "Decouple" the EU from the transatlantic security architecture. Among them, the second condition implies no discrimination against non-EU NATO members. Except for Turkey, other non-EU NATO members did not have much concern about the discrimination issue (Haine, 2004).

Turkey's concerns were resulted from its unique position in terms of the ESDP since Turkey has been both EU candidate and Non-EU European Ally of Atlantic Alliance. The other countries, which had similar status, like the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary relieved their worries owing to the immediate prospect of EU membership. On the other side other non-EU NATO members namely Norway and Iceland were interested in neither EU membership nor the development of ESDP (Cebeci, 2002: 144).

At the NATO's Washington Summit, NATO allies emphasized the development of 'effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency' based on the existing mechanisms between NATO and the WEU. Moreover, it involved promising statements participation of non-EU NATO members. At the EU's Cologne Summit, the demise of the WEU was declared and afterwards, the Helsinki European Council envisaged the participation of non-EU members in an operation with recourse to NATO assets on the condition of EU Council's invitation to participate in EU-led operations. In the Feira European Council, the EU made a distinction between accession candidates and non-EU NATO European Allies. The Nice European Council of December 2000 made a specific arrangement for the participation of non-EU European Allies (Cebeci, 2002: 155-156).

In the operational phase of a crisis, non-EU European NATO members can take part in case of an operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. If the EU prefers not to employ NATO assets, they can be invited to participate in the operation on the condition of decision by the EU Council. This means, non-EU European allies cannot participate in operations which EU does not use NATO assets and without invitation by the EU Council. Consequently, non-EU European NATO members have been placed at the “margin where they are entitled only to become involved as consultant” (Gözen, 2003: 60-62). Furthermore, at the Nice Summit, the EU council wanted the formation of “permanent arrangements” from NATO in line with Berlin Plus agreement in Washington Summit communiqué. However, in its essence, the Achilles heel of the non-EU NATO members’ participation was that their military participation in an EU-led operation was not backed by a political participation (Gözen, 2003: 66-68).

Having been the most affected country among the six non-EU NATO members, Turkey blocked the Berlin Plus agreement although it endorsed NATO-oriented attempts in European Security and wanted to improve participation level of associate members and thus have an opportunity to full participation (Bağcı, 2003: 62-63). According to Onur Öymen (2001: 404), the main expectation of Turkey from the EU was the adoption of any necessary provisions that would enable the participation of non-EU European allies in EU operations (including preparation and planning, political control and strategic direction) if that operation makes the use of NATO assets.

As a response to Turkish demands, the EU argued that since ESDP has been a part of European Integration process, only EU member states would be eligible for the full participation in ESDP’s decision making process. Secondly, ESDP did not have only security and defence aspects; much more than this, it has a “European identity” dimension. Due to problems in fulfilling Copenhagen criteria, Turkey was not ready for being a member of EU-led security community, and thus becoming a part of EU’s security identity. Thirdly, Turkey was regarded as a “security consumer” country causing problems rather than solutions for EU’s security community (Gözen, 2003: 95-97).

In order to solve this deadlock, a deal the so-called ‘Ankara Document’ took place between the US, Britain and Turkey. Being as a British-US joint proposal, Ankara Document led to the removal of Turkish veto on the EU’s access to NATO assets and capabilities. It provided guarantees to Turkey that the European crisis management capabilities would not be used in the Aegean Sea or Eastern Mediterranean. Besides, the EU committed not to intervene in the problems between Turkey and Greece. With the Ankara Document, Turkey accepted EU’s assured access to ‘some pre-determined’ NATO assets. The word ‘some pre-determined’ must be underlined because the EU has right to an automatic access to only non-strategic NATO assets and capabilities. The EU’s use of strategic ones will be determined by the NATO Council on a case by case basis (Bağcı and Yıldız, 2004: 94). Additionally, the Ankara document gave the right to “enhanced consultations” during peacetime and “active participation” in operations with recourse to NATO assets (Gözen, 2003: 21).

The Ankara Document was not materialized quickly due to Greek opposition. By emphasizing the autonomy of the EU with regard to its decision making process, Greece did not favour a discriminating attitude towards one of the non-EU ally of the NATO. Greece advocated reciprocal guarantees in the sense that Turkey must be given certain assur-

ances in return for EU's guarantees given Turkey. In line with this argument, Greece vetoed full operationalization of the ESDP at Laeken and Seville European Councils in 2001 and 2002 respectively (Bağcı and Yıldız, 2004: 94). The subsequent Turkey and Greek vetoes delayed the final security arrangement between NATO and the EU. In this regard, the end of 2002 passed away with intensive diplomatic bargaining to satisfy both Turkey and Greece on this issue (Çayhan, 2003: 47-48).

