



**TURKEY, ASIA ANEW AND SOUTH ASIA: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT ON
BILATERAL RELATIONS and SOFT POWER POLICY WITH BANGLADESH, INDIA,
and PAKISTAN**

**TÜRKİYE, YENİDEN ASYA ve GÜNEY ASYA: BANGLADEŞ, HİNDİSTAN ve PAKİSTAN İLE
İKİLİ İLİŞKİLER ve YUMUŞAK GÜÇ POLİTİKASI ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR
DEĞERLENDİRME**

ABSTRACT

Historically, South Asian Muslims, such as Bangladeshi, Indian, and Pakistani Muslims, have relations with the Turkish ancient, as it can be traced back to the first century B.C. As it is well known that Turkish people from Central Asia and Altaic regions started migrating in phases from their original homelands towards western and southern directions and settled in various regions.

In the 16th century the Mughal Empire on Indian Sub-Continent ruled during the next few centuries. Extensive relations between the Anatolian region and the Indian Sub-Continent (Sultanate, Mughal, and British periods) have existed since the medieval period through modern times. The interactions and cultural exchanges throughout history, particularly between both people of Ottoman Empire and the South Asian nations, have resulted in substantial influence on different aspects of cooperation. The main objective of this paper is to clarify and to underline various facets of Turkey and the South Asia (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) relation since the Ottoman Empire to the Turkey's current Asia Anew (Yeniden Asya) initiative. In this case, this paper shows and identifies the comprehensive analysis of Turkish soft power policy and bilateral relations with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh from the perspectives of social, cultural, economic, trade, business, political, diplomatic, and commercial aspects.

Keywords: Turkey's Foreign Policy, Asia Anew, Bilateral Relations, Turkey's Soft Power Policy, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

ÖZ

Tarihsel olarak, Bangladeşli, Hintli ve Pakistanlı Müslümanlar olmak üzere Güney Asyalı Müslümanların, MÖ 1. yüzyıldan itibaren Türklerin ataları ile etkileşim halindedir. Bilindiği üzere Orta Asya ve Altay bölgelerinden gelen Türklerin, anavatanlarından batı ve güney yönlerine doğru aşamalar halinde göç etmeye başladıkları ve çeşitli bölgelere yerleştikleri bilinmektedir.

Tüm bu süreçten günümüze kadar Anadolu bölgesi ile Hint Alt Kıtası arasında kapsamlı ilişkiler sürmektedir. Özellikle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Güney Asya milletleri arasındaki etkileşimler ve kültürel alışverişler, önemli işbirlikleri doğurmuştur. Bu makalenin temel amacı, Türkiye'nin mevcut Yeniden Asya girişimiyle, Türkiye ve Güney Asya'nın (Hindistan, Pakistan ve Bangladeş) Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan bu yana olan ilişkilerinin çeşitli yönlerini açıklığa kavuşturmak ve altını çizmektir. Bu örnekte, bu makale Türk yumuşak güç politikasının ve Hindistan, Pakistan ve Bangladeş ile ikili ilişkilerinin sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik, siyasi, diplomatik ve ticari olarak kapsamlı bir analizini göstermekte ve tanımlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Yeniden Asya, İkili İlişkiler, Türkiye'nin Yumuşak Güç Politikası, Bangladeş, Hindistan ve Pakistan.

* The earlier version of this paper was presented and proceeded in the 3rd International Social Sciences Congress, 2-3 December 2017 at Istanbul Medeniyet University, In collaboration with the Science Studies Association (ILEM) and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB).

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TURAN-SAM Uluslararası Bilimsel Hakemli Dergisi; p-ISSN: 1308-8041, e-ISSN: 1309-4033; Yıl: 2020; Ay: Eylül; Cilt: 12/NAZ, Sayı: 47

TURAN-CSR International Scientific, Peer-Reviewed & Refereed Journal; p-ISSN: 1308-8041, e-ISSN: 1309-4033; Year: 2020; Month: September; Volume: 12/SUMMER, Issue: 47

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15189/1308-8041>

INTRODUCTION

Turkish political and foreign policy “strategic importance” (Islam, 2019, Nyadera and Islam, 2020) seemed to be exposed to the world after the end of the Cold War, particularly the west understands the geostrategic importance of Turkey even Turkey’s policy towards the world has risen from grassroots to the upstairs level. Moreover, since the 2002 AK party period; Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy have enormous impacts on each and every corner of the world where especially in terms of the soft power policy, Turkey plays a significant contribution whatever it is from cultural impacts, economic participation, political values, humanitarian aid or historical ties and maintaining old allies (Islam, Bingöl and Nyadera, 2020; Bingöl and Islam, 2016).

In the world, while most of the states such as China, Germany, France, Russia, Brazil and India spend a lot of time and money to manufacture national narratives in a top-down manner, some others, such as the U.S., do it in a bottom-up manner through the agency of non-governmental organizations and civil society (Oguzlu, 2017). Nevertheless, Turkey is doing their soft power policies and practices both in top-down and bottom-up approaches such as Turkey’s government institutions working in a field-level as a tool of top-down approaches through their governmental institutions, for example, “TIKA, AFAD, Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), Diyanet Foundation, Presidency of Religious Affairs, State Hydraulic Works, State Airport Authority, Ministry of Health, The Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Anadolu Agency, TRT World and Turkish Red Crescent activities, policies, practices and strategies to the world as well Turkey’s non-governmental organizational roles through the bottom-up ways like IHH Turkey, Yardimeli, IGMG Hasana Association, Bashir Association, Cansuyu, The Deniz Feneri, and Arakan Platform working activities in different parts of the world” (Islam and Cansu, 2018). However, the political changes in the world since 1989 have also loosened the constraints within where Turkey’s foreign policy orientations to the countries of South Asia have become potentially more significant. The changing relationship between Turkey—uniquely positioned in both the West and the East—and its neighbors in the Middle East have great discussion from soft power policy impacts (Carley, 1994).

Turkey and South Asia, as they came to know each other since the middle of the 10th century. Turks came to the South Asian region for the cause of religious duty to spread Islam in the region. Later on, the continuous and increasing presence of religious preachers and teachers with the establishment of political authority made them influential personalities in society. Especially, since the Ottoman Empire was generally looked upon by the people of this area as the Khilafat of the Muslim Ummah, the importance of Ottomans in general and the Turks in particular enhanced considerably. Almost 700 years of historical relations between the two nations based on both material and spiritual values were interrupted by the advent of the British, which introduced a new form of socio-political dimension. But the two nations did not forget each other. The First World War and the Khilafat Movement in which a large number of Indian and Bengal Muslims took part on behalf of the Turks are the two glowing examples in this context. During these events, Bengal Muslims raised their voice against the British for the protection of Khilafat with various supports to meet the same goal. The smart power of Turkey in the South Asian region, particularly the role of Turkey to the issue of Kashmir to support Pakistan, Turkish’s position in United Nations Security Council, Turkey’s role in Afghanistan as a member of NATO, makes Turkey an important actor for ensuring their role in soft, smart and hard power relations with Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (Islam, 2017).

1. EXITING DEBATES AND THEORETICAL APPROACH OF TURKISH FOREIGN AND SOFT POWER POLICY

“Over the past 30 years, scholars, researchers, and practitioners of international relations have been indicating an excellent paradigm change in commercial activity” (Nyadera and Islam, 2020; Islam and Cansu, 2020). In order to understand the theoretical background of Turkey’s soft power policy and its impact on South Asia, especially on three specific countries like Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, some theoretical framework which evaluate the Turkey’s realpolitik, constructive soft power policy, practice and strategy such as “soft power policy” where the leading theorist of soft power policy, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. coined that “soft power” is



the ‘ability of states to get what they want through the power of attraction and persuasion, rather than the power of coercion or payment’ where he highly recommend that the attraction and persuasion can be cultural, economic, diplomatic, political values, foreign policies and personal relations (Nye, 2004: 1-4). In the description of Soft Power, Nye included that “the United States should focus on five critical areas: Alliances, partnerships, and institutions, Global development, Public diplomacy, Economic integration Technology and innovation” (Nye 2006). In an earlier article, Nye says that “the ability to affect what other countries want tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions” (Nye, 1990). He reasserts that “the Soft Power of a country has three primary sources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004). According to this theoretical understanding, it can be argued that Turkish soft power and public diplomacy institutions already get the trustable leadership position in all over the world especially by their enormous humanitarian activities, particularly Turkey’s assistance which increased Turkey’s soft and positive image to all over the world. Moreover, their political moves against India’s decision on the ‘Kashmir issue’ legitimate their moral authority to the world. Additionally, the Turkish drama series impact on the world mainly on South Asia which shows its credibility and cultural attractions to the other countries.

From the ‘constructive theoretical perspective,’ which can be employed in the process of identity construction to define the behavior of actors and their policies in the international arena. Their main focus on identity construction is shaped “to transcend what has traditionally been posited as a mutually exclusive dichotomy between ideational and instrumentalist dynamics: the aim is to understand how actor’s interest-based strategies are socially formed by longer-term values” (Dipama, Belder and Dal, 2014). Accordingly, Alexander Wendt (1994) argues that the international system is created and recreated in process of interaction, and therefore, it is this inter-subjective rather than material aspect of structures that influence behavior. Social-constructivist approaches assume that a country’s foreign policy agenda is not only shaped by material, but also essentially by an immaterial factor such as ideas, role identities, norms, and values. And indeed, the unprecedented Turkish engagement to Somalia could be a good example for this argument. The two countries share a deep historical connection, and historians agreed that South Asian countries were under Ottoman Empire administration. Perhaps that confirms the existence of cultural similarity besides the similarity of Muslim identity and value. Though, it seems the immaterial factors argument resembles much only when there is a different identity, so the actor would favor or would put all of its efforts into their identity friend. If the identities are similar, the material factors are stronger and important than the immaterial factors. Again, it could take an example of the case of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, where many Muslim countries need help, and definitely, Turkey is not devoted as it has been to these countries. Wendt states, “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is” (Wendt 1999: 231), which in turn depends on their social relationships (Jepperson et al. 1996: 59). However, constructivist analyses consider identities a crucial matter because it provides the basis for interests. “Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations” (Wendt 1999: 398). But, if the identities of actors are the basis of their interests, then how do they acquire those identities? And the most important, how would they define ‘self’ and ‘other’? In order to explain identity construction, Wendt makes a distinction between the corporate and social identities of states. In this case, “Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality” (Wendt 1994: 385). This sort of identity is produced from four primary interests: (1) physical security, (2) predictability in relationships to the world, (3) recognition as an actor by others, and (4) economic development (Wendt 1994: 385). How each state satisfies these corporate interests “depends on how it defines the self in relation to the other, which is a function of social identities at both domestic and systemic levels of analysis” (Wendt 1994: 385). A social identity or (role identity), on the other hand, is defined as “a set of meanings that an actor attributes itself while taking perception of others, that is, a social object” (Wendt 1994: 385). While actors have one corporate identity, they usually have several social identities. Social identities enable actors to determine who they are in a situation and exist only in relation to others. According to Wendt,



interests, and identities of actors emerge only in an interactive process. In short, constructivism regards international relations as norm-governed and state interests as constructed through a fluid and interactive process of identity formation” which leads to “particular norms coming to be seen as appropriate, that is genuinely embedded in belief systems rather than adhered to for merely instrumental reasons.” (Youngs 2001: 6). And indeed, the Turkish Development Policy towards the South Asian region somehow resembles the constructive perspective, which argues the foreign policy of each state is defined by their identity and the ideas that are constructed through relations with other states. In this sense, Turkey foreign development assistance globally or specifically, mostly goes to the Muslim majority countries and, more important were in the realm of the Ottoman Empire. As seen clearly in the figure the Turkey’s development assistance given in between these years, the Muslim majority countries in the world were granted the highest quota of the development budget, as it can be shown by the TİKA’s report Syria, Somalia, Albania, Afghanistan, and Niger were given the most part of the granted development assistance, in other words, identity plays a very vital role for the distribution of Ankara development assistance. The Turkish Development Assistance targeted different countries and applied in a different sector. For instance, Turkey’s Total Development Assistance (TDA) for 2015 has amounted to a total of 5.105 billion USD. This development assistance, which went to over 150 countries, and basically all those projects were implemented at the request of the recipient countries. In fact, it’s one of the factors that most of the recipient countries are acknowledging the Turkish Assistance Model. It was provided by Turkish NGOs and private establishments, and by over 70 Turkish public bodies under the principles of the authentic Turkish Development Assistance Model (TİKA Report, 2105). In fact, “Turkey provided the largest share of its bilateral development co-operation to Syria, Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, Albania and Afghanistan. The main sectors for Turkey’s bilateral development co-operation were humanitarian aid and refuge support, governance and civil society, education, health and population” (OECD, 2017). As İbrahim Kalin (2011) argued that

“the key factor that defines a Turkey’s soft power capacity is its political system. The most important among those elements which pave the way for a country to achieve a soft power status and make it a centre for attraction is a political system which prioritizes freedoms and liberties, guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms, and which is also just, transparent and democratic. In this regard, one of the main pillars of Turkey’s soft power is its democratic experience. Despite the ups and downs in its history, the strengthening of Turkish democracy and its gaining of legitimacy among the public play a significant role in Turkey’s position as a regional and global actor. For instance, the “Arab Spring” which began with popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 highlighted Turkey’s democratic experience in the Middle East. Turkey’s democratization efforts and success in economic development have been an inspiration for the newly emerging social and political movements in the Arab world”.