However, the adoption of the Ankara Document by the EU leaders at the Brussels European Council in October 2002 paved the way for easing the impasse. Therefore, the guidelines for the implementation of the Nice provisions regarding the involvement of non-EU NATO members to both operational and institutional dimensions of the ESDP in compliance with the Ankara Document were set out (Bağcı and Yıldız, 2004: 94-95). At the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions in December 2002, EU leaders agreed on that 'Berlin Plus' arrangements and the implementation of it would apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the 'partnership for peace' and which had consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO. It was also emphasized that Cyprus and Malta would not participate in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have been become members of the EU, would not, within the limits of the EU Security Regulations, affect the right of their representatives to participate and vote in EU institutions and bodies, including COPS, with regard to decisions which did not concern the implementation of such operations.

Shortly after the Copenhagen European Council, the EU and NATO agreed on the declaration on ESDP in December 2002. The EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP was accepted on 16 December 2002 and pointed out the strategic partnership between EU and NATO in crisis management. This declaration also added the main principles of this relationship, namely, partnership, which implies mutually reinforcing activities of NATO and EU on crisis management despite the different nature of them, effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency, equality and respect to decision making autonomy.

### **3. OPERATION CONCORDIA: THE FIRST TEST OF OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE EU-NATO RELATIONS**

In 2003, the EU began to conduct operations which have been the stepping stones for the development of full-fledged ESDP. Since January 2003, the EU involved in three missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). First of all, the European Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina marked the EU's first civilian crisis management operation within the framework of the ESDP. Secondly, The Operation Artemis, which was launched on 12 June 2003 in order to stabilize the situation in Bunia in the DRC, was the first peace-keeping mission conducted outside the geographical boundaries of Europe by a European institution and the first autonomous ESDP operation. Thirdly, Operation Concordia, which was launched on 31 March 2003, represented the first and the only EU-led military operation with recourse to the NATO assets (Missiroli, 2003). The main aim of the Operation was to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.

Unlike other former Yugoslav republics, FYROM gained its independence without a military conflict in 2001. However, in February 2001 members of Macedonian National Liberation Army (KLA) entered to the northern part of Macedonia from Kosovo, where the Albanians constituted the majority of population. The Macedonian KLA was mostly arranged by Albanian extremists and had the aim of halting the delicate political dialogue between ethnic groups in Macedonia to gain moderate Albanians' support for the 'liberation'. The armed conflict between Albanian guerrilla forces and Macedonian security forces which began in February 2001 had spilled into the north western part of Macedonia by the middle of March 2001. Afterwards, the parties agreed on peaceful settlement of conflict and Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed in Skopje, FYROM on 13 August 2001 under the auspices of the EU and the US. For securing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, NATO had carried out several operations. The first operation was the 'Operation Essential Harvest' (22 August - 23 September in 2001), which aimed to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. The second operation was the 'Operation Amber Fox' (23 December 2001 - 15 December 2002) which aimed to contribute to the protection of international monitors. The third one was the 'Operation Allied Harmony' (16 December 2002 - 31 Mart 2003), which aimed to provide support for the international monitors and help Macedonian government in taking ownership of security throughout the country. In this respect, NATO's operational elements gave support from the international monitors and its advisory elements helped government to take ownership of security in the country. While Allied Harmony had been approaching to its end, the EU leaders agreed to launch an operation in the FYROM, which would take over the mission from NATO and make use of NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin-plus arrangement. On 31 March 2003, when Operation Allied Harmony completed its mandate, Operation Concordia was launched in order to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. Admiral Rainer Feist from Germany was appointed as the operation commander and General Pierre Maral (France) has become the force commander. A total of 350 military personnel from 14 non-EU members and 13 EU members (all except Ireland and Denmark) participated in the operation (Abele, 2003).

On the launch of Concordia, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP stated that: "...Today's transfer of authority from NATO to the EU for the field operation is an important demonstration of our reinforced partnership. For our two organizations the key message today is not 'EU in and NATO out' - but that by working together, we are both stronger, here and wherever else such cooperation may be in demand" (Solana, 2003).

In this connection, being as the first EU-led military operation with the recourse to the NATO assets and capabilities, Operation Concordia was regarded as a model for procedural arrangements both with the EU and with respect to the EU-NATO strategic partnership. Furthermore, Operation Concordia was considered as a 'test-run' for the future EU operations. Concordia has put the ESDP procedures and mechanisms into practice, and thus provided a deep experience and a future point of reference. Moreover, it has made contribution to the improvement of ESDP's *modus operandi* (Vincze, 2003).