Kalin (2011) also argues that

“Turkey’s soft power is different from that of other countries in its form and content. Turkey’s soft power potential, which extends from the Balkans and the Middle East to inner parts of Central Asia, emerges from the cultural and historical experience it has inherited. The values Turkey represents, as well as its history and cultural depth, have mobilized regional dynamics and provided opportunities for the creation of new spheres of influence. In the larger Euro-Asian landmass, the common denominator for Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Abkhazians, Arabs, Azeris, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Turkmens and other ethnic groups, as well as Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Assyrian communities is the Ottoman experience they have shared and built together. It is this Ottoman heritage that brings together these diverse groups and enables them to relate to a shared experience in time and place. Today, Turkey represents the pivotal point of this heritage. This is not a new imperial adventure, termed by some as “NeoOttomanism.” Rather, this is a process whereby Turkey’s new geopolitical imagination and the new possibilities in the global political system allow the people of the region to reconcile with their history and geography. Remembering this experience plays an



important role in defining the spheres of soft power in Turkey” (Bilgin, Elis, Beng, Altunışık and Altınay, 2008).²³⁹

2. COMMON HISTORICAL RELATIONS

3.1 Advent of Islam in the South Asian Region: Islam reaches in Indian region at the early time of the advent of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. It is well known that there was a business relationship between Indians and Arabians with contact between Malay and Chinese. As Chittagong was the famous and strategic port in the region for the business, the presence of Arabians was familiar there at that time. In 627, the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) came in the region first (Ahmed, 1999: 20) and involved them in spreading Islam. Later on, the war between Muslims and local leaders indicates the strength and the growing position of the Muslim. On the other side, a good number of Turk (from the Turkic nation. It includes central Asian Turks too) saints, preachers and Alim started coming to this region for the cause of religious duty, spreading Islam by 10-12th centuries. Among them, Shah Muhammad Balkhi, Shah Muhammad Sultan Rumi, Shah Makhdum (Ahmed, 1999: 23-24) are famous. Hazrat Shah Jalal (R.) (1246-1346), a famous preacher from Turkish origin (born in Konya, a famous city of Turkey), also came in this region.

3.2 Khilafat²⁴⁰ Movement and the Relations between Turkey and South Asian Region: Although this region was under British rule but it's normally trying to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Empire. Taking part in a medical mission during the Balkan war is a clear example. Ismail Hossain Siraji took part as the representative of Bengal in the Indian medical team headed by Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari. The team arrived in Istanbul on 9 January 1913 and was known as El vefdel tibbi min bilad-el Hind and organized by the Indian Red Crescent society of Delhi. Siraji played the role of sending news of the Turks to 'Su Provat' and 'Mohammadi'. Returning from Turkey, he wrote a Bengali book 'Turaska Bharaman' or 'Travels in Turkey'. Siraji got excited observing the Muslim civilization of this region and the status of women. He gave a pen picture of his war experiences and depicted the condition of the Muslim army fighting in the Balkan wars (Rahman, 2014: 283). He was entitled to 'Gazi' by the Sultan before his return. During the First World War Indian government pressurized upon the Pan-Islamic leaders and Newspapers that are publishing news on behalf of the Muslim community. 'The Mussalman', a newspaper was forfeited for its editorial, entitled as 'England, Turkey, and Indian Mussalman'. The Government noticed to Maulavi Mujibur Rahman, the editor of 'The Mussalman' with the order of depositing fresh security, and pre-censorship of its editorials. But it continued publishing news in favor of Devlet-i Aliyye (Ottoman Empire). It is evident that the Muslim masses supported Devlet-i Aliyye, but the government servicemen, army men, etc. favored the policy of the British government. The Muslim army of India was more loyal than any group even against the pull of the religion. As Bengal troops were the central concern of British Indian troops, it had to play an essential role in the British force. It was sent in East Africa, Gallipoli, Salonica, Egypt and Palestine. Needless to say, sometimes, the Indian Muslim soldiers refused to fight against Muslims. In 1916, the Indian Muslim soldiers of 15 battalions mutinied in Basra and refused to march against the Turks. Not only that, in 1915, the Muslim soldiers, including the Hindus and Sikhs, who were in Singapore, opposed the British interests and eventually revolted, abiding by the fatwa of Sultan Mehmed V (Qureshi, 1999: 309).

3.3 Rise and Dimensions of Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movement: The defeat of Turkey in the First World War and the division of its territories under the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) among European powers made apprehensions in India over the Khalifa's custodianship of the holy places of Islam. Accordingly, "the Khilafat Movement was launched to protect the Turkish Khalifa and to save his empire

²³⁹ For the concept of soft power in international literature and its meaning for Turkey, see the essays by Bilgin, Elis, Beng, Altunışık and Altınay in the special soft power issue of Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April-June 2008).

²⁴⁰ The word 'Khilafat' comes from Khalifah an Arabic word, means one who comes after, a successor. For further information of Khilafat see T.W.Arnold, The Caliphate (Karachi: Oxford University Press, n.d)



from dismemberment by Great Britain and other European powers. The Ali brothers, Muhammad Ali and Shawkat Ali, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. MA Ansari, and Hasrat Mohani, commenced the Movement. Khilafat Conferences were organized in several cities in northern India. A Central Khilafat Committee, with provisions for provincial branches, was constituted at Bombay. And Seth Chotani, a wealthy merchant, was selected as its President, and Shawkat Ali as its Secretary. In 1920 the Ali Brothers produced the Khilafat Manifesto. The Central Khilafat Committee started collecting a fund to help the Nationalist Movement in Turkey and to organize the Khilafat Movement at home” (www.indhistory.com).

“Contemporaneously, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi led his non-violent nationalist movement against the government. Like, the Rowlatt Act of 1919 and the Jalian Wallah Bagh Massacres of April 1919. To get Muslim support in his movement, Gandhi supported the Khilafat cause and became a member of the Central Khilafat Committee and linked Indian National Congress with the both issue of Self-Government and Khilafat demands. And he adopted the non-cooperation plan to attain the twin objectives” (Ahmed, 2014). By mid-1920 the Khilafat leaders had made Hindus and Muslims in a united front against British rule in India. It was also supported by the Muslim theologians of the Jamiyat-al Ulama-i-Hind.

“The first stirring in favor of the Khilafat Movement in Bengal was seen on 30 December 1918 at the 11th Session of the All India Muslim League held in Delhi. AK Fazlul Huq first raised his voice against the attitude of Britain and her allies engaged in dividing and distributing Ottoman territories. When the Paris Peace Conference (1919) confirmed these apprehensions, Bengali Khilafat leaders held a public meeting in Calcutta on 9 February 1919 to gather public support to meet the goal” (www.indhistory.com).