According to Giovanna Bono (n.d.), Concordia indicated the start of a new strategic partnership based on two assumptions. First, it would be stepping stones for the EU to

become an equal partner with the US in external security. In addition, it would make contribution to the strengthening of the ESDP and CFSP. Nevertheless, Bono (n.d.) stipulated that Operation Concordia is unlikely to be a model for the ESDP's future for the short-term. Even though, it showed how a strategic partnership might work, due to the maximum flexibility provided to both EU and NATO, the modalities of EU-NATO operation have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis (Bono, n.d.). Operation Concordia ended on the 15 December 2003 and was replaced by an EU police mission, EUPOL PROXIMA. The initial assessment of the operation expressed that Berlin Plus worked well and the operation was successful. Therefore, Berlin Plus was put into effect by Concordia operation.

## CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, no interaction took place between the EU and NATO due to the divergence of goals and missions of these organizations. They performed their functions and missions separately from each other. However, the EU and NATO were forced to re-think their functions and missions with the end of Cold War. Both institutions employed new mechanisms in order to adapt themselves to the post-Cold War context. While the EU started to involve in foreign and security matters to be an effective and credible international actor, NATO tried to go beyond the collective defence mission and took on new responsibilities such as crisis management and peacekeeping. The adaptation processes of the two organizations were in parallel with each other.

With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU considered foreign and security policy issues together and emphasized on the development of the CFSP within the EU. As NATO endorsed the establishment of the CFSP, it put forward the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO through the ESDI. Although the ESDI was envisaged as a project within the EU, it turned out to be the policy of the EU in the late 1990s. The impact of the Yugoslav crisis together with European military (in)capabilities and the US concerns about engaging with instabilities in European security played an important role in the emergence of ESDP as a political project of the EU.

Following the initial stage of the ESDP, the EU's efforts for the development of the ESDP gained pace with convergence of British and French interests, which was embedded in the St. Malo Declaration. By referring to the prospect for an autonomous action, it constituted significant building block on the way to security actorness of the EU. However, Kosovo war became the real driving force for the EU to take tangible steps for ESDP. The war revealed military deficiencies of the EU member states and indicated how they relied on the US for providing security in their neighbourhood. Subsequently, EU member states decided to give substance to the ESDP. Beginning from Helsinki EU Council, the EU made a gradual progress to develop its military capabilities and improve their decision-making structures on defence. Therefore, the ESDI that initially stated for strengthening the European pillar of Atlantic Alliance in the mid 1990s turned out to be the evolving policy of the EU in 2000s. In this way, the EU expanded its activities into security realm and transcended beyond its civilian power character. Consequently, the activities of the EU started to coincide with that of NATO.

Despite the coincidence of EU and NATO's security goals and tasks, the problematic areas of EU-NATO relations hindered the progress of the EU-NATO relations. Military ca-

pabilities gap between NATO and the EU has been one of the major problems that need to be solved. In comparison with the EU, NATO has an extensive military infrastructure of command, control, surveillance and communication and therefore significant advantages. Despite the EU's plans for the improvement of its military capabilities, the EU has not succeeded in increasing its military capabilities substantially. Thus, the superiority of NATO over the EU in terms of military capabilities compels the EU to rely on NATO's military strength and undermines the possibility of complementary relationship

Besides, the defence budget of EU member states is another problematic area. There are two contrasting views on this issue. While some observers pointed out that defence spending level of EU member states is not sufficient for the acquisition of enabling capabilities and the achievement of headline goals. On the other side, some underlines the importance of efficiency in defence spending. In this regard, rather than increasing money allocated to defence spending, the improvement of efficiency in defence spending is required to overcome financial constraints problem.

The September 11 Attacks on New York and Washington added new dimension to this relationship. The new challenges posed by September 11 Attacks led to the acceleration of the efforts for the improvement of the EU-NATO relations. Specifically, the Berlin Plus dispute concerning the EU's access to NATO assets was resolved in the post September 11 era. Therefore, the EU and NATO agreed on joint declaration arranging their strategic partnership in December 2002. Despite the promising statement of strategic partnership, the question of what kind of partnership does exist between the EU and NATO retains its importance. As these ambiguities persisted, the first EU-led military operation with recourse to NATO assets took place in FYROM in 2003. Operation Concordia, which was conducted in order to facilitate the achievement of a stable, secure environment for effective implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid framework, provided a perfect opportunity to test the EU-NATO Accord on Berlin Plus.

The future of EU and NATO relations is mainly related to political will major powers. Cooperation of both institutions is crucial for dealing with today's security challenges including challenges such threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal migration.

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