In Bengal, the Khilafat-Non-Cooperation Movement (1918 to 1924) became a mass movement from village to city in which both Muslims and Hindus participated. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad propagated Khilafat ideas in rural Bengal. In the beginning stage, the movement was popularized by many Bengali leaders such as Maulana Akram Khan, Mujibur Rahman Khan and others. Maulana Akram Khan and Maniruzzaman Islambadi toured Bengal and organized Khilafat meetings, particularly in Dhaka and Chittagong. In an article Asahojogita-o-Amader Kartabya (non-cooperation and our obligation), Maniruzzaman Islambadi declared that to protect Khilafat and to acquire Swaraj was the sacred duty of every Indian to support these ideas. The agenda of the movement were followed by the people, mostly by the Muslims. Such as, prayers were offered in at different Masjids, shops were closed in the demanded time, public meetings were held all over the Bengal (Ahmed, 2014), British goods were boycotted at a large scale, a policy of non-cooperation with the government were adopted in many positions, boycotting educational institutions and legislative councils etc. Not only that Bengal representation was everywhere from central to rural. Even the Khilafat committee was formed all over the Bengal. In March 1920 a Khilafat delegation led by Maulana Muhammad Ali went to England to plead for the Khilafat cause. Abul Kasem represented Bengal in this delegation (Qureshi, 1974: 229-230). Numerous Khilafat meetings were held in Dhaka and Chittagong with the largest one in Tangail. It was the first significant anti-British mass movement in which Hindus and Muslims participated with equal conviction. The media, both Muslim and Hindu, played a vital role in popularizing the movement. 'Mohammadi', 'Al-Eslam' and 'The Mussalman' were publications that deserve to be mentioned. The Khilafat Movement prompted a Muslim political consciousness that reverberated throughout Bengal under the leadership of Maulana Azad, Akram Khan, Maniruzzaman Islambadi, Bipin Chandra Pal and others. Visibly shaken by the popularity of the Movement, the Government of Bengal declared the activities of the Khilafat and Congress volunteers illegal on 19 November 1921. Government officers raided Khilafat offices, confiscated documents and papers, banned meetings, and arrested its leaders like, Maulana Azad, CR Das, Akram Khan, Ambika Prasad and others. Though the Khilafat movement ended abruptly provided an opportunity to throw up a new Mofassil based leadership which played a key role in introducing a coherent self-assertive political identity for Bengali. A good number of leaders from different parts of Bengal played an important role. Like, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani originally from Pabna (but later settled in Tangail), Zahiruddin Tarafdar (Mymensingh), Abul Mansur Ahmed (Mymensingh), Abul Kalam Shamsuddin (Mymensingh), Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish (Pabna), Habibur Rahman Chowdhury (Comilla), Ashrafuddin Ahmed Chowdhury (Comilla) and others from Chittagong, Faridpur, Barisal, Bhola, Pirojpur,



Noakhali, Bogra, Gaibandha, Dinajpur, Burdwan, Rangpur, Khulna, Kushtia, Jessore, etc. However, the movement's objectives suffered a setback because of the Hijrat to Afghanistan in 1920 of about 18,000 Muslim peasants and the idea that India was Dar-ul-Harb came to light. Moreover, the Moplah rebellion in South India in August 1921 and the Chauri-Chaura incident in February 1922 in the United Provinces where a violent mob set fire to a police station caused the killing of twenty-two policemen. "Soon after Gandhi called off the Non-cooperation movement leaving Khilafat leaders with a feeling of betrayal" (www.indhistory.com). And it shocked more by the policies taken by the Turks, the abolition of Sultanate and Khilafat respectively (Bomford, 1925).

3.4 Role of Ulema Deoband and Farangi Mahal: The role of "Ulema Deoband"²⁴¹ and "Farangi Mahal"²⁴² at the Time of Balcan War in 1912 as like Collected funds and dispatched medical missions under Doctor Ansari for medical assistance to the Turkish victim of War and to help the Turkish Red-Crescent in looking after the wounded soldiers. In November 1911, Ali Brothers (Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali) along with Aligarh students opened a relief fund and started collecting money for the Turkish people. They also founded Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'aba (Society for the Servants of Ka'aba) by Abdul Bari in 1913 after defeating in Balkan War where the main objects of this organization were included-

- a) The first to be given to Turkey to maintain the dignity and political independence of the sacred places.
- b) The second to be given to Islamic Schools, Orphanages and missionary societies.
- c) And the third reserved for the future defense of the Kaa'ba

3.5 Role of All India Muslim League and Joint Movement in South Asia: WWI defeated Turkey caused grave concern for Indian Muslims. That's why Indian Muslims to start a joint Movement for protecting Khilafat (Ottoman Empire). As the first effort, to mobilize the support of the Khilafat 'on 20 March 1919, a public, a meeting of 15,000 Indian Muslims was held in Bombay. This meeting set up a local organization named as Majlis-i-Khilafat or Bombay Khilafat committee'. The meeting asked the 'Indian government to make sure that Constantinople (Istanbul) would remain in Turkish hands. On 17 October 1919, the Committee observed the Khilafat Day. On this day, the Muslims all over India suspended their business, kept fast and offered prayers. On 23 November the Khilafat Conference held its first session at Delhi under the chairmanship of A.K.Fazl-ul-Haq where boycott British goods and will non-cooperate with the government was adopted on the advice of Gandhi. Gandhi had displayed his sympathy for the cause of Turkey as early as 1918 because he thought that 'such an opportunity of winning over the Muslims and forging the unity of Indian people to fight the British would not come in a hundred years' (Bomford, 1925). All India Muslim League called for an All India Muslim Conference (AIMC) protested at the

"...separation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia from the Ottoman Empire, as they explained that Khilafat was bound with the temporal power of Turkish Sultan and the division of Ottoman Empires was regarded by the Indian Muslims as an assault upon their religion. They also objected to the internationalization of Constantinople and the partition of Thrace" (Qureshi, 1974). The Muslim League at its Amritsar session in December 1919 included that the Ottoman Sultan as a successor of Prophet (PBUH) and head of Islam. "If

²⁴¹ The Darul Uloom Deoband is the Darul uloom Islamic school in India where the Deobandi Islamic movement began. It is located at Deoband, a town in Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh. The school was founded in 1866 by the ulema (Islamic scholars) from Indian subcontinent (wikipedia.org).

²⁴² Dar al-'Ulum Farangi Mahal came into existence in 1693. It was founded by Mulla Nizam al-Din Sihalwi (d. 1748) and was a direct descendent of the Farangi Mahal family of Lucknow. He was responsible for evolving the syllabus of that educational institution and as a result, the curriculum of studies was named after him, i.e. Dars Nizami (Desai, Ziyauddin A. Centres of Islamic Learning in India. Simla. Government Press. 1978. p. 27). This curriculum came to be implemented in practically every Muslim religious institutions in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent and in other parts of the world, including South Africa. Dar al-'Ulum Farangi Mahal was noted for the training of qadis (judges), muftis (those competent to issue legal opinions) and other legal officials that were, from time to time, required in Muslim courts. Thus Dar al-'Ulum Farangi Mahal succeeded in filling the void in Islamic scholarship which existed after the displacement of religious centres in Delhi (ibid, p. 14).



Great Britain becomes a party in reducing HIM the Sultan of Turkey as the Khalifa of the Muslim world to the status of a pretty sovereign, the reaction in India will be colossal and abiding”- (Muhammad Ali Jinnahin 4 September 1919)

3.6 Humanitarian Role of South Asian Muslims: The Khilafat Committee send Khilafat delegation team to England, France and Italy in January, February and March 1920 to preserve the pre-war territorial status and to gather support for Turkey. On 28 May 1920 the delegation sent an appeal to the Sultan of Turkey not to accept the peace terms divided Arab region then there was Hijrat Movement in April 1920 to break out the British rule from India to Afghanistan even when Ottoman Empire had fallen and the rise of Mustafa Kemal, the Khilafat Movement from India gave Mustafa Kemal a title of Saif-al-Islam (the Sward of Islam) just for showing their love to Ottomans. However, abolishing Khilafat System on 1 March 1924 and shocking news for Indian Muslims and divided between Indian Muslims reaction towards Turks



“Khilafat Movement Receipt”

Source: Symes (2014)



“Khilafat Movement Receipt”²⁴³

²⁴³ See Symes (2014) ...“Although the images depicted here have an appearance of a banknote, they are the front and back of a one-rupee receipt issued in 1920 by the Khilafat Committee in Calcutta. Because it is not always understood this is a receipt for a



Source: Symes (2014)

3.7 The Abolition of Khilafat and Conclusion of the Movement: The Khilafat leaders received a final and deadly blow from the Turks themselves when Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal abolished the Sultanate in November 1922 and transformed Turkey into a Republic in October 1923 with the abolition of the Khilafat in March 1924. By 1924 the Khilafat Movement had become devoid of any consequence and significance and met its end. After the abolition of Khilafat, the Indian Muslim reacted in two ways, first, generally they were shocked heavily as they were leading movement in favor of Turks. They simultaneously expressed their anger. A good number of Bengali Muslim leaders condemned Mustafa Kamal for his activities and regarded him as disbeliever and non-Muslim. AK Fazlul Huq criticized him tremendously as irresponsible, an enemy of Islam, atheist, etc. (Faruq, 2007: 41). Secondly, there was a relation between the two regions' leaders, Mustafa Kamal and Indians. Mustafa Kamal informed them of the reality and the demand of time is the formation of the Turkish Republic rather than continuity of Khilafat system (Arnold, 1924). Not only that, but Khalifa was also under the influence of the British until the victory of the Turkish Independence War. And after the abolition of the Sultanate in November 1922, Khalifa became powerless like a pope of Christianity, it was unexpected. At that time there was the only option, what was introduced by Mustafa Kamal, the Turkish Republic, was a brave and inspiring decision for the Muslims of a different part of the world (Minault, 1982: 23).

3.8 Roots of Turkey's Influence on Society and Culture of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh:

During the 1st phase of the 20th-century Indian region was under the British colony, and it was demanding self-government rights from the British Government of India. On the other side, Devlet-i Aliyye (Ottoman Empire) was in great chaos and problems, both from internal and foreign sides, with the defeat in the First World War. The state faced new dimensions in the socio-political arena when it was transformed from a Khilafat to a Republic with major social reforms. In the Independence war, the Muslims of India, in general, mainly Bengali Muslims, collected funds and sent it to their Turk Muslim brothers. A picture of the influences of Turks is discussed below.

3.8.1. Cultural Impacts: Devlet-i Aliyye became the central concern for the South Asian Muslims for centuries. When Turkish Islamic tradition demolished by the reforms of Mustafa Kamal, Muslims all over the world, mainly Indian Muslims were disappointed as they followed Turkish people as their model, however, Turkish nation was regarded as a "God-gifted nation" for their victory against British and French allied forces (Faruq, 2007).

3.8.2. Ideological Influence: The Turkish Republic was the first republic in Islamic history. The fall of Istanbul and Izmir made the Muslim world disillusioned. When the Ottoman Military under the leadership of Mustafa Kamal reclaimed the cities, the Muslim world, mostly Indian Muslims as they were under the British, inspired more to raise their voice against the colonial power and started taking policies to get their rights and freedom from British colonialism in collective ways such as collective movement and protest, looting arms and offices, attacking on British soldiers, etc.

3.8.3. Influence on Society and Literature: As Muslims of the South Asian region were under the oppression of the British, they expected a leader for themselves like Mustafa Kamal, who can protect them from the British colonial rule. In doing so, Muslims in South Asia liked to name their child as like Mostafa

donation, examples of the receipt are occasionally found in bank note dealers' stock, as they can be mistaken as a local currency issue. They are particularly confusing to collectors as the text on the notes appears to be Arabic and the image of the Ka'aba within the Holy Mosque in Mecca suggest the receipts originate from the Arab world. In fact, the text on the notes is written in English, Arabic and Urdu, and the receipts are entirely of Indian origin"



Kamal. ‘Turk Cap’ or ‘Fez Cap’ was being regarded as the sign of the elite symbols, however, as it was banned in Turkey, Muslims in South Asia stopped to use it, in there, a new version, ‘Kamali cap’, which was introduced newly in Turkey was introduced an elite symbol to the Muslims of South Asia. In addition, in 1981, two avenues of Banani in the capital city of Bangladesh and another avenue of Chittagong was named as the ‘Kamal Atatürk Avenue’. In literature, especially within the ’20-’30s of the 20th century, South Asian literatures took the inspiration from the Turkish Cultural revolution. Kamal, with other Turkish heroes, became the subjects of almost all writings in South Asia. Abdul Kadir (b. 1906) wrote a poem describing Mustafa Kamal as a hope of a defeated nation and an inspiration to lighten Islam again etc. (Hoque, 2013). Dilip Das Gupta, a Hindu poet, wrote mentioning, Kamal, “you are not the pride of the Muslim only but for the whole world”. Poet Muksed Ali and other a good number of other poets wrote poems on Turkish and their heroes. Kazi Nazrul Islam, a national poet of Bangladesh, wrote ‘Kamal Pasha’ poem to dedicated to the Gazi Mustafa Kamal, some sentences in Turkish alike-

“Brother Kemal, the desperate son of a frenzied mother
Has gone furious; so, the devils' dens are full of hue and cry
Looking for self-protection everywhere;
Kemal, what a wonder you've worked!
Ho Ho Kemal, what a wonder you've worked!”

(Ey kahırlı ananın yiğit oğlu
Kemal kardeş!
Kararlıydı, kararlı ve kızgın
Düşman siperlerinde bir telaş bir bozgun
Canını kurtarmak beyhude oyun
Harikalar yarattın sen kemal, harikalar
harikalar yarattın sen kemal kardeş, harikalar

Hurra hey! Hurra ho!) (Davaz, 2000: 79)

This poem was written in October 1921 when Nazrul was the young age of 22 only. Principal Ibrahim Khan (1894-1978) praised the Turks writing drama naming ‘Kamal Pasha’, and ‘Anowar Pasha.’ Poet Ismail Hossen Siraji wrote on ‘Khilafat’, Turkey Tour, Divine Mustafa Kamal Pasha, as what shows the roots of Turkish influences in the South Asia.

3.8.4. Influence upon Education: Different educational institutions were started establishing by the name of Kamal. In 1939, a high school was established named ‘Ataturk High School’ in Feni, Bangladesh. As the founder of the school, Mizanur Rahman said

‘...the students of the school ...let them draw inspiration from the life-story of the great man after whom the School is named. Let me, hope as ‘Ataturk High School’ will succeed in producing as ‘Ataturks’ in miniature for the land we live in’ (Rahman M., 1989)

A junior Madrasah named ‘Ataturk Junior Madrasah’ was established at Zamalpur of Mymensingh District.



3. TURKISH COMMON AREAS OF COOPERATION AND SOFT POWER POLICY WITH INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH




Figure 1: Common Areas for Turkish Bilateral Relations with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

5. SOFT POWER POLICY AND TURKEY-INDIA BILATERAL RELATIONS

5.1 Turkish-India Recent Issue of Joint Collaboration: From a regional perspective, Turkey had not evolved an active South Asian policy as long as it remained a West-centric country until a centrist Prime Minister from the Motherland Party Turgut Ozal Turkey undertook an active foreign policy. As he professed his conviction that Turkey “should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy”, he became the first Prime Minister to visit India in 1986. As Ozal himself was a centrist and had run as a candidate from an Islamic party, his policies were widely respected by a large constituency of the Turkish society including the seculars, Islamists, and nationalists. In exploring an active foreign policy and looking towards Asia, Turkey faced a major dilemma of choosing between India and Pakistan; both had fought two wars on their dispute over Kashmir (Anas, 2017: 2). The following figure will show the recent issues of India-Turkey for collaboration.




Figure 2: Turkey and India Joint Collaborations



Additionally, there are three issues which have been dominating the public discourse of India-Turkey relations: Turkey’s growing vocal support to Pakistan on Kashmir issue, Turkey’s position on India’s membership at NSG as well as in the United Nations Security Council and third, Turkey’s role in India’s immediate and extended neighborhood, which includes Afghanistan and West Asia (Anas, 2017: 3).

5.2 Turkey-India Bilateral Trade Relations: The total trade volume between India and Turkey had steadily declined from 7 billion in 2014 to 6 billion in 2015 and 2016. The above-mentioned corrective measures, normalization with Russia and Israel, the peace process in Syria, taken by the Turkish government will likely help India-Turkey trade. To bring back trade relations and to bridge the deficit gap, Turkey is actively seeking Free Trade Agreement and now a Comprehensive Economic Partnership to achieve the target of 15 billion bilateral trade and bridge the trade deficit (Anas, 2017: 4).

Year	Export (Million)	Import (Billion)	Volume	Balance
2007	348.229	2.299.732	2.647.961	- 1.951.50
2011	756.082	6.498.651	7.254.733	- 5.742.57
2014	586.589	6.898.575	7.485.164	- 6.311.98
2015	650,424	5.613,217	6.263,641	- 4.962.79
2016 (September)	613.94	2287.29	2901.23	
Gold, metalliferous ores and metal scrap, crude fertilizers and crude minerals, non-ferrous metals, power-generating machinery and equipment		Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials, textile yarn and related products, plastics in primary forms), organic chemicals, road vehicles		

Source: Foreign Ministry, Republic of Turkey and bilateral-trade-report/turkey

Table 1: Turkey-India Bilateral Trade

5.3 Common Perspective: For broader regional cooperation which includes security and stability of the Persian Gulf, North Africa, Afghanistan where the two countries are ambitious to expand their trade ties, they need to explore the ways to cooperate regional security even in recent years, both sides have exchanged crucial intelligence on counterterrorism particularly about the ISIS in Syria and Iraq and worldwide. Literally, in 2008, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, had agreed to enhance cooperation between the two defence forces and President Pranab Mukharjee and President Abdullah Gul also "agreed to enhance cooperation between two defence forces through military-to-military contacts and training exchanges" according to an interview President Mukharjee gave to the Turkish news agency Cihan during his visit in October 2013. Turkey no longer wants to remain dependent on NATO for its security and is looking to diversify its security arrangements by engaging more with China, Russia, and Pakistan. Turkey’s total military export has increased from 70 million USD in 1999 to one billion in 2014 aiming for a defence export worth \$25 billion by 2023. Turkey’s defence companies are going global to produce small weapons and military equipment. If this is the upcoming template of Turkey’s South Asia vision, India and Turkey need to intensify their over-all interaction and maximize mutual interests. Although Indians are closely observing Turkey’s deepening military ties with Pakistan and China with whom Turkey had once attempted to purchase a long-range missile defence system from China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation in 2013, then vetoed by Turkey’s NATO allies (Anas, 2017). India is already among the biggest economies of the world, having integrated into the global economy and its relations with Turkey are important for India’s trade expansion globally reaching Central Asia, Europe, and West Asian countries. Both countries have started heavily investing in research and development, their cooperation in related areas of research and development will be beneficial for both sides and in some cases, India’s emerging research workforce may help Turkey’s research industry. Both India and Turkey have seen growth in their economy mostly in the service sector and



both are committed to becoming self-dependent in critical areas of technology, defence, and science. Most importantly, Turkey is very keen to attract Indian visitors to Turkey. In 2015, there were 130,000 Indian tourists to Turkey and Turkish tourism expects more arrivals. To this end, Turkish airlines and Air India have already signed a Free Sale Codeshare Agreement which allows both the airlines to market each other's flights by their code and flight numbers on a free sale basis.

6. SOFT POWER POLICY and TURKEY-PAKISTAN BILATERAL RELATIONS

The 15th meeting of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) between Turkey and Pakistan was held between October 15-16, 2014 in Ankara to hold a good tie between Turkey and Pakistan for increasing the bilateral relations. In Pakistan, more than 100 firms are operating by Turkish companies. Turkish investments are mainly focused on energy, finance, infrastructure projects and contracting sectors. Construction is the leading sector for Turkish investors in Pakistan. Since the early 1990's the total amount of projects completed or undertaken by Turkish contractors (45 projects) exceeds 2.7 billion (Turkish Ministry Foreign Affairs, 2017). Additionally, in Turkey, there are also more than 100 Pakistani firms operating by Pakistani companies. They are mainly focused on electronics, telecommunications, machines, trade and banking.

6.1 Turkey-Pakistan Economic and Trade Relations: Turkey and Pakistan both have very relations on the level of business purposes. The main export items of Turkey to Pakistan as like communication tools, cameras, radars, machines, various goods. On the other hand, the main import items of Turkey from Pakistan as like textile fiber, plastic, cotton, polyester, and clothing. The following table 2 shows the present economy of Pakistan in 2016.

GDP (billion \$)	269	Inflation Rate (%)	8.6
Real GDP Growth Rate	4.5	Unemployment Rate (%)	6
Population (million)	185.1	Exports (billion \$)	23
Population Growth Rate (%)	...	Imports (billion \$)	43
GDP Per Capita (USD)	1513	Turkish Firms in the Country	100~

Source: Turkish Embassy in Islamabad, Ministry of Economy, EIU, World Bank

Table 2: Economy of Pakistan (2016)

6.2 Bilateral Economic and Commercial Relations

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Export	248	214	276	286	259	289.1	347
Import	750	873	555	436	436	310.5	263
Volume	998	1.087	831	722	695	599.6	610
Balance	-502	-659	-279	-150	-177	-21.4	84

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)

Table 3: Bilateral Trade (million USD) between Turkey and Pakistan

6.3 Pakistani Tourists in Turkey: Although the number of Pakistani tourists visiting Turkey has increased during the past few years, the number is still below the desirable level. In 2014, 29.352, in 2015 59.700 Pakistani citizens visited Turkey (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).



6.4 Turkish Development Assistance to Pakistan: Turkey has been providing development aid to Pakistan since 2004. The total amount of “Official Development Aid” allocated to Pakistan between 2004-2013 reached to 724.48 million USD. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has been operative in Pakistan since 2010 in order to administer civilian development aid. Turkey and Pakistan are working to conclude a Free Trade Agreement between two countries (MFA, Turkey, 2017).

6.5 Political and Diplomatic Relations: Fraternal ties, as one of the prominent players for the security and stability of the region of South Asia particularly, have high-level strategic cooperation. The High-Level cooperation council signed 51 agreements and documents. Turkey and Pakistan are supporting each other in all international platforms. Most recently, Pakistan's role to combat FETO's governed school in Pakistan on a recent failed coup attempt by FETO's was very much appreciated by the Turkish government.

6.6 Preferential Trade Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA): Turkey and Pakistan are working to conclude the process of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The last FTA negotiations were held in Islamabad on 29-31 August 2016. Turkey is a special trading partner for Pakistan.

- The strong political will that facilitates the strengthening of economic cooperation
- Pakistan has been enjoying a strong trade surplus which can be expanded
- Strong export similarities and intra industry trade providing opportunities for firm synergies. Scope for technology transfers and moving up the value chain
- Turkey may be exploited as a gateway to expand further in the European market and Central Asian Republics

Additionally, it is an opportunity Pakistan should pursue more rigorously where they can expect direct gains given the trade surplus. Pakistan expected indirect gains given the opportunity for firm synergies where they can give the present trade structures and volumes. More importantly, it should be remembered Pakistan needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Pakistan. The need of the hour thus is to leverage this trade agreement in such a way that Pakistan can maximize its potential in its best interest.

6.7 Pakistan-Turkey Defense Cooperation is a Smart Policy of Turkey: As part of the efforts to transform existing collaboration in the field of defence industry into a strategic partnership, Pakistan and Turkey concluded three important documents. These documents were signed in the presence of Minister for Defence Production of Pakistan Rana Tanveer Hussain and Minister for National Defence of Turkey, Fikri Isik on the sidelines of the 13th International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF) 2017, being held in Istanbul from May 9-12. Firstly, the two sides signed the contract for the sale of Pakistan's 52 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) would supply these aircraft to the Turkish Air Force. The contract was signed by Chairman PAC Air Marshal Arshad Malik and Turkish Under-Secretary SSM Prof. Dr. Ismail Demir. It may be recalled that Letter of Intent (LoI) with Turkey for the sale of this aircraft was signed on November 22 during the International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) held in Karachi from Nov 22-25, 2016 in the presence of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Secondly, the two countries signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) on the four MILGEM Ada class corvettes project. The LoI was signed on the Pakistan side by Secretary, Defence Production, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Owais; Under-Secretary SSM Prof. Dr. Ismail Demir signed on behalf of Turkey. The third document was signed between Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for collaboration in the aviation field. These agreements would further intensify bilateral defence industry collaboration which was growing and could be further expanded through concerted efforts (The Nation Newspaper, 2017).

7. SOFT POWER POLICY and TURKEY-BANGLADESH BILATERAL RELATIONS'

7.1 Political and Diplomatic Relations as a Tool of Soft Power Policy: Relations between Turkish and Bengali nations have strong historical and cultural roots dating back before the foundation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Muslims of South Asia including the Bengalis had supported the Turkish War



of Independence. The respect and admiration for Atatürk is reflected in the epic poem “Kamal Pasha”, written by Kazi Nazrul Islam, National Poet of Bangladesh, in 1921. This poem has been on the curriculum in Bangladesh schools. Besides, one major avenue in Dhaka and another one in Chittagong have been named “Kemal Atatürk Avenue”. Furthermore, a high school in Dagan Bhuiyan, in Feni and a Turkish language center in Dhaka Cantonment were named as “Atatürk Model High School” and “Mustafa Kemal Turkish Language Center”. In the same vein, the support of the Bengal people during the Turkish War of Independence is still remembered with gratitude by the Turkish people. Finally, the second busiest airport in Bangladesh, formerly known as “Sylhet Airport” was renamed as Shahjalal International Airport to honor Hazrat Shah Jalal, one of the students of Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi from Konya. Turkey recognized Bangladesh on 22 February 1974 on the occasion of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) Summit which was held in Lahore. The Turkish Embassy in Dhakka was opened in 1976 and the Embassy of Bangladesh in Ankara in 1981. Relations between Turkey and Bangladesh intensified and the perception about Turkey in Bangladesh has been further consolidated with the last official visits of President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Bangladesh on 12-13 February 2010 and 13-14 November 2010 respectively. The last official visit at the Presidential level from Bangladesh to Turkey was paid by the late President Zillur Rahman on 7-10 November 2009, upon the invitation by President Abdullah Gül to participate in the Special Summit of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (COMCEC) in Istanbul on the occasion of COMCEC’s 25th Anniversary. Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, accompanied by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dipu Moni paid a visit to Turkey to participate in the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries which took place in İstanbul on 9-13 May 2011. Prime Minister Hasina also paid an official visit to Turkey on 10-13 April 2012 upon the invitation of Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan to increase the bilateral relations between Turkey and Bangladesh.

7.2 Turkish-Bangladesh Economic and Trade Relations:

GNDP (billion \$)	174
GNDP Growth Rate (%)	6,1
Population(million)	159.1
GNDP Per Capita (\$)	1161.8
Inflation Rate (%)	6.41
Unemployment rate (%)	4,7
Exports(fob-billion \$)	31,21
Imports(fob-billion \$)	37,42

Source: Turkish Embassy in Dhakka, EIU, World factbook

Table 4: Main Economic Indicators of Bangladesh

The primary commodities exported to Bangladesh from Turkey are Iron and steel construction material, cotton, milk and milk products, machines and their components, textile machinery, generators. On the other hand, the primary commodities imported from Bangladesh to Turkey are Jute yarns & twine, Jute manufacturers knitwear, woven garments, leather, and ceramics. The following figure shows the development of Turkish and Bangladesh trade relations.

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Exports from Turkey	135	170	132	214	195	196	180	264
Imports from Banhladesh	524	845	896	766	1.004	767	934	881
Trade Volume	659	1.015	1.028	980	1.199	963	1.114	1145
Trade Balance	-389	-675	-764	-522	-809	-571	-754	-623

Source: MFA, Turkey (2017)

Table 5: Figures of export, import, trade volume (million \$)



7.3 Soft Power Policy and Bilateral Cooperation Mechanisms: The last Joint Economic Commission Meeting (JEC) meeting between the two countries (4th period) was held in Dhaka on 11-12 November 2012 to increase the bilateral relations between the two countries. On the other hand, the Business Council, which was established in 2011, is working for business oriented issues. Additionally, there are some agreements on the agenda to maintain the bilateral trade relations between two countries, such as the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Bangladesh and Turkey is on the agenda. According to the information provided by the Central Bank of Bangladesh, net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Turkey in Bangladesh in the fiscal year 2015-2016 realized as 1.41 million USD, and as of June 2016, the total FDI stock in Bangladesh has been 11.9 million USD. According to the data of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, the FDI in Bangladesh is seen as zero (0). So, for ensuring good and significant trade and business relations, FDI is a vital tool where Bangladeshi authorities can ensure this to boost their business in the country of Turkey.

7.4 Development Assistance: Development assistance made by Turkey to Bangladesh between 2004-2014 is around 13 million USD. The significant part of the aid is in the area of education, health, and vocational training. TIKA Program Coordination Office has been operating in Bangladesh since 2014.

8. TURKEY'S ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA AS A MATTER OF SMART POWER POLICY FROM COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENTS

There are some areas where scholars are argued to discuss the Turkey soft power, smart power, hard power and bilateral relations with this region, particularly the three countries like Bangladesh, India and Pakistan on the following aspects.

8.1 Areas of Divergence

- Turkish Role over Arakan and Rohingya Refugees
- Turkish Role over Kashmir (Islam, 2016; Islam, 2019a and Islam, 2019b)
- Turkish Matrix Relations with Afghanistan, NATO, Central Asia, Russia, India and Pakistan
- Turkey Need Nuclear Assistance from Pakistan
- Democracy, Secularism, and Khilafat or Ummah Thought

8.1.1 Turkish Role over Arakan and Rohingya Issue: “The emerging humanitarian crisis that has been rocking Myanmar - where an estimated 600,000 Rohingya have been forced out of the country – has prompted broad international condemnation. But so far, it has translated into little concrete action” (UNHCR Report, 2017). United Nations (UN) human rights chief Zeid Raad Al Hussein has called the Rohingya’s plight a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” following a similar statement from UN Secretary-General António Guterres. While Western countries have been slow and hesitant to respond, leaders of Muslim-majority countries – particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan – have sought to place as much international pressure as possible on the Myanmar government.

“The strongest and most vocal response of all has come from Turkey. Indeed the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, appears to have appointed himself as the international voice of the Rohingya Muslims” (<http://theconversation.com>, 2017).

8.1.1.1 Turkey’s Aid Response as a Tool of Soft Power Policy: According to a Turkish government statement, “Erdoğan is the first one that managed to get permission for humanitarian aid to enter Myanmar. The Burmese government had, at the peak of the violence, blocked all UN aid towards the Rohingyas” (<http://theconversation.com>, 2017). And so, on September 7, Turkey’s foreign aid agency, TIKA, became the first foreign outfit to deliver an initial shipment of 1000 tons of basic foodstuffs and medicine to the conflict zone in Rakhine state, where the majority of Rohingyas live. Turkey simultaneously announced plans to



distribute humanitarian aid to the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh. The move was widely publicized as Emine Erdoğan, the Turkish president's wife, visited the camps at the same time.

8.1.1.2 Rohingya Issue as a Turkey's Soft Heart Humanitarian Policy: "Turkey has the world's largest refugee population since 2011" (Nyadera and Islam, 2020). Accordingly, they are pro-active towards refugee in any corner of the world. During a meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, Erdoğan as the current chief of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), formally condemned Myanmar's attitude towards Rohingyas, taking the lead on the topic on behalf of the organisation. He had previously called the ongoing violence genocide. Since the crisis broke on August 25, the Turkish president has taken several actions to gather Muslim leaders across the world to put pressure on the Myanmar government. On August 31, he spoke with the leaders of Mauritania, Pakistan, Iran and Qatar, urging them to join forces to find a way to stop the violence against the Rohingyas. Alongside Erdoğan, other Turkish politicians have addressed the issue. Remarks by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the foreign minister, garnered global attention. Mehmet Şimşek, deputy prime minister, even tweeted unrelated images to raise the point, creating a bit of an embarrassment, which proves that Turkey has a solid background to prove them as a humanitarian country in the world.

8.1.2 Turkish Role over Kashmir Issue: Kashmir is the issue where at least the perceptions of Turkey have started to diverge from those of Pakistan. Turkey has traditionally supported Pakistan's official standpoint on Kashmir, which says that a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir under the supervision of the UN should take place, as was specified in the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. Ankara still supports the UN option for a Kashmir settlement. Still, over the last few years, it has started to stress the importance of India-Pakistan bilateral talks in settling the issue. The difference of perception between the leaders of Pakistan and Turkey over Kashmir became clearer during Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's visit to India in March-April 2000. During the visit, Ecevit shared Indian concerns on the issue of "international terrorism" by pointing out that Turkey had itself been faced with this menace for a long time. Ecevit was sharply criticized in the Pakistani media for making these remarks. The only 'terrorism' that India faces is allegedly in the form of the Mujahideen crossing the LOC and taking part in the Kashmiri uprising against Indian forces. Pakistan officially maintains that it provides only "moral and diplomatic support to Kashmiri freedom fighters" and that the government of Pakistan does not control Mujahideen organizations based in Pakistan and operating in the "Indian-held Kashmir" (Shiekh & Yusufzai, 2000). Although in the recent visit of President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan to India was very much crucial for his called for a "multilateral dialogue" with Turkey's involvement to resolve the Kashmir issue where he offered to get involved in settling the issue such as he said-

"We should not allow more casualties to occur, and by strengthening multilateral dialogue, we can be involved, and through multilateral dialogue, I think we have to seek out ways to settle this question once and for all, which will benefit both countries," (Hindustan Times, 2017).

8.2 Areas of Convergence

- Strategic Relations towards Trade, Business, and Commercial
- More Private Investment and Development Aid
- Exchanging Scientific Knowledge and Information Technology
- Cultural Exchange such as Indian Film role vs. Turkish Serials (Ertugrul, Muhtesam

Yuz Yil vs. Bollywood films industry in Turkey such as 3-idiots, My Name is Khan)

CONCLUSION

"In every context, more cooperation rather than less is the best way to arrive at an unparalleled solution" (Islam, 2020). Turkey possesses essential resources and values unique to itself where Turkey's own international relations and priorities are based on its short, mid and long-term primary and secondary interests, and it will define soft power policy arena and strategies to its foreign policy vision. According to Ibrahim Kalin (2010), "the concept of soft power depends upon the "carrot and stick" dialectic of American power.



However, it is not always possible or even desirable to use the carrot-stick dialectic in the geopolitical environment of a country like Turkey. Instead, a new geopolitical imagination and a notion of shared memory, conscience, and cultural depth shape soft-power relations. Turkey's achievement of an adequate soft power status depends on its ability to mobilize these dynamics. As a result of the changes it has been going through, Turkey today has a 'new story' and a 'new narrative'.

The effective communication of soft power policy and strategy indicates that the new "Turkish story" is rising and emerging trust-able leadership position in the world, which can be only possible 'through the participation of Turkish soft power actors that function in the public, private and non-governmental sectors' where both soft and smart power tools, policies and strategies can be used in terms to achieve the realpolitik domestic and foreign policy interest of Turkey. Though, this kind of leadership position gives Turkey huge responsibilities and legitimacy for their public diplomacy maintenance, sustainability and long-term basis policy-making and strategy where Turkey will have national interest both from domestic and foreign policy arena and they can be part of those host countries policymaking and policy implementation process like other unilateral and multilateral countries doing to ensure their national interest and protecting their leadership legitimacy. Now, the world facing a leadership vacuum that demands the new world order and new leadership from economically, politically, and culturally where Turkey can fill up that leadership vacuum and write a new history for tomorrow's world.

Turkey has a shared interest in the stability and security with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. As it can be argued that "in every context, more cooperation rather than less is the best way to arrive at an unparalleled solution" (Islam, 2020). In light of the above, the possibility of improving relations between Turkey and this region is sound, particularly with India and Pakistan's emergence as a significant power with considerable influence on the world scene. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan's impressive economic growth and Pakistan and Indian's nuclear status have also attracted Turkish attention. Turkey has begun to view India and Pakistan as a possible source of high technology and a useful economic partner. It is to be noted that whoever would be from the land, especially Muslims, will be regarded as the grandchild of the Devlet-i Aliyye (Ottoman Empire) and will be followed in whatever they do.

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